TMI Blog2008 (9) TMI 1016X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... disputed land ). Late Smt. Narmadabai who was a widow, was the original landowner of the disputed land. She died in 1964 leaving behind her two sons Ramchandra and Laxman Bhau Sutar. On 1st of April, 1957, i.e. on the Tiller's Day, the Appellant was in cultivation of the disputed land. The original tenant named Maruti died subsequently in 1994 during the pendency of the Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The original tenant had initiated proceedings under Section 32G of the Act before the Additional Tahsildar, Kavathe Makhanlal, and the case was decided in his favour with the purchase price of the disputed land being fixed. Thereafter, one of the heirs of the deceased landowner Narmadabai, named Laxman, preferred an appeal to Appellate Authority against the said order. After the matter was remanded back to the Additional Tehsildar , again an order affirming the previous position was passed in favour of the tenant under Section 32G. This time, the other heir of Late Smt. Narmadabai, namely Ramchandra, challenged the said order before the Sub-Divisional-Officer, Miraj, and he again by his order dated 31st of March, 1978, remanded the matter to the Tahsildar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... considered as substantial compliance resulting in dispensation of the mandatory requirement of Section 32F. Therefore, considering the fact that the tenant had failed in his duty to issue a written notice to the owner of the land i.e. Respondent No. 2, as required under Section 32 F, he has lost his right to purchase the disputed land. The Writ Petition was therefore dismissed by the High Court. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the High Court, this Special Leave Petition was filed which, on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned Counsel for the parties. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and also the orders passed by the Tahsildar , Appellate Court and the Revisional Court. We find that the High Court noticed the provision of Section 32F of the Act, in so far as it is relevant, which reads as follows: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections,- (a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion.] 9. We have examined the aforesaid provisions of the Act on which the High Court had placed strong reliance. In our view, the interpretation given by the High Court in the impugned judgment of the aforesaid provisions cannot be faulted with. It must be said that the High Court in its impugned judgment, correctly noticed that Sub-section (3) of Section 31 provides that the landlord under disability and intending to exercise a right under this chapter shall give a notice terminating the tenancy and if the landlord is a widow then the notice can be given by the successor-in-title of the widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist. In the present case when the widow Narmadabai died, she ceased to have interest in the land and therefore the right of Ramchandra, as her successor-in-interest, to give notice under Section 31 to the tenant gets extended for one year from the death of Narmadabai, i.e. till the 12th of January, 1965. 10. The learne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the tenant had initiated proceedings under Section 32G, that order was set aside by the SDO in the appeal and the matter was remanded for fresh enquiry in respect of the two points referred to above. Therefore, even if the tenant had initiated proceedings under Section 32G and even if he had paid some installments and the price of the land, the same cannot be considered as substantial compliance resulting in dispensation of the mandatory requirement of Section 32F.... 11. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and after examining the judgment under Appeal as well as the orders of the other authorities, and other materials on record including the depositions of the parties before them, we are of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed for the reasons set out hereinafter : 12. In our view, the High Court correctly pointed out that the provisions of Section 32F are independent in nature and are separate from the provisions under Section 31 of the Act. The exception mentioned under Section 32F(1) to subsection (2) is limited to the sections referred to in it, i.e., from Section 32 to 32E (both inclusive) and 32G to 32R (both inclusive). Further the expressio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s submission because language of the Sections 32F and 31 is quite clear and the period of one year will have to be counted in accordance with the said provisions and not from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we cannot in such a case, grant relief on the basis of equity. Again in Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar (2006)7SCC200 , relying on counsel for the parties in their submissions, this Court has clearly summarized the position of law. The paragraphs relevant to this case are 23 (c) to 23 (e) which have been laid down herein: 23 (c) A landlord has a right to give notice and make an application for possession after terminating the tenancy, if he wanted the land bonafide for personal cultivation, provided the notice was served on the tenant on or before 31.12.1956 (with copy to the Mamlatdar) and application for possession under Section 29 was filed on or before 31.03.1957. (d) A landlord widow also entitled to make an application for possession under Sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 31, which is an enabling provision, extends the time within which the widow can seek possession ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dow, exercises her right of termination and secures possession of part of the tenanted land for personal cultivation under Section 31(1) of the Act, then there is no question of her successor-in-title giving a notice of termination within one year from the date on which the widow's interest ceases to exist. When Section 31 ceases to apply, Section 32F also will not apply and there is no need for the tenant to give any intimation under Section 32F. 27. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on the decisions of this Court in Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade, Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anadrao Desai, Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar and Balchandra Anantrao Rakvi v. Ramchandra Rukaram to contend that the tenant has to issue a notice under Section 32F within the period prescribed and if he fails to do so, he loses the right to purchase the land and the landlord will become entitled to the same absolutely. These were all cases where the landlord under disability had not sought possession for personal cultivation under Section 31 and where admittedly, Sections 31(3) and 32F applied and consequently, there was an obligation on the part of the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g a notice as to his intention of purchasing the land to both the brothers contesting for the disputed land or either one of them according to the provisions of Section 32F. This Court, in the case of Teja Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. [1995]2SCR433 , has observed that in the matter of land acquisition, service of notice on one of the co-owners is necessary and will therefore be construed as service on all the co-owners. The appellant has argued that he had on more than one occasion conveyed about his willingness to purchase the land to both the brothers and that his intention to do so was known by both of them. However, it does not absolve him from the duty of providing a written notice in terms of Section 32F of the Act. Moreover, the Appellant himself admitted before the Tahsildar, Kavathe Mahankal, that he had not served any written notice to either of the two brothers mentioning his intention. This can be identified from the statement of the Appellant on the 8th of October, 1976 and the 16th of March, 1981 whereby he stated: Narmadabai died before 10-12 years. I have not served the notice on the owners. I have informed them orally regarding the purchase from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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