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1916 (3) TMI 2

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..... say whether the defendant was a ryot. He contended himself with saying that the land was pas-ture land and that the defendant obtained the land every year on cowle for that year for the purpose of grazing cattle. 2. The defendant contended that the land was ryoti land that the defendant has been enjoying the land " as it suited him " and not merely as pasture land and that the defendant had therefore occupancy right in the land. The defendant did not expressly state that he was a " ryot" within the definition of the term in the Estates Land Act. 3. On the above pleas of the defendant, two main issues were framed by the District Munsif: 1. Is the suit land not a ryoti land and is plaintiff entitled to eject the defen .....

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..... iction was not ousted and the defendant cannot claim occupancy right. I think it must be admitted that the evidence to prove that the land was private land of the Rajah is very meagre, the description of the land in Exhibits A and B as "seri" and "separated from the seri " not being of much value, having regard to the presumption laid down in Section 185 of the Estates Land Act that every land shall be " presumed not to be private land until the contrary is shown". See also Gajapathi Maharaja Garu v. Sondi Prahlada Bissoyi Ratno (1918) 14 M.L.T. 562. But there is abundant evidence to support the finding of the lower Courts that the land was let for the purposes of pasture and not for purposes of agriculture and .....

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..... of Mr. Sarma, I see no reason to resile from the view i have expressed in that case, namely, that the ordinary meaning of "agriculture" is the raising of annual or periodical grain crops through the operation of ploughing, sowing, &c. I admit that in particular Acts or Statutes, a much larger meaning is sometimes given to that word by special definitions and if the definition in the Estates Land Act gives such a wide meaning so as to include 'pasturing", we are, of course, bound to give that special extended meaning. Far from indicating any such intention to include' "pasture" in "agriculture", the legislature has given only one particular extension in the Estates Land Act to the meaning of the wor .....

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..... conclusion of fact that the land was let only for pasturing purposes. It may be that the use of the land solely for pasture may not deprive the tenant of his claim to be called " ryot " provided that he has the right to use it for agriculture, (see Appalaswami v. Rajah of Vizianagaram (1913)25MLJ50 but the finding of fact in this case is that it was not let for agriculture and hence, the tenant had no right to so use it. Assuming, however, that the lower Courts were wrong in holding that the land was let solely for pasture the next question for consideration is whether it was cultivable land and therefore ryoti land. I am clear on the precedents that unless the land is of such a nature that it is ordinarily cultivable or cultivabl .....

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..... aste". It is clear to me from the facts found by the lower Courts (without adopting the view of the first court that the land is " private land ") that the plaint land is old waste. The definition of old waste in Section 3(7)(1) of the Act clearly applies to the land in dispute and on this ground also (a ground argued before us though not taken in the lower Courts) the defendant cannot claim occupancy rights in the land. " Bent " again under the definition in Clause 1 of Section 3 is what is payable for the use of land for purposes of agriculture and pasturage dues are therefore not " rent" and a suit therefore is not exempted from the cognizance of Civil Courts. 10. In the result, I would dismiss the app .....

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