TMI Blog2020 (1) TMI 651X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... esaid appeals by assessee for Quarter-1 to Quarter-4 of Assessment Year [in short referred to as AY ] 2014-15 contest common order of Ld. Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals)-59, Mumbai, [in short referred to as CIT(A) ], Appeal Nos. CIT(A) Mumbai-59/IT-218-221/TDS- 1/14-15 dated 14/05/2015. 2.1 The registry had noted a delay of as many as 634 days in filing of the appeals, the condonation of which was sought by the assessee during the course of hearing on 18/12/2019. Upon hearing rival contentions and after considering the factual matrix, the bench formed an opinion that delay was to be condoned, however, upon payment of cost of ₹ 5,000/- per appeal. The order, in this regard, was passed by the bench on the same day and the assessee was directed to pay the cost in the specified manner. 2.2 Accordingly, as directed in the order, the appeals were posted for final hearing today. The Ld. Authorized Representative for Assessee (AR), submitted that the aforesaid cost, as directed, has already been deposited by the assessee. The relevant challans have already been placed on the record. Finding the same in order, the matter was pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... - T.D.S., Ghaziabad-201 010, U.P. levying the late filing fees of ₹ 12280/- (26Q-4/FY; 2013-14) u/s. 234E of the act is also totally bad in law as the issue of empowering powers/authority to levy of the late filing fees under section 234E of the act under the provisions of section 200A of the I. T. Act, 1961 has been finally settled after making the amendments by way of inserting the substituted clauses (c) to (f) to section 200A by the amended Finance Act, 2015 w. e. f. 1st June, 2015 and not with any retrospective effect/date. Therefore, the Intimations passed u/s 200A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 prior to the date of amendment (1st June, 2015) are without any proper valid legal authority and are therefore totally improper, unjustified erroneous. It is quite evident from grounds of appeal that the assessee is aggrieved by imposition of fees u/s 234E for late filing of TDS returns which is to be computed @₹ 200/- for each day of default. 5.1 Facts on record would reveal that the assessee filed its e-TDS returns for 4 quarters of financial year 2013-14. The said returns were to be filed electronically in the prescribed manner as prov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cision of Hon ble Karnataka High Court rendered in Fatehraj Singhvi V/s Union of India (73 Taxmann.com 252 26/08/2016) for the said submissions. It was also submitted that this decision was followed by Mumbai Tribunal in several cases, few of which have already been enumerated in the impugned order. This decision of Hon ble Karnataka High Court was stated to be followed in by same court in its subsequent decision dated 12/12/2017 rendered in Writ Petition No. 618/2015 filed by Shree Ayappa Educational Charitable Trust . However, it was also pointed out that there was a conflicting decision by Hon ble Gujarat High Court in Rajesh Kourani V/s Union of India (297 CTR 502 20/06/2017) wherein it was held that Section 234E was a charging provision creating a charge for levy of fees for defaults in filing of TDS statements and the same could be levied even without a regulatory provision being found in Section 200A for computation of fees. In the above background, it was submitted that in case of conflicting judgement of two non-jurisdictional High Courts, the view favorable to the assessee should be taken in terms of the decision of Hon ble Supreme Court rendered in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve made submissions which shall be dealt with appropriately at the later stage. But, in order to appreciate the controversies including that of the background, certain aspects deserve to be taken note of which are as under: 8. As per Section 200(3) of the Act read with Rule 31A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules') a tax deductor is required to file quarterly statement of such taxes deducted at source by him as TDS and for the period in question, the relevant dates for filing of such statement is as follows: ( i ) 30th June - 15th July of the financial year; ( ii ) 30th September - 15th October of the financial year; ( iii ) 31st December - 15th January of the financial year; and ( iv ) 31st March - 15th May of the following financial year. 9. It may be recorded that Section 200(3) requiring to file formal TDS statement within the aforesaid each quarter was inserted on 1.4.2005 and at the relevant point of time, Section 272A(2)(k) provided for the penalty of ₹ 100/- per day for each day of default in filing TDS statemen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d and it reads as under: Penalty for failure to furnish statements, etc. 271H. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, [the Assessing Officer may direct that a person shall pay by way of] penalty, if, he- ( a ) fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed in subsection (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C; or ( b ) furnishes incorrect information in the statement which is required to be delivered or caused to be delivered under sub section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to subsection (3) of section 206C. (2) The penalty referred to in sub-section (1) shall be a sum which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, no penalty shall be levied for the failure referred to in clause ( a ) of sub-section (1), if the person proves that after paying tax deducted or collected along with the fee and interest, if any, to the credit of the Central Government, he had delivered o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the amount of refund due to, him under clause ( d ); and ( f ) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause ( d ) shall be granted to the deductor:] Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation. -For the purposes of this sub-section, an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement- ( i ) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement; ( ii ) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) For the purposes of processing of statements under sub-section (1), the Board may make a scheme for centralised processing of statements of tax deducted at source to expeditiously determine the tax payable by, or the refund due to, the deductor as required under the said sub-section. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he aforesaid contentions show that, Section 234E has come into force on 1.7.2012. Therefore, one may at the first blush say that, since Section 234E is a charging section for fee, the liability was generated or had accrued, if there was failure to deliver or cause to be delivered the statement/s of TDS within the prescribed time. But, in our view, Section 234E cannot be read in isolation and is required to be read with the mechanism and the mode provided for its enforcement. As observed by us hereinabove, when Section 234E was inserted in the Act simultaneously, Section 271H was also inserted in the Act providing for the penalty for failure of furnishing of statements etc. Therefore, if there was failure to submit the statement for TDS as per Section 234E, the fee payable is provided but the mechanism provided was that if there was failure to furnish statements within the prescribed date, the penalty under Section 271H (1) and (2) could be imposed. However, under subsection (3) of Section 271H, the exception is provided that no penalty shall be levied for the failure referred to under clause (a) of sub-section (1) if the person proves that after paying TDS with the fee and interest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... those sub-sections; or ( f ) to deliver or cause to be delivered in due time a copy of the declaration mentioned in section 197A; or ( g ) to furnish a certificate as required by section 203 or section 206C; or ( h ) to deduct and pay tax as required by sub-section (2) of section 226; ( i ) to furnish a statement as required by sub-section (2C) of section 192; ( j ) to deliver or cause to be delivered in due time a copy of the declaration referred to in sub-section (1A) of section 206C; ( k ) to deliver or cause to be delivered a copy of the statement within the time specified in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C; ( l ) to deliver or cause to be delivered the statements within the time specified in sub- section (1) of section 206A; [( m ) to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time as may be prescribed under sub-section (2A) of section 200 or sub-section (3A) of section 206C,] he shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum of one hundred rupees for every day during which the failure contin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the rigors of the penal provision, the provisions of Section 234E would meet with the test of quid pro quo. 21. However, if Section 234E providing for fee was brought on the state book, keeping in view the aforesaid purpose and the intention then, the other mechanism provided for computation of fee and failure for payment of fee under Section 200A which has been brought about with effect from 1.6.2015 cannot be said as only by way of a regulatory mode or a regulatory mechanism but it can rather be termed as conferring substantive power upon the authority. It is true that, a regulatory mechanism by insertion of any provision made in the statute book, may have a retroactive character but, whether such provision provides for a mere regulatory mechanism or confers substantive power upon the authority would also be a aspect which may be required to be considered before such provisions is held to be retroactive in nature. Further, when any provision is inserted for liability to pay any tax or the fee by way of compensatory in nature or fee independently simultaneously mode and the manner of its enforceability is also required to be considered and examined. Not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... invalid. 24. If the facts of the present cases are examined in light of the aforesaid observation and discussion, it appears that in all matters, the intimation given in purported exercise of power under Section 200A are in respect of fees under Section 234E for the period prior to 1.6.2015. As such, it is on account of the intimation given making demand of the fees in purported exercise of power under Section 200A, the same has necessitated the appellant-original petitioner to challenge the validity of Section 234E of the Act. In view of the reasons recorded by us hereinabove, when the amendment made under Section 200A of the Act which has come into effect on 1.6.2015 is held to be having prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee under Section 234E could be made for the TDS deducted for the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices under Section 200A by the respondent-authority for intimation for payment of fee under Section 234E can be said as without any authority of law and the same are quashed and set aside to that extent. 25. As such, as recorded ea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the question of constitutional validity of Section 234E shall remain open to be considered by the Division Bench and shall not get concluded by the order of the learned Single Judge. 28. The appeals are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. 3.3 On the other hand, the case of the revenue would derive strength from the contrary decision of Hon ble Gujarat High Court rendered in Rajesh Kourani V/s Union of India (297 CTR 502 20/06/2017) wherein the Hon ble court has declined to concur with the aforesaid adjudication of Hon ble Karnataka High Court, by observing as under: - 2. Brief facts are as under. 3. The petitioner is a proprietor of one M/s SaiBaba Textiles which is engaged in the manufacture and trading of ladies garments. In course of the business, the petitioner would make payments to individuals and agencies, many of which would require deducting tax at source. The provisions under the Act would further require the petitioner to file periodic statements of such tax deducted at source and depositing the tax in the Government within the time prescribed. With effect from 01. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ees. The special concession to the Government agencies was wholly unnecessary and not based on any rational. The same difficulties and complexities which are faced by Government agencies would also be faced by the individual assessees. 7. With respect to the amendment in sub-section (1) of section 200A, counsel submitted that prior to such amendment, there was no mechanism provided under the Act for collection of fee under section 234E of the Act. The Assessing Officer therefore could not have adjusted such fee in terms of section 200A of the Act. Counsel drew our attention to an intimation sent by the Assessing Officer, purported to be under section 200A of the Act, in which, he had adjusted a sum of ₹ 33,123/- by way of late filing fee under section 234E of the Act. Counsel relied on a decision of Pune Bench of ITAT in case of Gajanan Constructions v. Dy, CIT [2016] 73 taxmann.com 380/161 ITD 313 (Pune - Trib.), in which, the Tribunal held that prior to 01.06.2015, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to charge fee under section 234E of the Act. Counsel also relied on a decision of Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sing of statements of tax deducted at source. We would notice the provisions of this section prior to 01.06.2015 and the changes made therein by virtue of Finance Act, 2015, with effect from 01.06.2015. Further, we would take note of provisions of section 234E of the Act. For the time being, we may notice that section 200A provides for a mechanism for processing a statement filed under section 200 of the Act and enables the Assessing Officer to make some adjustments and to intimate the final outcome to the assessee. 12. Section 234E which pertains to fee for default in furnishing the statements was introduced for the first time by the Finance Act, 2012, with effect from 01.07.2015. Section 234E reads as under: Fee for default in furnishing statements. 234E .(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, where a person fails to deliver or cause to be delivered a statement within the time prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 200 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C, he shall be liable to pay, by way of fee, a sum of two hundred rupees for every day during w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... person deducting any sum (hereafter referred to in this section as deductor) under section 200, such statement shall be processed in the following manner, namely:- ( a ) the sums deductible under this Chapter shall be computed after making the following adjustments, namely:- ( i ) any arithmetical error in the statement; or ( ii ) an incorrect claim, apparent from any information in the statement; ( b ) the interest, if any, shall be computed on the basis of the sums deductible as computed in the statement; ( c ) the sum payable by, or the amount of refund due to, the deductor shall be determined after adjustment of amount computed under clause (b) against any amount paid under section 200 and section 201, and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest; ( d ) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause ( c ); and ( e ) amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (b) and clause (c) against any amount paid under section 200 or section 201 or section 234E and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest or fee; ( e ) an intimation shall be prepared or generated and sent to the deductor specifying the sum determined to be payable by, or the amount of refund due to, him under clause (d); and (f) the amount of refund due to the deductor in pursuance of the determination under clause (d) shall be granted to the deductor:] Provided that no intimation under this sub-section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed. Explanation. -For the purposes of this sub-section, an incorrect claim apparent from any information in the statement shall mean a claim, on the basis of an entry, in the statement- ( i ) of an item, which is inconsistent with another entry of the same or some other item in such statement; ( ii ) in respect of rate of deduction of tax at source, where such rate is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (2) For ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 15th May of the financial year immediately following the financial year in which the deduction is made. 15th May of the financial year immediately following the financial year in which the deduction is made. This rule thus, while laying down the last date by which such statements should be filed, draws two categories; in case of deductor is an office of government and in case of a deductor is a person other than the office of the government. Consistently, the office of the government is granted 15 days extra time as compared to the other deductors. For example, the statement for the date of the quarter ending on 30th June, an ordinary deductor would have to file a statement latest by 15th July of the same year, whereas for the Government office, the last date for filing such statement would be 31st July of the said year. This 15 days extra time is a consistent feature in all four quarters. The short question is, did the legislature discriminate in doing so? It is well settled that Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification but frowns upon class legislation. In the af ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fect was therefore limited upto 01.07.2012. 17. In essence, section 234E thus prescribed for the first time charging of a fee for every day of default in filing of statement under sub-section (3) of section 200 or any proviso to sub-section (3) of section 206C. This provision was apparently added for making the compliance of deduction and collection of tax at source, depositing it with Government revenue and filing of the statements more stringent. 18. In this context, we may notice that section 200A which pertains to processing of statements of tax deducted at source provides for the procedure once a statement of deduction of tax at source is filed by the person responsible to do so and authorizes the Assessing Officer to make certain adjustments which are prima-facie or arithmetical in nature. The officer would then send an intimation of a statement to the assessee. Prior to 01.06.2015, this provision did not include any reference to the fee payable under section 234E of the Act. By recasting sub-section (1), the new clause-c permits the authority to compute the fee, if any, payable by the assessee under section 234E of the Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n order passed under section 200A of the Act is rectifiable under section 154 of the Act and is also appealable under section 246A. In absence of the power of authority to make such adjustment under section 200A of the Act, any calculation of the fee would not partake the character of the intimation under said provision and it could be argued that such an order would not be open to any rectification or appeal. Upon introduction of the recasted clause (c), this situation also would be obviated. Even prior to 01.06.2015, it was always open for the Revenue to calculate fee in terms of section 234E of the Act. The Karnataka High Court in case of Fatheraj Singhvi ( supra ) held that section 200A was not merely a regulatory provision, but was conferring substantive power on the authority. The Court was also of the opinion that section 234E of the Act was in the nature of privilege to the defaulter if he fails to pay fees then he would be rid of rigor of the penal provision of section 271H of the Act. With both these propositions, with respect, we are unable to concur. Section 200A is not a source of substantive power. Substantive power to levy fee can be traced to section 234E of the A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , while interpreting an all-India statute like the Income-tax Act, is bound to follow the decision of any other High Court and to decide accordingly even if its own view is contrary thereto, in view of the practice followed by this court in such matters. Because, if we are to accept this submission, it will be an exercise in futility to examine the real controversy before us with a view to decide the issue, as in that case in view of the Calcutta decision whatever may be our decision on the question of law referred to us, we would be bound to follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court and answer the question accordingly. This submission, in our opinion, is not tenable as it goes counter not only to the powers of this court to hear the reference and decide the questions of law raised therein and to deliver its judgment thereon but also to the doctrine of binding precedent known as stare decisis. We shall deal with the reasons for the same at some length a little later. We have also carefully gone through the decisions of this court referred to by counsel for the assessee in support of his above contention. In our opinion, the observations in those decisions have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , AIR 1979 SC 1937, dealing with the controversy whether a decision of the erstwhile Travancore High Court can be made a binding precedent on the Madras High Court on the basis of the principle of stare decisis, clearly held that such a decision can at best have persuasive effect and not the force of binding precedent on the Madras High Court. Referring to the States Reorganisation Act, it was observed that there was nothing in the said Act or any other law which exalts the ratio of those decisions to the status of a binding law nor could the ratio decidendi of those decisions be perpetuated by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis cannot be stretched that far as to make the decision of one High Court a binding precedent for the other. This doctrine is applicable only to different Benches of the same High Court. It is also well-settled that though there is no specific provision making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts, it is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior Tribunal that the Tribunals subject to its supervision would confirm to the law laid down by it. It is in that view of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... binds whom, we may next examine what is binding. It is well-settled that it is only the ratio decidendi that has a precedent value. As observed by the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (at page 231) : It is elementary that what is binding on the court in a subsequent case is not the conclusion arrived at in a previous decision, but the ratio of that decision, for it is the ratio which binds as a precedent and not the conclusion. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what may come to follow logically from it. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes (see Amar Nath Om Parkash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218; [1985] 1 SCC 345). While following precedents, the court should keep in mind the following observations in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai [1976] 49 FJR 15, 32 ; AIR 1976 SC 1455 (at pages 1467-68) : It is trite, going by Anglophonic principles, that a ruling of a superior court is binding law. It is not of scriptural sanctity but is of ratiowise luminosity within the edifice of facts where the judicial lamp plays the legal flame. Beyond th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this court, to support their reasoning. In the above decision, the Supreme Court, also quoted with approval, the following note of caution given by it earlier in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530, at page 578 (at page 320 of 198 ITR) : It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment. It is thus clear that it is only the ratio decidendi of a case which can be binding-not obiter dictum. Obiter, at best, may have some persuasive efficacy. From the foregoing discussion, the following propositions emerge : ( a ) The law declared by the Supreme Court being binding on all courts in India, the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts, except, however, the Supreme Court itself which is free to review the same and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gh Courts or Courts or Tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction are concerned. Any such attempt will go counter to the very doctrine of stare decisis and also the various decisions of the Supreme Court which have interpreted the scope and ambit thereof. The fact that there is only one decision of any one High Court on a particular point or that a number of different High Courts have taken identical views in that regard is not at all relevant for that purpose. Whatever may be the conclusion, the decisions cannot have the force of binding precedent on other High Courts or on any subordinate courts or Tribunals within their jurisdiction. That status is reserved only for the decisions of the Supreme Court which are binding on all courts in the country by virtue of article 141 of the Constitution. However, upon perusal, we note that the observation that decision in later point of time has to be followed has been made in the context of decisions rendered by different benches of same High Court and the said observation do not apply in case of conflicting decisions of two non-jurisdictional High Court. 3.6 Proceeding further, we find that Pune bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng Officer was beyond the scope of adjustment provided under section 200A of the Act and such adjustment could not stand in the eye of law. 12. The said proposition has been applied in the next bunch of appeals with lead order in Vidya Vardhani Education Research Foundation v. Dy. CIT [2017] 88 taxmann.com 894 (Pune - Trib.) and also in Swami Vivekanand Vidyalaya ( supra ) and Medical Superintendant Rural Hospital v. ACIT [IT Appeal Nos.2072 2073 (PUN) of 2017, order dated 21-12-2017], which has been relied upon by the learned Authorized Representative for the assessee. 13. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi ( supra ) had also laid down similar proposition that the amendment to section 200A of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2015 has prospective effect and is not applicable for the period of respective assessment years prior to 01.06.2015. The relevant findings of the Hon'ble High Court are in paras 21 and 22, which read as under:- 21. However, if Section 234E providing for fee was brought on the state book, keeping in view the aforesaid purpose and the intention t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest. 14. The Hon'ble High Court thus held that where the impugned notices given by Revenue Department under section 200A of the Act were for the period prior to 01.06.2015, then same were illegal and invalid. Vide para 27, it was further held that the impugned notices under section 200A of the Act were for computation and intimation for payment of fees under section 234E of the Act as they relate for the period of tax deducted at source prior to 01.06.2015 were being set aside. 15. In other words, the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka explained the position of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Gujarat in Rajesh Kourani ( supra ). On the other hand, the learned Authorized Representative for the assessee has pointed out that the issue is settled in favour of assessee by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Fatheraj Singhvi ( supra ). Since we have already relied on the said ratio laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, the CIT(A) has mis-referred to both decisions of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka and Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat; but the CIT(A) has failed to take into consideration the settled law that where there is difference of opinion between different High Courts on an issue, then the one in favour of assessee needs to be followed as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vegetable Products Ltd. ( supra ), in the absence of any decision rendered by the jurisdictional High Court. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 54 taxmann.com 200 had decided the constitutional validity of provisions of section 234E of the Act and had held them to be ultra vires but had not decided the second issue of amendment brought to section 200A of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2015. In view thereof ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fact is clear from the perusal of Form No.35 with special reference to Column 2(a) and 2(b). In the entirety of the above said facts and circumstances, we find no merit in the order of CIT(A) in the case of Medical Superintendent Rural Hospital, Surgana in dismissing the appeal in-limine being filed beyond the period of limitation. We have already decided the issue on merits in favour of assessee. 20. We have already decided the issue on merits in favour of assessee. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal raised by assessee in all appeals are allowed. 21. In the result, all the appeals of assessee are allowed. As rightly observed by co-ordinate bench in para-17, the decision of Hon ble Bombay High Court in Rashmikant Kundalia v. Union of India [2015] 54 taxmann.com 200 deal only with examining the constitutional validity of provisions of section 234E of the Act and do not deal with effect of amendment in Section 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Therefore, respectfully following the aforesaid view of co-ordinate bench of Pune Tribunal, we hold that view favorable to the assessee was to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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