TMI Blog1949 (1) TMI 8X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Hindu female heir, the reversioners being her three sons, to wit, Nripendra Lal Mitter, Jatindra Lal Mitter and Manindra Lal Mitter. On 15th December 1905, Krishna Adarini, along with her three sons, executed an indenture of lease in respect of the said premises in favour of one I.M. Solomon on certain terms and conditions set out therein. The lease was to be for a term of 40 years expiring on 31st December 1945; and these 40 years were divided into four decennial periods, the rent payable by the lessee being fixed at a progressively increassing rate for each succeeding decennial period. For the first period of 10 years, the rent was payable at the rate of ₹ 145/- a month ; for the second it was ₹ 165/., during the third decennial period the rent was fixed at ₹ 180/- per month and the maximum rent of ₹ 195/- a month was fixed for the fourth and last of these decennial periods. 4. The only other provision in the lease that is material for our present purpose is the one relating to apportionment of the compensation money in case the premises were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or any other legislative enactment of a like characte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arties agreed that in case of compulsory acquisition of the premises, the proprietors would be entitled to twenty-five times the said respective rents as mentioned in the lease and the residue was to go to the lessee. The contention of the lessees was that the words mentioned above referred to the monthly rents which the lessees were to pay under the terms of the document, whereas the lessors argued that they could not but mean the rents payable for the whole year upon the capitalised value of which the compensation payable to the proprietors would depend. The learned President of the Tribunal accepted the contention of the lessees and held that the proprietors were entitled to twenty-five times the monthly rent that was payable at the date of the declaration and the result was that they were given a sum of ₹ 4,875 only as their share of the total compensation money and the lessees were held entitled to the remainder amounting to more than ₹ 70,000. 7. Against this decision, an appeal was taken to the Calcutta High Court by some of the proprietors, who are respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal and who represent one-third share in the proprietary interest. The other cos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 6. Before the records were transmitted to England, the powers of this Court were enlarged under Act I [1] of 1948 and in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the records came to this Court and the appellants lodged their petition of appeal on 9th August 1948. 10. On the case being called on for hearing, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents challenging the competency of the appeal. It is argued by Mr. Ghosh for the respondents that Section 71, Calcutta Improvement Act (Bengal Act V [5] of 1911) makes an award of the Tribunal, final, subject to the restricted right of appeal to the High Court that is given by the Calcutta Improvement (Appeals) Act. Not only no right of appeal to the Privy Council is given by the express words of the Calcutta Improvement Act, but the Act being a self contained statute which expressly excludes the operation of Section 54, Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of appeal to the Privy Council which have been introduced into the general Act by subsequent amendments could not be incorporated by reference into the Calcutta Improvement Act. In this connection, reliance has been placed by the learned advocate upon the decisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y rent been mentioned at all. 13. The second argument advanced is that even if the High Court was right in the interpretation it put upon the clause mentioned above, the learned Judges acted illegally and in excess of their jurisdiction in giving relief to the non-appealing proprietors under Order 41, Rule 33. Civil P.C, on an application for review presented subsequently to the delivery and signing of the judgment which expressly refused this relief. 14. As regards the first point raised by the appellants, the primary rule of construction undoubtedly is that the words and sentences used in a document must receive their plain and natural meaning. The Court would certainly have to look to the instrument as a whole, for, if there is any inaccuracy or inconsistency in it, attempt should be made to ascertain and give, effect, if possible, to the intention of the framers of it as could be gathered from the entire document. It is argued by Mr. Gupta that we cannot assume any intention on the part of the executants of a document apart from the language used in it; nor can we when there is no ambiguity in the words used, refuse to interpret them in their ordinary sense simply because ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted clause at all. It cannot be said, therefore, that the words being unambiguous, no question of interpretation, strictly speaking, arises. 16. The intention of the parties in introducing a clause of this character in the lease was undoubtedly to lay down beforehand how the lessors' interest was to be valued in case the property became the subject-matter of a land acquisition proceeding while the lease was still subsisting. One of the accepted methods of valuing property is to capitalise the annual rental of the land at so many years' purchase. The number of years' purchase would undoubtedly vary with the nature of the property and the character of investment; but whatever figure might be taken for the purpose of capitalising the rent, it is the annual rent that is capitalised and not the monthly rent. The idea of valuing property by capitalising the monthly rental is something opposed to common sense and is unheard of in business transactions. It is a well established rule of construction that in construing a will, statute, or any written instrument, absurdity and repugnancy are always to be avoided. The intention of the parties in the present case, as appears from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cation for review of judgment when in the judgment itself these powers were not exercised. Mr. Gupta argues that no such powers could be exercised by the High Court on an application for review, and he relies upon the decision of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram v. Neki A.I.R. (9) 1922 P.C. 112 where it wa8 held by Viscount Haldane that the expression any other sufficient reason in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C, should be interpreted to mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. In this case, the Punjab Chief Court had granted an application for review on the ground that the judgment proceeded on an incorrect exposition of law. This, it was held, was not a sufficient ground within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C., and the Court had no jurisdiction to order a review because it was of opinion that a different conclusion of law should have been arrived at. 18. That a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the Court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the Court di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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