TMI Blog2020 (6) TMI 629X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... section 92BA is unconditional, that is, it does not say that Pending Proceedings under clause (i) of section 92BA would continue in future, even after its omission on 01.04.2017. PCIT erred in exercising his jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act, so far clause (i) of section 92BA is concerned, reason being, in the eyes of law after omission of clause (i) of section 92BA, it would be treated as if it never existed in the Statute Book. In other words, clause (i) of section 92BA, was omitted w.e.f 1.4.2017 unconditionally and without a saving clause therefore section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. PCIT issued the above show cause notice u/s 263 in respect of specified domestic transactions referred to in clause (i) of section 92BA of the Act which was omitted with effect from 01.04.2017, and effect of such omission of clause (i) of section 92BA means that this provision never existed in the statute book, since clause (i) of section 92BA never existed in the statute book therefore, ld PCIT cannot exercise his jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act in respect of specified domestic transactions referred to in clause (i) of section 92BA of the Act. Therefore, the act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal in ITA No.1035/Kol/2019 (M/s Srinath Ji Furnishing Pvt. Ltd.) assessment year 2014- 15: 1. For that the order of the Hon'ble Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax is arbitrary, illegal and bad in law. 2. For that the Hon'ble Pr. Commissioner of Income tax erred in taking conclusion that it is mandatory for assessing officer to refer the specified domestic transaction to the Transfer Pricing officer as per section 92CA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which he failed to do so, in spite of the fact that the section 92CA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is very clear about the discretionary power given to assessing officer, if he consider it necessary or expedient so to do, he may refer the matter to Transfer pricing officer. 3. For that the Hon'ble Pr. Commissioner of Income tax erred in cancelling the Assessment Order and giving direction to the assessing officer to pass an assessment order de novo in spite of the fact that the Assessing Officer has called for the transfer pricing report in form 3CEB and considered the same. 4. For that the Hon'ble Pr. Commissioner of Income tax has erred in cancelling the Assessmen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... done as per the statute for determining the Arm's Length Price(ALP). In view of the above facts, the ld PCIT took a view that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of revenue. Hence, proceedings u/s 263 were initiated for A Y 2014-15. During the course of the said proceedings the assessee was given opportunity of being heard and to furnish documents and arguments against initiation of 263 proceedings inter-alia. A notice dated 30/11/2018 was issued to the assessee and in response to the said notice, the assessee furnished written submission before ld PCIT. The important part of the written submission which is useful for our discussion is reproduced below: If It has been stated in the notice under reference that It is observed from the assessment records that as per Form 3CEB your concern had made specified domestic transactions amounting to ₹ 34,82,67,956/- but the same was not referred to Transfer Pricing Officer by the Assessing officer after obtaining the approval of PCIT as per 92CA of the Act. In this view of the matter the benchmarking of the domestic transaction undertaken with the specified d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... per Section 92CA of the I.T.Act,1961, the above said transactions remained un-benchmarked as per the provisions of the section 92CA of the Act In such a circumstances, the Arm's Length Price (ALP) remained undetermined because of the non-application of the Function, Asset, Risk ((FAR) analysis etc. Resultantly, the specified domestic transactions are not held to have been benchmarked as per the provisions of the Act leading to an erroneous and prejudicial order. Therefore, ld PCIT cancelled the assessment order and directed to the Assessing Officer to pass an assessment order de novo as per law and in accordance with the provisions of the I.T.Act,1961. 8. Aggrieved by the order of ld PCIT, both the assessees are in appeal before us. 9. Both the Learned Counsels, Shri Subash Agarwal and Shri S.M. Surana argued the matter on technical issue under consideration. Both the ld Counsel put their common arguments before the Bench stating that the whole object of the omission of clause (i) of section 92BA is to reduce the compliance burden. The clause(i) of section 92BA has been omitted w. e.f 01.04.2017 and the effect of such omission without any saving clause of general clause ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e correct Benchmarking of the domestic transactions undertaken by the assessee with specified domestic parties. The notice for 263 proceedings was issued dated 20.11.2018. The assessee is contesting the jurisdiction of the Pr. C.I.T.-5, Kolkata in initiating proceedings u/s.263 on the ground that the reference to the TPO on the specified domestic transactions was not applicable to him since Section 92BA(i) was omitted by Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 01.04.2017. The assessee is relying on Section-6 of the General Clause Act, 1897(GCA 1897) to contend that an omission is not entailed in repeal, and upon omission, the provision results in obliteration from the very beginning. The appellant has relied on the decision of ITAT, Bangalore in the case of M/s. Texport Overseas (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT, A.Y. 2013-14, ITA No.IT(TP)A No.1722/Bang/2017, order dated 22.12.2017 for the proposition that since clause 92BA(i) was omitted w.e.f. 01.09.2017 it is to be treated as if it never existed in the statute and thus no adverse inference can be drawn against the appellant under the said provisions. Against this it is submitted that Section-6 of GCA, 1897 has to be read in consonance with Section-6 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re Bench in the case of M/s. Texport Overseas Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has given the finding on the basis of Apex Court decision in the case of General Finance Company 257 ITR 338. This is an old decision pronounced on 04/09/2002. However, it may kindly be pointed out that the Hon'ble Bench of Bangalore Tribunal did not take into consideration the subsequent decision of the Apex Court constitutional bench on the same issue in the case of M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills (supra) and M/s. Fibre Boards (supra). The constitutional bench in the above cases, orders passed in 2015, have held that repeal, delete and omit can be used interchangeably and, therefore, section 6 of the General Clauses Act would also save provisions which have been omitted from the Act. Therefore, the proceedings initiated during the omission of provision will continue. It cannot be obliterated from the very beginning. 11. We heard both the parties and carefully gone through the submission put forth on behalf of the assessee along with the documents furnished and the case laws relied upon, and perused the fact of the case including the findings of the ld PCIT under section 263 of the Act and other materi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pliance burden of the taxpayers. In order to reduce the compliance burden of the taxpayers, it was proposed by the Finance Act 2017 to provide that expenditure in respect of which payment has been made by the assessee to a person referred to in section 40A(2)(b) are to be excluded from the scope of section 92BA of the Act. The whole object of the omission of clause (i) of section 92BA is to reduce the compliance burden of taxpayers. As we noticed that clause (i) of section 92BA has been omitted with effect from 01.04.2017. The effect of such omission without any saving clause of General Clauses Act, means that the above provision was not in existence or never existed in the statute book. If it is held that effect of such omission of clause (i) of section 92BA means that this provision was never existed in the statute book, then in that situation the exercise of jurisdiction by the ld PCIT [ in respect of above said clause (i) of section 92BA] under section 263 of the Act would fail. 12. We note that ld PCIT has issued a show cause notice under section 263 of the Act to the assessee, which is reproduced below: It is observed from the assessment records that as per Form ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... altogether, no new proceeding by way of prosecution could be initiated even though it might be in respect of an offence committed earlier during the period that the rule was in force. We are inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Sen that the language contained in clause 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1965 can only afford protection to action already taken while the rule was in force, but cannot justify initiation of a new proceeding which will not be a thing done or omitted to be done under the rule but a new act of initiating a proceeding after the rule had ceased to exist. On this interpretation, the complaint made for the offence under R. 132A(4) of the D.I. Rs., after 1st April, 1965 when the rule was omitted, has to be held invalid. This view of ours is in line with the general principle enunciated by this Court in the case of S. Krishnan and Others' v. The State of Madras(1), relating to temporary enactments, in, the following words :-- The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be affected by the expiry as respects things previously done or omitted to be done. The Act could, therefore, be held to be in operation in respect of acts already committed, so that the conviction could be validly made even after the expiry of the Act in respect of an offence committed before the expiry. In the case before us, the operation of R. 132A of the D.I. Rs. has not been continued after its omission. The language used in the notification only affords protection to things already done under the rule, so that it cannot permit further application of that rule by instituting a new prosecution in respect of something already done. The offence alleged against the accused in the present case is in respect of acts done by them which cannot be held to be acts under that rule. The difference in the language thus makes (1) [1947] A.C. 362. it clear that the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in the case cited above cannot apply to the notification with which we are concerned. Reference was next made to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiralal Sutwala(1), but, there again, the accused was sought to be prosecuted for 'an offence p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nded sub-s. (4) of s. 1 of the Act had the effect of making applicable the principles laid down in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, so that a legal proceeding could be instituted even after the repeal of the Act in respect of an offence committed during the time when the Act was in force. As we have indicated earlier, the notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs omitting R. 132A of the D.I.Rs. did not make any such provision similar to, that contained section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Consequently, it is clear that, after the omission of R. 132A of the D.I.Rs., no prosecution could be instituted even in respect of an act which was an offence when that Rule was in force. In this connection, Mr. Desai pointed out to us that, simultaneously with the omission of R. 132A of the D.I.Rs., s. 4(2) of the Act was amended so as to bring the prohibition contained in R. 132A(2) under s. 4(1) of the Act. He urged that, from this simultaneous action taken, it should be presumed that there was no intention of the Legislature that acts, which were offences punishable under R. 132A of the D.I.Rs., should go unpunished after the omission of that rule. It, however, appears that when s. 4(1) o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bsence of such condition/ saving clause it would be presumed that clause (i) of section 92BA had obliterated from the inception, that is, it would be presumed that clause (i) of section 92BA was never existed in the statute book. 13. We note that the Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd (2000), Civil Appeal No.2132of 1994, dated 01/02/2000, has distinguished the terminology omission and Repeal as follows: 29. We have carefully considered the decisions in Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries (supra) and Falcon Tyres case (supra). Though the judgments in these cases were rendered after the decision of the Constitution Bench in Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (supra) a different view has been taken by the High Courts for the reasons stated in the judgments. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries (supra), as it appears from the discussions in the judgment, tried to distinguish the decision of the Constitution Bench in M/s Rayala Corporation (supra) for reasons, we are constrained to say not sound in law. The decision of the Constitution Bench is directly on the question of applicability of Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t which makes provision for continuation of orders, notification, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, issued under the repealed Act or Regulation under an Act after its repeal and re-enactment. In that case section 6 did not come up for consideration. Therefore the ratio of that case is not applicable to the present case. With respect we agree with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in M/s Rayala Corporation case (supra). In our considered view the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the case on hand. 32. For the reasons set forth above we do not accept the view taken in Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. (supra), in Falcon Tyres Ltd. (supra) and the other decisions taking similar view. It is not correct to say that in considering the question of maintainability of pending proceedings initiated under a particular provision of the rule after the said provision was omitted the Court is not to look for a provision in the newly added rule for continuing the pending proceedings. It is also not correct to say that the test is whether there is any provision in the rules to the effect that pending proceedings will lapse on omission of the rule under wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. Thus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceeding shall not continue but a fresh proceeding for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision. In the present case, as noted earlier, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. There is no saving provision in favour of pending proceeding. Therefore action for realisation of the amount refunded can only be taken under the new provision in accordance with the terms thereof. The further question that arises for consideration in this connection is whether the notification No. 267/77 dated 6.8.77 by which Rule 10 was deleted contained any provision for continuance of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld PCIT cannot exercise the jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. 14. Our view is also fortified by the judgment of the Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of General Finance Co. 257 ITR 338 (SC), wherein the Hon`ble Supreme Court relied on its previous judgments in the case of Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Director of Enforcement 1969 (2) SCC 412, and Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd Anr. vs. Union of India Ors. 2000 (2) SCC 536, and held that an omission of a provision is different from a repeal and section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to a repealed law and not to omission. The Hon ble Supreme Court held in the context of section 276DD of the Income Tax Act that in the Income Tax Act, section 276DD stood omitted from the Act but not repealed and hence, a prosecution could not have been launched or continued by invoking section 6 of the General Clauses Act after its omission. The findings of the Hon`ble Supreme Court are as follows: 6. Net result of this discussion is that the view taken by the High Court is not consistent with what has been stated by this Court in the two decisions aforesaid and the principle underlying s. 6 of the General Clauses Act as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ready addressed by us in para 12 of this order, hence we do not repeat the same for the sake of brevity. 17. Regarding second grievance of ld DR who relied on the following two judgments of Hon`ble Supreme Court, namely: (1) M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills vs. C.I.T. Excise Others - 2015(326) ELT 209(S.C.) and (2) M/s. Fibre Boards 62 Taxmann.com 135 (S.C.) and contended that these two judgments interpret the lis in favour of the Revenue. In order to appreciate the contention of ld DR, let us go through, one by one, the concluding para and ratio decendai of the said judgments, in the case of (1) M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills (supra) and (2) M/s. Fibre Boards (supra) First, we take the judgment of Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills vs. C.I.T. Excise Others - 2015(326) ELT 209(S.C.), the relevant paras of the said judgment are reproduced below: 24. Fibre Boards case is a recent judgment which, as has correctly been argued by Shri Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel on behalf of the revenue, clarifies the law in holding that an omission would amount to a repeal. The converse view of the law has led to an omitt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by us today, this appeal will also have to be allowed in the same terms as the other assessees appeals which have been allowed. All the aforesaid appeals are disposed of accordingly. Having gone through the concluding para, as mentioned above, we note that Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills (supra), has not decided the issue in favour of Revenue. Therefore, the contention of ld. D.R. that Hon ble Supreme Court has interpreted the issue in favour of Revenue, is not tenable. In fact, the concluding para No. 44 of the said judgment clearly speaks that the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed and the appeals filed by the assessees are allowed. The said judgment of the Hon`ble Supreme Court also advocates that omitted provision being treated as if it never existed and as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not then apply to allow the previous operation of the provision so omitted or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Nor may a legal proceeding in respect of any right or liability be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of rights and liabilities acquired or incurred under the enactment so omitted. Therefore, cons ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n omission . 21. In Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd., what fell for decision was whether proceedings could be validly continued on a complaint in respect of a charge made under Rule 132A of the Defence of India Rules, which ceased to be in existence before the accused were convicted in respect of the charge made under the said rule. The said Rule 132A was omitted by a notification dated 30th March, 1966. What was decided in that case is set out by paragraph 17 of the said judgment, which is as follows: 17. Reference was next made to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiralal Sutwala [AIR 1959 MP 93] but, there again, the accused was sought to be prosecuted for an offence punishable under an Act on the repeal of which Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been made applicable. In the case before us, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot obviously apply on the omission of Rule 132-A of the DIRs for the two obvious reasons that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions, and applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a rule. If Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been applied, no doubt this c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r between, and hence found on facts that it was not an appropriate case for reference to a larger bench. 25. We may also point out that in G.P. Singh s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition, the learned author has criticized the aforesaid judgments in the following terms: Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to all types of repeals. The section applies whether the repeal be express or implied, entire or partial or whether it be repeal simpliciter or repeal accompanied by fresh legislation. The section also applies when a temporary statute is repealed before its expiry, but it has no application when such a statute is not repealed but comes to an end by expiry. The section on its own terms is limited to a repeal brought about by a Central Act or Regulation. A rule made under an Act is not a Central Act or regulation and if a rule be repealed by another rule, section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not be attracted. It has been so held in two Constitution Bench decisions. The passing observation in these cases that section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions needs reconsideration for omission of a provision results in abrogation or obliter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. 29. A reading of this Section would show that a repeal can be by way of an express omission. This being the case, obviously the word repeal in both Section 6 and Section 24 would, therefore, include repeals by express omission. The absence of any reference to Section 6A, therefore, again undoes the binding effect of these two judgments on an application of the per incuriam principle.1 30. Thirdly, an earlier Constitution Bench judgment referred to earlier in this judgment, namely, State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch Co., (1964) 4 SCR 461 has also been missed. The Court there stated: 1 In Mamleshwar Prasad Anr. v. Kanahaiya Lal (dead) through LRs., (1975) 3 SCR 834, Krishna Iyer, J., succinctly laid down what is meant by the per incuriam principle. He stated: We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, whereby obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n implied repeal of a statute would fall within the expression repeal in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This is for the reason given by the Constitution Bench in M.A. Tulloch Co. that only the form of repeal differs but there is no difference in intent or substance. If even an implied repeal is covered by the expression repeal , it is clear that repeals may take any form and so long as a statute or part of it is obliterated, such obliteration would be covered by the expression repeal in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 32. In fact in Halsbury s Laws of England Fourth Edition, it is stated that: So far as express repeal is concerned, it is not necessary that any particular form of words should be used. (R v. Longmead, (1795) 2 Leach 694 at 696). All that is required is that an intention to abrogate the enactment or portion in question should be clearly shown. (Thus, whilst the formula is hereby repealed is frequently used, it is equally common for it to be provided that an enactment shall cease to have effect (or, If not yet in operation, shall not have effect ) or that a particular portion of an enactment shall be omitted). 33. At this stage, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the assessee is given a window of three years after the date on which transfer has taken place to purchase new machinery or plant or acquire building or land. We find that the High Court has completely missed the window of three years given to the assessee to purchase or acquire machinery and building or land. This is why the expression used in 54G(2) is which is not utilized by him for all or any of the purposes aforesaid . . It is clear that for the assessment year in question all that is required for the assessee to avail of the exemption contained in the Section is to utilize the amount of capital gains for purchase and acquisition of new machinery or plant and building or land. It is undisputed that the entire amount claimed in the assessment year in question has been so utilized for purchase and/or acquisition of new machinery or plant and land or building. 37. The High Court is not correct when it states:- 31. The word purchase is not defined under the Act and therefore, has to be construed in the commercial sense. In many dictionaries, the word purchase means the acquisition of property by party s own act as distinguished from acquisition by act of law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ose of his business in the said area. If the High Court is right, the assessee has to purchase and/or acquire machinery, plant, land and building within the same assessment year in which the transfer takes place. Further, the High Court has missed the key words not utilized in sub-section (2) which would show that it is enough that the capital gain made by the assessee should only be utilized by him in the assessment year in question for all or any of the purposes aforesaid, that is towards purchase and acquisition of plant and machinery, and land and building. Advances paid for the purpose of purchase and/or acquisition of the aforesaid assets would certainly amount to utilization by the assessee of the capital gains made by him for the purpose of purchasing and/or acquiring the aforesaid assets. We find therefore that on this ground also, the assessee is liable to succeed. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Having gone through the second judgment, in the case of M/s. Fibre Boards, 62Taxmann.com135(S.C.) (supra), as relied on by the ld DR for the Revenue, we note that Hon`ble Supreme Court has decided the issue in favour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of ld DR, rather, we have noticed after going through the subsequent judgments of Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills (supra) and M/s. Fibre Boards (supra) that these previous judgments in the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd (supra) and in Rayala Corporation P. Ltd (supra) were appreciated and accepted by the subsequent judgments of the Hon ble Supreme Court. In one of the subsequent judgments, in the case of M/s. Fibre Boards (supra), both these judgments were appreciated in the following words: 19. But then Shri Arijit Prasad put before us two roadblocks in the form of two Constitution Bench decisions. He cited Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd. and M.R. Pratap v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, (1969) 2 SCC 412 which was followed in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. Anr. v. Union of India Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 536. He argued based upon these two judgments that an omission would not amount to repeal and that since the present case was concerned with the omission of Section 280ZA, Section 24 would have no application. 20. Shri Prasad is correct in relying upon these two Constitution Bench judgments for they do indeed say that in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ur Cane Sugar (supra), it will be presumed that clause (i) of section 92BA never existed in the Statute Book, meaning thereby it is obliterated from the very beginning and hence the jurisdiction exercised by the Ld. PCIT u/s. 263 of the Act invoking clause (i) of section 92BA, for reference by A.O. to TPO is null in the eye of Law, as clause (i) of section 92BA is omitted and not repeated and there is no provision in any other section of the Income Tax Act saving the pending proceedings initiated under the omitted provision [ (clause (i) of sec, 92BA)] as the said clause (i) was omitted on 01.04.2017, therefore, subsequent revision proceedings by ld. PCIT u/s. 263 on dated 08.03.2019 would be invalid. As we noticed above that an omission of a provision is different from a repeal and section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to a repealed law and not to omission of law, therefore section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply. So in the assessee`s case it is noted that in the Income Tax Act, clause (i) of section 92BA was omitted from the Act and not repealed, hence pending proceedings/ prosecution could not have been launched or continued by invoking section 6 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nally omitted without a saving clause in favour of Pending Proceedings therefore ld. PCIT ought not to have proceeded u/s. 263 of the Act, since the omission took place prior to 08.03.2019 and such omission in clause (i) of section 92BA is unconditional, that is, it does not say that Pending Proceedings under clause (i) of section 92BA would continue in future, even after its omission on 01.04.2017. Therefore, Ld. PCIT erred in exercising his jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act, so far clause (i) of section 92BA is concerned, reason being, in the eyes of law after omission of clause (i) of section 92BA, it would be treated as if it never existed in the Statute Book. In other words, clause (i) of section 92BA, was omitted w.e.f 1.4.2017 unconditionally and without a saving clause therefore section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. We note that ld PCIT issued the above show cause notice u/s 263 in respect of specified domestic transactions referred to in clause (i) of section 92BA of the Act which was omitted with effect from 01.04.2017, and effect of such omission of clause (i) of section 92BA means that this provision never existed in the statute book, since clause ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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