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TMI Blog2020 (3) TMI 1310X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er Nain, Aayush Agarwala, Anuj Agarwala, Abhinav Malhotra, Sudipto Sircar, Bhav Ratan, Pramod B. Agarwala, Siddharth Batra, Gaurav Agrawal, Avishkar Singhvi, Harsh Parashar, Nipun Katyal, Tanvi Bhatnagar, Rahul Kaushik, Dhruv Surana, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Aravind C., Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamalendra Mishra, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Sandya Sharma, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sagar N. Pahune Patil, S. Lakshmi Iyer, Abhikalp Pratap Singh, Aishwarya Dash, Durgesh Gupta, A.P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Sanjeev Kumar Choudhary, Jitesh Malik, Beena, Satish Kumar, Garima Sehgal, Sugandha Sharma, Ram Sankar, Om Prakash Kumar Srivastava, Ashish Chaubey, G. Chitrakala, Maafi, R.K.V. Suhas, R.V. Kameshwaran, Mahesh Thakur, B.S. Srinivas, Vipasha Singh, Sharan Thakur, Siddharth Thakur, Vijay Kumar Pardesi, Shailesh Madiyal, Sudhanshu Parkash, Kartik Anand, Sheffali Chaudhary, Zoheb Hossain, Adeeba Mujahid, Aditi Dani, Ashwin Kumar D.S., Piyush Goyal, Vivek Gurnani, Agni Sen, Sanjeev Menon, Purbita Mitra, A. Jaswanthi, K.V. Vijayakumar, Anandh Kannan, Deepak Goel, Kamal Kumar Pandey, Baldev Atreya, Ajay Kumar Singh, Neelum Goel, Gaurav Yadava, Veena Bansal, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry, Mumtaz Alam Siddiqui, Keshav Thakur, Arvind Kumar Kanva, Aniruddha P. Mayee, R.M. Bhangde, Shivkant Mishra, Hara Prasad Sahu, Vishal Arun Mishra, Pawan Kumar, Pranay Kumar M., Binu Tamta, Dhruv Tamta and Pankaj Pandey, Advs. JUDGMENT S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9036-9038, 9798-9799, 17088-17089, 37375, 37372, 16573-16605 of 2016, S.L.P. (C) CC No. 15967 of 2016, Civil Appeal Nos. 19356, 19362, 19361, 19358, 19357, 19360, 19359 of 2017, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 34752-34753 of 2016, 15890 of 2017, Civil Appeal Nos. 19363, 19364, 19412 of 2017, MA 1423 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 12247 of 2016, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 33022, 33127, 33114 of 2017, MA 1787 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 10210 of 2016, MA 1786 of 2017 in Civil Appeal No. 10207 of 2016, MA 45 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No. 6239 of 2017, S.L.P. (C) No. 16051 of 2019, Diary No. 23842 of 2018, S.L.P. (C) No. 30452 of 2018, Civil Appeal No. 4835 of 2015 and S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30577-30580 of 2015 Arun Mishra, J. 1. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act of 2013'), is the subject matter of reference to this five Ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India to refer the issues to be resolved by a larger Bench at the earliest. Yet again in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd.) and Anr. (CA No. 4835 of 2015) referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate Bench for consideration of the larger issue. These batch appeals were referred to a five Judge Bench, which after hearing counsel, framed the following questions, which arise for consideration: 1. What is the meaning of the expression paid'/tender' in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013') and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (Act of 1894')? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court Under Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into lapse of acquisition Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences of non-deposit in Court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused Under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rned Additional Solicitor General (hereafter "ASG"), Mr. Anoop Chaudhary and Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Shashi Kiran, Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. R.M. Bhangade and Mr. Rajesh Mahale, learned Counsel, made their submissions. 9. The learned SG, arguing that this Court should overrule the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other judgments which followed it, contended that the Court did not consider the various interpretations of Section 31 of the (repealed) Land Acquisition Act, ("LA Act" hereafter). He urged that the provisions of the Act of 2013, vis-à-vis the timelines and consequences that would ensue if the acquisition proceeding prolongs, were not examined. He highlighted that Section 24 is a transitional provision and such provisions should be given an interpretation which accords with legislative intent, rather than so as to impose hitherto absent standards, upon past proceedings, or proceedings initiated under the previous regime, but which have not worked themselves out. He urged that there is a presumption in favour of restricted retrospective applicability of any provision in an enactment unless a contrary intention appears. It is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are subject to an award Under Section 11 of the LA Act being made five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 (which is 1.1.2014). If the award is so made, two contingencies result in complete lapse-: (a) Physical possession of the land has not been taken; or (b) compensation has not been "paid". The provision for lapse, per Section 24(2) is, by its nature, a vital provision, inviting serious consequences, in case those contingencies arise. It is the interpretation of these "contingencies" that requires further consideration. The "contingencies" ought to be interpreted in a manner which saves the past transactions to the extent they can be saved as it is clearly not the intention of the Act of 2013 to tide over all past transactions. 13. The learned SG argued that the proviso to Section 24(2) further carves out an exception to Section 24(2) viz., in case the award has been made and compensation in respect of majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, no lapsing will take place, but all the beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to be a reversible one and, therefore, provides for lapsing of all previous stages prior to "non-payment". However, if it can be demonstrated that though-(1) compensation was tendered to all; (2) some of them [for whatever reason] did not take the compensation; and (3) compensation is deposited in case of majority of the land holdings [viz. setting apart the share of such persons and making it available for them to take it], then, neither proceedings would lapse nor the compensation will be required to be determined under the Act of 2013. In substance, therefore, the legal situation would be akin to the one contemplated Under Section 24(1)(b) for all practical purposes. 17. It is submitted that during the drafting of the Bill, the legislative intent and the apprehensions of the stakeholders in the acquisition process is clearly depicted in 31st Report of the 'Standing Committee on Rural Development' while discussing the 'The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011' which was the precursor to the Act of 2013. The learned SG relied on extracts of the Standing Committee Reports, the draft Bill, various comments from government and public agencies ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ifested from Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Both Section 114 (of the Act of 2013) and Section 6 of the 1897 Act clearly point to a narrow interpretation of Section 24 with the object of saving on-going acquisition proceedings as far as possible. The learned SG referred to the provisions of UK's Interpretation Act, 1978; he also relied on Bennion's Statutory Interpretation Bennion's Fifth Edition, (2012) Indian Reprint, which reads as under: Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention. 20. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All ER 712, to the effect that: Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears. The learned SG also referred to the later judgment of the House of Lords which dealt with the said question. It is submitted t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that all further "proceedings" after the award would be taken under the new Act. It was highlighted here, that Parliament clearly intended that the compensation determined under the old Act had to be paid in terms of the new Act, which is Under Section 77. The learned SG submitted that given these aspects, which are expressed in Section 24(1), the non obstante Clause and the following provisions of Section 24(2) have to be interpreted contextually, and in a purposive manner. It was submitted that Parliament did not intend that settled matters should be undone, and whatever had attained finality, in acquisition matters, should not be re-opened. He cited the decisions of this Court reported as Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State Of Assam and Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para 118-121; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 186 para 16-18; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle (2008) 3 SCC 279 @ para 51-54; Government of Andhra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 31) meant that higher interest as mandated by Section 34 was to be paid. 26. The context of Section 24, learned Counsel urged, is to provide for a transitory provision viz. to take care of the pending land acquisition proceedings which are ongoing under the LA Act when the Act of 2013 is brought into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. The purpose and object of making this provision is to balance the competing rights of public projects vis-à-vis holders of the land. The object and purpose was to ensure that where acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached an advanced stage and investment of public money had already been made, firstly, the lapsing of such ongoing projects should be avoided and secondly as far as possible, the land owners also can, without disturbing the process of acquisition, be given the compensation under the Act of 2013. 27. It was reiterated that the legislature knows about the ground realities faced in land acquisition proceedings. There are very few cases where one or two land parcels are acquired in isolation. Mostly, acquisitions take place of bigger tracts of land involving more than one parcel of land and more than one person "entitled to compensation" ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... equence of lapsing by dealing with a particular situation in light of fact situation emerging in each case. Not treating "paid" and "deposit" as synonymous or the "deposit" so as to keep it available being the next step after "pay", would lead to disastrous situations as the acquiring authority may have acquired vast tract of land and may have put substantial portion from it to public use by constructing infrastructural projects. Such a disastrous situation/consequence would never have been anticipated or envisaged by the legislature. Learned Counsel also referred to various Standing Orders, framed as part of the financial code of several States, which provided for procedure to deposit money in the treasury, when landowners refused to accept compensation, or were untraceable, at the time the amount was to be tendered. 31. It is submitted by the learned ASG that this Court should not assume any omission or add or amend words to the statute. It is submitted that plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. It is submitted that when a literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icuous by its absence in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Parliament intentionally used the phrases "paid" and "deposit" not in terms of their meanings Under Section 31 so as to avoid the rigours of the said provision and to keep the practical exigencies of land acquisition in mind, more particularly when Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is merely a transitory provision. It was argued that it is a settled canon of interpretation that when the Legislature uses two different phrases, the meaning they carry would be different. Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India, (2002) 3 SCC 722 is relied on. 35. It is submitted that Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante clause, providing for a limited overriding effect of the LA Act in case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24(a) and (b). Section 24(1)(a) contemplates that where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the LA Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force viz. 1.1.2014, acquisition proceedings could continue, however compensation will have to be determined under the Act of 2013. Section 24(1)(b) provides that where an award Under Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as "paid": if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference Under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated Under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been "paid" within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33. 40. It was argued that the conclusion in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) that deposit of the amount of compensation in the Government treasury cannot amount to the said sum (amount of compensation) "paid" to the landowners or persons interested. This view was taken without dwelling on the legal connotation of the expression "paid" in Section 24(2). In the process, it has also not taken into account the binding law as held in Dalmia's case and Benares State Bank's case. Though Section 34 of the LA Act was menti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d not have been to divest the acquiring authority of the land after the said has been vested "free from all encumbrances". In line with the same, it is submitted that the word "or" may be read as "and" so as to limit the lapsing only in cases where both, payment has not been made (subject to proviso) and possession has not been taken. 44. Reliance is placed on the judgments reported as Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of UP 1969 (1) SCR 219, where this Court approved and extracted passages from Maxwell on Interpretation and Stroud's Judicial Dictionary to the effect that generally, the conjunctive "and" is used in a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of "or" and that however, sometimes, even in such a connection, it is, by force of its contents, read as "or". Similarly, Maxwell accepted that "to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one for the other". Learned Counsel also relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353 which held that: 38. ....Even otherwise, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ery little attention is paid to it by English Courts. ...... When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation."). Reliance was also placed on Jamshed Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra. 2005 (2) SCC 591. 46. It was argued by Ms. Pinky Anand, learned ASG, that payment of compensation is not a sine qua non for vesting in terms of Section 16 of the old LA Act. It is urged, in this context, that the old Act did not provide any time line for depositing compensation; nor even for taking over of possession. Ordinarily, the repeal provision under the Act of 2013 (Section 114) would prevail; however, Section 24 carves out an important, albeit a limited scope from the repeal clause. Section 24(2) freshly introduces the concept of lapsing, in relation to acquisitions that were initiated under the old Act. Necessarily, lapsing is to be considered as a narrow concept. Supporting the learned SG's argument that "or" is to be read conjunctively, she highlighted that by reason of Section 16 of the old Act, title vested in the State, upon taking of possession. Divesting under old Act was impermissible. It was urged ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law. 48. It was urged that serious consequences arise when condition Nos. (ii) and (iii) are to be read as not conjunctive or disjunctive. The word used to connect these two conditions is "or"; if it is not read conjunctively, disastrous consequence leading to absurd result would emanate. Once possession is taken over vesting occurs Under Section 16 of the LA Act. Section 24(2) contains no stipulation that such vesting of title of land stands nullified or divested. If the intention of Parliament was to divest the State of its title that had to be stated in plain and clear language. It was emphasized that the conjunctive use of "or" in Section 24(2) would have not only momentous consequences to the State, but innocent third parties, who would be exposed to the risk of being divested title to the lands and properties, perfected by them, as allottees or subsequent purchasers. Merely because a person who has received compensation clungs on to the possession of the land and the same shall lead to la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rtain private persons, in case they re-enter in possession of open land, start cultivation or residing in the house. Lawful possession is deemed to be of the State. A number of decisions that accepted the mode of drawing panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of taking possession were cited. In Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal5 this Court observed that preparing a panchnama is sufficient to constitute taking of possession. If acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing an appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures. Even subsequent utilisation of a portion of acquired land for public purpose was still sufficient to prove taking possession. 51. It is submitted that when the State acquires land and has drawn memorandum of taking possession that is the way the State takes possession of large tract of land acquired, it ought not necessarily to physically occupy such land after forcefully displacing those physically in possession. Possession in law is deemed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vantage, as that would amount to granting a premium for one's wrongdoing, or rank speculation. It is urged, therefore, that it is imperative that the period during which the State or the acquiring authority was prohibited/injuncted by an interim order of the court from taking possession has to be excluded. This principle, submit learned Counsel, is based on settled common law principles. These are in fact Rules of equity, justice and sound logic. In the absence of their being a prohibition in the law these principles would be attracted. The efficacy and binding nature of such common law principles cannot be diminished or whittled down in the absence of any express prohibition in law. Coupled with the aforesaid principle is also a principle of restitution. An interim order passed by the Court merges into the final decision, goes against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end of the litigation would be justified in being placed in the same place in which it would have been, had the interim order not been passed. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to the principle of restitution is in fact ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the country in the name of development and their transfer to private entrepreneurs, who utilize it to construction of multi-storied complexes, commercial centres and for setting up industrial units. Similarly, large scale acquisitions were made on behalf of companies by invoking the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Resultantly, such acquisition led to deprivation of the source of livelihood of land owners, engaged in agricultural operations and other ancillary activities in rural areas. A large number of these people are unaware of, and unable to assert their rights, and secure fair compensation. The unrest and inequity which arose out of these deprivations, impelled the State to enact a modern law, which ensured not only fair compensation, but other rights such as rehabilitation, employment, higher solatium and a guarantee against deprivation of certain kinds of lands. Thus, the Act of 2013 ushered a new regime that starts from a fresh direction. Learned Counsel also relied on Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor and Ors., 2012 (12) SCC 675 to say that the provisions of the Act of 1894 were outdated and were misused and were oppressive to the interest of the landow ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed Counsel submitted that the objective of new Act must be kept in mind to understand the scope of Sections 11, 11(A), 12, 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act, on the one hand, and provisions of Section of 24 of the Act of 2013 on the other. Furthermore, it was argued that the non-obstante Clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour in its own field. It was stressed that such a provision is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the enactment following it, will have its full operation of that, the provision indicated in the non-obstante Clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment. Decisions in this regard were cited by counsel.7 56. Mr. Divan relied upon the three stages preceding the Act of 2013 to urge that there was no doubt in the mind of Parliament, that lapsing of acquisition proceedings was intended to ensue, in the event compensation were not paid; or possession were not taken, in respect of awards made five years prior to coming into force of the Act of 2013. It was argued that Section 24 should be given a plain and literal construction, except to the extent that the term "paid" occurring in Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e other authority other than the Reference Court, could not have been termed as compliance with the Act of 1894. Here, it was urged that Parliament was acutely alive of the fact that the previous land acquisition regime resulted in injurious and unconscionable delays in payment of compensation. Furthermore, even after awards were made, possession was never taken. This led to a great deal of uncertainty as far as the land owners were concerned because they could not move ahead in their life without compensation nor could they take any steps to acquire new lands or properties. It was precisely to address this mischief, rather a widespread one, that the Parliament wished to enact a "bright line approach" whereby all acquisitions which did not culminate either in payment of compensation or taking over of possession in respect of awards made five or more years prior to 1.1.2014 had to lapse. It was submitted that Section 24(1) provided a limited window in that it saved some acquisitions, i.e., notably where awards had been made but further proceedings had not been taken or where awards had not been made in both cases less than 5 years prior to 1.1.2014. It was only in these two limited ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntimano Fernandes v. State of Goa (2011) 11 SCC 506, to say that the State cannot be-in the event of non-acceptance of the compensation by the land owner or its inability to locate the land owner or in the event of a dispute-keep the compensation amount with itself and claim it to be part of same general treasury amount and proceed to utilise it. It was submitted that precisely to deal with this practice, the appeal provided that non-payment of compensation-and in the event of any of the contingencies accruing in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the failure to deposit it with the Reference Court would result in lapse of entire acquisition itself. It was submitted that this interpretation is not only literal but followed the objective and purpose sought to be achieved by the Parliament through the provision. Learned Counsel urged this Court that the literal interpretation in this case would also accrue with an equitable interpretation and ensure that the real benefit of the new law would accrue to land owners deprived of their properties and livelihoods for long periods without payment of compensation. Learned Counsel, therefore, urged that the beneficial interpretation adopted by thi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Further, the proviso to Section 24 provides for compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 where the following conditions are fulfilled, firstly an award has been made Under Section 11 of the 1894 Act; and secondly, compensation in respect of the majority of the land holdings has not been paid to the landowners. It was submitted that the "majority" is required to be reckoned with reference to the award passed under the Act of 1894, and that awards contemplated by the proviso are awards made within the period of five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e., awards made between 1.1.2009 and 31.12.2013. 62. Learned Counsel stated that the third set of cases is where the land owners do not get any benefit under the Act of 2013 and the acquisition proceeds under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It was argued that these cases are covered by Section 24(1)(b) and to which neither Section 24(2) nor the proviso applies. This covers situations where though an award has been passed five years prior to the commencement of the Act, neither of the conditions for deemed lapsing are present. Mr. Divan urged that the provisions of the Act of 1894 will continue to apply without any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... literal interpretation, and the manner of payment, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), is to be strictly in terms of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 as it is an expropriatory legislation. It was contended as to the learned Solicitor General's submission that payment in terms of Section 24 is complied with if the amount is tendered to the landowners, overlooks the obligation of payment in terms of Section 24 is only met if the amount is actually paid to the landowners. On the occurrence of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it ought to be deposited in the Reference Court as defined Under Section 3(d) of the Act of 1894. He submitted that tendering money is not payment and Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 uses the words 'tender' and 'paid' to convey different meanings and obligations. Mr. Divan argued that the judgments cited by the learned Solicitor General in this regard essentially deal with labour laws, and are inapplicable as these statutes did not contain a provision such as Section 31 of the Act of 1894, which strictly and precisely prescribes what is to be done in the event when the payment is not accepted. 66. It wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arding the interpretation of the proviso to Section 24, it was stated that the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24 and not Section 24(1)(b). Mr. Divan submitted that a proviso may in certain cases operate as an independent provision, and the proviso to Section 24 is a stand-alone provision which operates on its own terms. To the extent it is linked to any provision in Section 24, it is linked to Section 24(1)(b) since it permits enhanced compensation (in a particular contingency of non-payment to majority of the landowners) even if an award may have been passed as contemplated in Section 24(1)(b). Mr. Divan placed reliance on the reasons given in the judgment of Delhi Development Authority v. Virendra Lal Bahri, [SLP [C] No. 37375/2016]. 69. All counsel for landowners submitted that there is no valid reason to exclude from the period of 5 years Under Section 24(2), the time during which a landowner had the benefit of an interim order of a court. In support of this argument, it was argued firstly, that Parliament did not expressly exclude such a period in Section 24. Second, where in the Act of 2013, the legislature did want to exclude the period of a stay or injunction, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ar date, the Legislature in the Act of 2013 prescribed the cut-off point with reference to the commencement of the Act. This method of specifying the cut-off point would not attract the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit". It was argued that the occasion for excluding time would arise only where there is a starting point and a statutory period to complete the task. In such provisions, it may be reasonable to provide for the exclusion of time by appropriate language in the section. Here, where a cut-off date is prescribed and as such there is no starting point and period for completion of the task, the notion of excluding time spent in litigations is an alien concept. It was, therefore, submitted that it is not the court's business to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omit words used in the provisions of an Act, i.e., to fill in an obvious and conscious exclusion of a contingency, or a casus omissus. In support of this submission, learned Counsel relied on decisions of this Court. 12 It was also argued that this Court should not also exclude any period or periods, spent in litigation, when interim orders were operating, because, firstly, in each such ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t return the compensation. It was urged that where the State has paid the money by deposit in the Reference Court and the money was lying with the Court, the State may withdraw the money on deemed lapsing. However, if the State were to decide to acquire the land afresh, the compensation already paid may be adjusted; and further since inherent in the notion of lapsing is the requirement for restitution, the State can recover the compensation, inter alia by framing suitable rules. The citizen cannot retain compensation "had and received" since this would amount to unjust enrichment. It was submitted that where the physical possession as well as compensation are with the State, i.e., where the State has taken possession without paying compensation as required under the Act of 1894, there is no absolute vesting free from all encumbrances as contemplated Under Section 16. In the absence of vesting, the State is required to restore possession to the citizen. 73. Learned Counsel argued that having regard to the unfair working of the Act of 1894, giving effect to the legislative intent by reading the expression "or" as "or" is the correct interpretation with beneficent consequences for th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t Under Section 31(2) or in the treasury Under Section 31(1). It is urged that an analysis of Sections 17(3A) & (3B), 31(1) & (2) and Section 28 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894 shows that these provisions clearly distinguish between tender, paid or deposit whether in the court or the treasury. 76. Learned Counsel argued that three different words used in the same Act, in various provisions of the Act, cannot mean the same. It follows also from the reading of Section 19(1)(c) and (cc). In both these provisions word "tender" is used in contrast to word "paid" while word paid is used in contrast to word "deposit". The word "deposit", wherever used, is in the context of "deposit in Court" only not treasury. The expression "tender payment" Under Section 17(3A) and Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 were followed by the words "pay it to them". Therefore, tender cannot mean "paid". It is urged that these terms fall in Part V of the Act, titled as "Payment". The term "pay it to them" Under Section 31 after "tender" must mean an additional action or step. When after "tender" an effort is made "to pay" the compensation and the same is accepted by the beneficiary, it becomes "paid". Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is "deposit". Likewise, these provisions frequently use words "paid or deposited" which shows they are different. Deposit cannot be, therefore, equated with paid as they are more than once separated by word 'or'. 78. It was contended that the scheme of the Act of 1894 was clear and categorical that the amount of compensations when accepted by the beneficiary is deemed to be "paid" for interest to stop running. The running of interest Under Section 34 denotes non-discharge of obligation to pay, otherwise why pay interest? The "deposit in Court" may stop running of interest and therefore, may for this purpose be taken to be paid, but when it comes to actual meaning in the above provisions, "paid and deposit" are invariably separated by the use of word "or" in between them. Therefore, it is submitted that when Section 24(2) of the New Act uses the phrase "compensation has not been paid" it uses the terminology of the proviso to Section 34 (proviso) and must have the same meaning "has not been paid" cannot be read as "has not been deposited". If this is the right interpretation than the coverage of Section 24(2) also expands to cover those cases in which the compensation has n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s in their favour, stalling the acquisition or payment of compensation. All that the provision says is "or compensation has not been paid". The projected policy intent is broad and unencumbered by any exception. This is a clearest indicator of legislative intent to cover all such cases that may cause hardship to the State or may be due to the fault of Court or the litigious land oustee. The intent is clear and therefore, has to be read apart from difficulties or hardships. 80. It is submitted that the State's contention with regard to a differential approach for possession and compensation is irrational and is against the very grain of Section 24(2) and is also unreasonable and discriminatory. It is unreasonable because there are hardly any cases where compensation may have been paid, yet possession may not have been taken. Most of the cases are Under Section 17(1) where possession is invariably taken while compensation remains unpaid as award is not made. By reading word 'or' as 'and', the words "or the compensation has not been paid" become otiose or redundant. Parliament could have only said that lapsing would occur only if possession has not been taken, bec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be rational to read Section 24(2) in such a manner that deprives it of its value and worth and makes it ineffective. Section 24(2) would become ineffective as a whole because there would be rarest of the rare cases, where both the conditions would be fulfilled. The experience shows in vast majority of cases of acquisition under the old Act, possession is taken while award & compensation come much later. This is because Sections 9 & 17(6) of the Act of 1894 were used in vast majority of acquisitions and the Legislature was aware of it. The law does not compel doing of an act that is impossible. It is emphasized that the principle does not apply as the new Act is not requiring any such performance. The new Act after recognising the past, is providing new solutions, rights and benefits. Section 24(2) by itself does not compel performance of an impossible act. This principle could have been relevant during earlier Act but is hardly relevant for interpreting the scope of Section 24(2) of the New Act. Section 24 clearly postulates that even though the Act may be impossible of performance, or results in undue advantage to the beneficiary despite his fault in declining, yet benefit of Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the approach to interpret Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is that it is a savings Clause with an exclusionary deeming provision. It is urged that the words "physical possession" Under Section 24(2) should be read to reflect the actual state of affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013 came into force, i.e., there was actual physical possession of the land. This would also be the case in relation to the term "compensation not paid" Under Section 24(2), where compensation would either have had to be paid or deposited in court; and that use of the term "or" signifies that the two conditions set out above are disjunctive. It is argued that Section 114 consists of two Sections (1) a repeal Clause set out in Section 114(1); and (2) a savings Clause set out in Section 114(2). It is contended that there is a distinction in the manner in which a repealing Clause is construed as compared to the manner in which a savings Clause is construed. While a repealing clause, followed by a new legislation on the same subject-matter would result in a line of enquiry about what rights are obliterated under the old Act by the new Act, a savings Clause would be construed in a manner that resurrects a prov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r determination of compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 naturally would mean that proceedings under the Act of 1894 would be revived, save and except on the issue of computation of compensation. Having revived proceedings Under Section 24(1), Section 24(2) provides for a deemed lapsing through a non-obstante provision for an award made five years or prior to the date of the commencement of the Act of 2013. This creates a legal fiction which, as held by this Court in J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mils Ltd. v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 350 is: ...an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed...The legislature is quite competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. Learned Counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 to the following effect: [l]egal fictions are created only for some definite purpose" and referred to the decision East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 at paragraph 71, which reads as follows: if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you mus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... usted against compensation determined under the Act of 2013. Arguendo, it is urged that even if Section 114(2) of the Act of 2013 is construed to keep alive the State's vested rights by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such rights are limited by Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Thus, while ordinarily the acquisition proceedings that were pending in respect of awards passed under the Act of 1894 would have continued, the legislature by way of a creating a legal fiction, provided for the deemed lapse of these proceedings in respect of which physical possession has not been taken or compensation not paid. Learned Counsel placed reliance on some decisions of this Court.17 VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala, 2016 (4) SCC 216 where it was held that: ...a vested right can also be taken away by a subsequent enactment if such subsequent enactment specifically provides by express words or by necessary intendment. In other words, in the event of the extinction of any such right by express provision in the subsequent enactment, the same would lose its value. 88. It was submitted that in order to determine the accrued rights an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sions of Sub-section (3)- (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31, Sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of Section 31, Sub-section (2) (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made Under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification Under Section 4, Sub-section (1).] 16. Power to take possession.--When the Collector has made an award Under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. *** *** 31. Payment of compensation or deposit of sam ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. The relevant provisions of the Act of 2013 are as follows: 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,-- (a) where no award Under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2013 are extracted hereunder: INTRODUCTION The Land Acquisition Act, LA was a general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act was found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act did not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families. There had been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. However, there was growing public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land. There was no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement were two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement was necessary. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isition Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State Governments as well. Further, there has been heightened public concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner. 4. Earlier, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007 were introduced in the Lok Sabha on 6th December 2007 and were referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development for Examination and Report. The Standing Committee presented its reports (the 39th and 40th Reports) to the Lok Sabha o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es a careful assessment of the economic disadvantages and the social impact arising out of displacement. There must also be holistic effort aimed at improving the all-round living standards of the affected persons and families. 8. A National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families was formulated in 2003, which came into force with effect from February 2004. Experience gained in implementation of this policy indicates that there are many issues addressed by the policy which need to be reviewed. There should be a clear perception, through a careful quantification of the costs and benefits that will accrue to society at large, of the desirability and justifiability of each project. The adverse impact on affected families-economic, environmental, social and cultural-must be assessed in participatory and transparent manner. A national rehabilitation and resettlement framework thus needs to apply to all projects where involuntary displacement takes place. 9. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, has been formulated on these lines to replace the National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, 2003. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g subsistence allowance, jobs, house, one acre of land in cases of irrigation projects, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed. 15. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for livelihood losers, including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed. 16. Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes have been envisaged by providing additional benefits of 2.5 acres of land or extent of land lost to each affected family; one-time financial assistance of Rs. 50,000/-; twenty-five per cent additional rehabilitation and resettlement benefits for the families settled outside the district; free land for community and social gathering and continuation of reservation in the resettlement area, etc. 17. Twenty-five infrastructural amenities are proposed to be provided in the resettlement area including schools and play grounds, health centres, roads, and electric connections, assured sources of safe drinking water, Panchayat Ghars, Anganwadis, places of worship, burial and cremation grounds, village level post offices, fair price shops, and seed-cum-fertilizers storage faci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... visions contained in the Bill. 92. Section 2(2) of the Act of 2013, provides that in the event of acquisition for private companies, consent of 80% of the affected families has to be obtained and for the public-private partnerships, consent of 70% of the affected families is required to be taken. In Section 3(c), the term 'affected family' has been widened, which inter alia includes members of the Schedule Tribes, forest dwellers, and families whose livelihood is dependent on forests or water bodies. A "Social Impact Assessment" ("SIA") has to be prepared, as provided in Sections 4 to 9. Special provisions to safeguard food security have been made by prohibiting the acquisition of multi-cropped land except in exceptional circumstances as enumerated in Section 10. Section 11 is akin to Section 4 of the Act of 1894 regarding issuance of preliminary notification. The SIA report lapses in case preliminary notification Under Section 11 is not issued within a period of 12 months from the date of the report. A Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme ("RR Scheme") is provided in Sections 16 to 18. The Collector has to pass the award Under Section 23. Section 26 deals with the deter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act; the public purpose has been defined; consent provisions have also been made. The interest of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been adequately protected. Various Committees and Authorities have been constituted. The definition of 'affected families' has been widened. 93. Undoubtedly the Act of 2013 has provided safeguards, in the form of higher compensation and provisions for rehabilitation, which are necessary. In that light, the court has to interpret its provisions, to give full and meaningful effect to the legislative intent keeping in mind the language and tenor of the provisions, it is not for the court to legislate. The Court can only iron out creases to clear ambiguity. The intended benefit should not be taken away. At the same time, since the Act of 2013, envisages lapse of acquisitions notified (and in many cases, completed by the issuance of the award) due to indolence and inaction on the part of the authorities and therefore, intends acquisition at a fast track, the full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in Section 24. Scope of Section 24 94. Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all other provisions of the A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the conditions are cumulative, i.e. both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of acquisition proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative ("either/or"). According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a situation where possession has been taken, and compensation is not paid, there is no lapse: also in case where compensation has been paid, but possession not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1.1.2014, there is no lapse. Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word "or" used in phrase 'the physical possession of the land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid', has to be interpreted as "and" as two negative requirements qualify it. Furthermore, argues the State when two negative conditions are connected by "or," they are construed as cumulative, the word "or" is to be read as "nor" or "and." Naturally, the landowners argue to the contrary, i.e., that lapse of acquisition occurred if compensation were not paid, or possession were not taken, 5 years before the coming into force of the Act of 2013. 97. It would be useful to notice Rules of Statutory Interpretation in this regard. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation either Under Section 29 read with Section 31 or Under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending April 1, 1957, the tenant would become the purchaser on "the postponed date", that is to say, when the application would be finally rejected. But if the application be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser. The expression "an application" in the proviso means not only an application Under Section 31 but also an application Under Section 29 read with Section 14. If an application of either type was pending on April 1, 1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that elate. Now, on April 1, 1957, the application filed by Respondent No. 1 Under Section 29 read with Section 31 was pending. Consequently, the Appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the lands on April 1, 1957. The decision of this Court in The Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. v. The C.I.T., West Bengal, Calcutta 1971 (2) SCC 540, was relied upon in the discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and the Explanation (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for consideration. This Court ruled with respect to "or" and held that it had to be read as "and" ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e commonly collation of the words "or" can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where the disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity. 99. In this Court's considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the Rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by "or" is used, then "or" should be read as "nor" or "and". Brown & Co. v. Harrison (supra), ruled thus, about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the word "or": .....I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a conjunctive sense. It is generally disjunctive, but it may be plain from the collation of words that it is meant in a conjunctive sense, and certainly where the use of the word as a disjunctive leads to repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within the ordinary principles of construction adopted by the court to give the word a c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e clauses must be fulfilled. It was observed: (13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence, then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In such a case, "or" really means "either" "or." In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word "or" is given as "A particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases or clauses between which there is an alternative." It is also there stated, "The alternative expressed by "or" is emphasised by prefixing the first member or adding after the last, the associated adv. EITHER." So, even without "either," "or" alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the sentence before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives, any one of which may be chosen without the other being considered at all. In such a case it must be held that a penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000 can be imposed. (14) If, however, the sentence is a negative one, then the position becomes different. The word "or" between the two clauses would then spread the negative influence over the Clause following it. This Rule of grammar is not in dispute. In such a case the conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled and the res ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a), similar observations were made. In Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R. (1928) 1 KB 561, it has been laid down that sometimes word "or" read as "and" and vice versa, but does not do so unless it becomes necessary because "or" does not generally mean "and" and "and" does not generally mean "or". 104. In R.M.D.C. (supra) the definition Under Section 2(1)(d) came up for consideration. The qualifying Clause consisted of two parts separated from each other by the disjunctive word "or". Both parts of the qualifying Clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize competitions that they qualified were of a gambling nature. The court held considering the apparent intention of the legislature, it has perforce to read the word "or" as "and". In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1638, this Court considered the composition of the Board prescribed Under Section 5. The expressions used were not belonging to professing the Hindu religion or not belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. Two negative conditions were used. This Court has observed that "or" in Clause (g) dealing with disqualification must mean "and". The relev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt has observed: 59. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has also submitted that insofar as private universities are concerned, the word "or" occurring in the expression "established or incorporated" in Sections 2(f), 22 and 23 of the UGC Act should be read as "and." He has submitted that the normal meaning of the word "established" is to bring into existence. In order to avoid the situation which has been created by the impugned enactment where over 112 universities have come into existence within a short period of one year of which many do not have any kind of infrastructure or teaching facility, it will be in consonance with the constitutional scheme that only after establishment of the basic requisites of a university (classrooms, library, laboratory, offices, and hostel facility, etc.) that it should be incorporated and conferred a juristic personality. The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive, but at times, they are read vice versa to give effect to the manifest intentions of the legislature, as disclosed from the context. If literal reading of the word produces an unintelligible or absurd result, "and" maybe read for "or" and "or" maybe read for "and." (See ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... habad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint. The word "or" cannot be read as "and". If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a court to refuse to give it effect. If there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things. If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience, by reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it is read in a manner in which it is capable, though not in an ordinary sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all; there would be reason why one should not read it according to its ordinary grammatical meaning. Where the words are plain, the Court would not make any alteration. 108. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia (1980) 1 SCC 158, for interpretation of 'and' and 'or' in the context of the term 'adulterated' as defined in Section 2(i)(f), the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Vol. 3, at p. 2009: You will find it said in some cases that 'or' means 'and'; but 'or' never does mean 'and'. Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp. 229-30, it has been accepted that "to carry out the intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one for the other." The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive, but at times they are read as vice versa. As Scrutton, L.J. said in Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co., LR (1928) 1 KB 561, 568: "You do sometimes read "or" as "and" in a statute .... But you do not do it unless you are obliged, because "or" does not generally mean "and" and "and" does not generally mean "or." As Lord Halsbury L.C. observed in Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Henderson, LR (1888) 13 AC 603, the reading of "or" as "and" is not to be resorted to "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done." The substitution of conjunctions, however, has been sometimes made without sufficient reasons, and it has been doubted whether some of the cases of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it means "nor;" that is to say, that the two things comprised in the prohibition are both prohibited, and not merely prohibited in the alternative. If the sense which I attribute to the word is right, it would have been more strictly grammatical to have written "nor" instead of "or." But I think that the meaning of the enactment is that the road must be of the width specified, and that no road shall be allowed unless it is of the width specified, nor unless it is open at both ends. That seems to me to be the object of the statute, which was passed for sanitary purposes, and also for the purpose of comfort and traffic. It was contended that the object of the provision is sanitary only, and that if a street is forty feet wide, or if however narrow, it is open at both ends, good ventilation is secured. But a very long narrow street would hardly be more salubrious with both ends open than if one end were closed and the street were a cul de sac. Our construction of the Act is according to the ordinary use of language, although it may not be strictly grammatical. We might have referred to authorities by good writers, shewing that where the word "or" is preceded by a negative or proh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in Section 24(2). 113. Even if possession has been taken, despite which payment has not been made nor deposited, (for the majority of the land-holdings), then all beneficiaries holding land on the date of notification Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, are to be paid compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 frowns upon indolence and stupor of the authorities. The expression "possession of the land has not been taken" or "compensation has not been paid" indicates a failure on the part of the authorities to take the necessary steps for five years or more in a pending proceeding Under Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante Clause overriding what is contained in Section 24(1). Thus, Section 24(2) has to be read as an exception to Section 24(1)(b). Similarly, the proviso has to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) for the several reasons to be discussed hereafter. Parliament ena ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. Once possession is taken Under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the owner of the land loses title to it, and the Government becomes the absolute owner of the land. 116. Payment of compensation under the Act of 1894 is provided for by Section 31 of the Act, which is to be after passing of the award Under Section 11. The exception, is in case of urgency Under Section 17, is where it has to be tendered before taking possession. Once an award has been passed, the Collector is bound to tender the payment of compensation to the persons interested entitled to it, as found in the award and shall pay it to them unless "prevented" by the contingencies mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 31. Section 31(3) contains a non-obstante Clause which authorises the Collector with the sanction of the appropriate Government, in the interest of the majority, by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands or in such other way as may be equitable. 117. Section 31(1) enacts that the Collector has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ough the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged Under Section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse Under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged Under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. The expression used is "all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition Under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act", i.e., Act of 1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete, there is no divesting as held in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate 1958 SCR 1156, thus: (9) A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the definition Clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition Clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere possession is taken, but compensation has not been paid. 124. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is to be given full effect. Section 24(2) has been carved out as an exception to the otherwise general applicability of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and Section 24(1)(a) and (b) apply to the proceedings which are pending. Sub-section (2) is an exception to Sub-section (1) which reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1)" where an award has been made, but possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, an exception has been carved in Section 24 where an award has been passed, but no steps have been taken to take the possession nor payment of compensation has been made in pending proceedings Under Section 24(1). The provision has to be construed in the spirit behind what is saved Under Section 6 (of the General Clauses Act) as provided in Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and the non-obstante Clause in Section 24(2). 125. It was also submitted on behalf of the States that neither a transitory provision nor a repealing law could be interpreted so as to take away, disturb or adversely affect rights created by operation of la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d not want to deprive the awardees concerned either of the newly conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the increased benefit Under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the Collector and the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings pending before them where they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed on the power of the Collector in this behalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30-4-1982 to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such awardees. This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984, the reference Court would be able to give the said benefit to the awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in question had accepted the awards, the same having become final, should not be reopened. As regards the increased benefit Under Sections 23(2) and 28, the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24-9-1984 but also to those where awards were made by the Collector and th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sub-section (2) of Section 85 provides for a non-obstante clause. Clause (a) of the said Sub-section provides for saving Clause stating that the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before the said Act came into force. Thus, those arbitral proceedings which were commenced before coming into force of the 1996 Act are saved and the provisions of the 1996 Act would apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after the said Act came into force. Even for the said limited purpose, it is necessary to find out as to what is meant by commencement of arbitral proceedings for the purpose of the 1996 Act where for also necessity of reference to Section 21 would arise. The court is to interpret the repeal and savings clauses in such a manner so as to give a pragmatic and purposive meaning thereto. It is one thing to say that commencement of arbitration proceedings is dependent upon the facts of each case as that would be subject to the agreement between the parties. It is also another thing to say that the expression "commencement of arbitration proceedings" must be understood having regard to the context in which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r implied repeal; that the scheme of the 1940 Act is different from the 1996 Act; that the word "reference" in Section 48 of the old Act had different meanings in different contexts; and for the said reasons, I am of the view that while interpreting Section 85(2)(a) in the context of the question raised in this appeal, one cannot rely only on Section 21 of the 1996 Act. 127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not been taken Under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted hereunder: 48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.- (1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions. Again, in C. Padma and Ors. v. Dy. Secretary and Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 627, this Court stated that: 4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for short "the Act") in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... either original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose. 6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition. The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 335 thus: 9. ...There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the Respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the Respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is a well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession Under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had re-entered the acquired land immediately after its possession had been taken by the Government ignoring the scenario that he stood divested of the possession, Under Section 16 of the Act. This Court observed as under: (Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29) 29. ... This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the Appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the Appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the Appellant had re-entered the land on account of the various interim orders granted by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no effect for two reasons, (1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and (2) that the land once having vested in the Government by virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the landowner would not obliterate the consequences of vesting. This court stated, in Leelawanti and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2012) 1 SCC 66 thus: 19. If Para 493 is read in the man ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... * 24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Appellants have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the Respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. 129. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 is in pari materia with the provisions Section 77 of the Act of 2013; Section 34 (of the Act of 1894) is pari materia with Section 80 of the Act of 2013. Section 77 of the Act of 2013 deals with payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the Authority. Section 77 is reproduced hereunder: 77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority.-(1) On making an award Under Section 30, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Sub-section (2). (2) If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omalous situation-because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the landowners that they must return the compensation in the case of lapse if possession has not been taken. In case possession is with the landowner and compensation has been paid, according to landowners' submission, there is deemed lapse Under Section 24(2) by reading the word "or" disjunctively. It would then be open to the State Government to withdraw the money deposited in the Reference Court. It was also submitted that it is inherent in the notion of lapse that the State may recover the compensation on the ground of restitution. In our opinion, the submissions cannot be accepted as an anomalous result would occur. In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid. The landowner would be unjustly enriched. This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The pri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ls to make deposit Under Section 31(3) or otherwise with respect to majority of the landholdings, in that exigency, all the beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 shall be entitled to higher compensation under the Act of 2013 and there would be no lapse in that case. 134. The landowners had complained that in some cases, under various schemes, close to 80% of the compensation amount was not handed over to the concerned Collector. It was also submitted that in some of the schemes, 50% beneficiaries, for whose benefit the land had been acquired, had not paid even a single rupee. Since this Court is not deciding individual cases here, what is the effect of the interpretation of the law, in the light of this decision, has to be considered in each and every case. We refrain from commenting on the merits of the said submissions as we are not deciding the cases on merits in the reference made to us. Various aspects may arise on the merits of the case as the schemes were framed at different points of time and the dates of notifications Under Section 4 issued thereunder, whether there is one or different notifications and various other attendant circumstances have to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nsure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration Under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award Under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions Under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) that even if compensation was not paid to the Appellant Under Section 17(3-A), it could not be said that possession was taken illegally. Vesting is absolute. This Court has ob ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious consequences. *** 95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 a similar view was reported. That was a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court took the view that once the possession was taken Under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdraw from that position Under Section 18 and even the provisions of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed Under Section 11-A after taking of the possession. A clear-cut observation came to be made in that behalf in para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 was approved. The Court also relied on the decision in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 wher ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... payment of compensation before taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31. In view of the aforesaid ratio it follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted in the present case and even if it be assumed that the award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition of land does not come to an end. 138. In Awadh Bihari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 31, question was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition proceedings in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A as award had not been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. Possession had been taken by the Government Under Section 17(1). It was held that it was not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition. Provisions of Section 11-A was not attracted. Following is the relevant portion of the observations made by this Court: 8. ..It was contended that i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o an order of the Government without application of its mind in the matter of making Section 5-A not to apply, it was open to it to set aside or quash the subsequent acquisition proceedings except Section 4(1) notification which had followed and restore the ownership of the land to the Appellants' land if it had to order fresh enquiry on the basis of Section 4(1) notification. Such a setting aside or quashing was inevitable because the acquisition proceedings had been completed Under Section 17 and the land had vested in the State Government, inasmuch as, without setting aside that vesting of the land in the State Government and restoring the land to the Appellant-owners, that land was unavailable for subsequent acquisition by following the procedure Under Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 and Section 16. Thus in the circumstances of the case in respect of the land of the Appellants, when publication of Section 4(1) notification was made on 21-7-1977, when declaration Under Section 6 was published on 21-7-1977 and taking possession of that land Under Section 17(1) by the Collector was made on 10-7-1978 and the vesting in the State Government of that land had occurred on that d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed according to the ceremonies indicated therein. 25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance with the provision could render the entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provisions in question. The Court may find out as to what would be the consequence which would flow from construing it in one way or the other and as to whether the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions and as to whether the non-compliance is visited by small penalty or serious consequence would flow therefrom and as to whether a particular interpretation would defeat or frustrate the legislation and if the provision is mandatory, the act done in breach thereof will be invalid. *** 27. In G.H. Grant (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237, this Court has held that if a "person interested" is aggrieved by the fac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tates that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible to identify who would get the right to possession if the interest should become a present estate at any time." Thomas F. Bergin 8. Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2d ed. 1984). 144. In Webster's Dictionary, 'vested' is defined as: vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in church vestments. 2. in law, fixed; settled; absolute; not contingent upon anything: as, a vested interest. 145. In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118, it has been observed that once possession is taken and the award has been passed, no title remains with the landowner and the land cannot be de-notified Under Section 48(1) and observed thus: 3. The learned Judge having noticed the procedure prescribed in disposal of the land acquired by the Government for public purposes, has held that the said procedure was not followed for surrendering the land to the erstwhile owners. The Respondent having purchased the land had improved upon the land and is, therefore, entitled to be an equitable owner of the land. We wholly fail to appreciate the view take ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Petitioner has challenged the notification, the declaration, and the award as illegal. It contends that the award does not come in the way of the Petitioner in filing the writ petition on 21-1-1994. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches. 147. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 and Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. and Anr. (1996) 3 SCC 99. The concept of 'vesting' was also considered in The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust 1957 SCR 01. Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. This Court observed thus: (19) That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that "such property shall thereupon vest in su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt in Garikapati case will have full application while considering the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the fifth Respondent claiming a vested right by relying upon unamended Rule 7-A(3). Principles (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the said judgment are apposite to the case on hand. When we make a comprehensive reference to the above principles, it can be said that for the legal pursuit of a remedy it must be shown that the various stages of such remedy are formed into a chain or rather as series of it, which are connected by an intrinsic unity which can be called as one proceeding, that such vested right, if any, should have its origin in a proceeding which was instituted on such right having been crystallised at the time of its origin itself, in which event all future claims on that basis to be pursued would get preserved till the said right is to be ultimately examined. In the event of such preservation of the future remedy having come into existence and got crystallised, that would date back to the date of origin when the so-called vested right commenced, that then and then only it can be held that the said right became a vested right and it is not defeated by the law th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eedings are kept pending due to lethargy of the officials. The drastic consequences follow by the provisions contained in Section 24(2) in such cases. 152. For considering the legislative intent, Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) has been referred to, in which it has been observed: Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention. Principle against doubtful penalisation. It is a general principle of legal policy that no one should suffer detriment by the application of a doubtful law. The general presumption against retrospectivity means that where one of the possible opposing constructions of an enactment would impose an ex post facto law, that construction is likely to be doubtful. .... If the construction also inflicts a detriment, that is a second factor against it. A retrospective enactment inflicts a detriment for this purpose 'if it takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fet retroactif: ..... But both these passages draw attention to an important point, that the exception only applies where application of it would not cause unfairness or injustice. This is consistent with the general Rule or presumption which is itself based on considerations of fairness and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell quoted, ante, p. 494C-E, and recently emphasised by Staughton LJ in Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe (1991) 2 All E.R. 712, 724: In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears. It is not simply a question of classifying an enactment as retrospective or not retrospective. Rather it may well be a matter of degree-the greater the unfairness, the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is intended. The distinction between rights and procedure, and unfairness and fairness, may well overlap. Thus, if a limitation period is shortened but a Plaintiff has time to sue before expiry of the shortened period, he is like ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion "than its language renders necessary" (Lauri v. Renad, at p. 421) or "than is necessary to give effect either to its clear language or to its manifest purpose" (Arnold v. Central Electricity Generating Board (1988) A.C 228, 275. The absence of express limiting words cannot be used as a basis for implying retrospective operation. That would reverse the true presumption. A necessary and distinct implication typically arises in the context of a statute that, by repealing a previous statute, would leave a "lacuna" in the law if the new statute were not to be construed as having retrospective effect: see, e.g., Food Corporation of India v. Marastro Compania Naviera S.A. (1987) 1 W.L.R. 134, 152. The particular problem in the present case is a transitional problem only, applicable only to those arbitrators that are stale as at 1 January 1992, in respect of which applications to strike out are made shortly thereafter. In the future, such claimants will either continue to be dilatory or not, in which case the references will proceed to a conclusion. The concern of the legislature, and the mischief at which the Section was aimed, was not a limited number of existing stale arbitration ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n this case is whether par. 3 of the Article is to be construed in all its generality as applicable to acts or circumstances which have been done or occurred completely in the past and before the commencement of the Order, so as to create or confer a settlement where none existed before, or whether, as the Appellants contend, it is to be construed as supplemental to pars 1 and 2 and limited to the cases where persons are in process of acquiring a settlement or status of irremovability so as to preserve their inchoate rights. If the words in par. 3 are construed without limitation, then, the residence of the pauper at Chequer's Row in Upton St. Leonard's between 1893 and 1897 being deemed to be residence in Gloucester, a settlement in Gloucester is conferred upon him and the Respondents succeed. We think this paragraph should be so construed subject to the general principle that a statute is prima facie prospective and does not interfere with existing rights unless it contains clear words to that effect, or unless, having regard to its object, it necessarily does so, and that a statute is not to be construed to have a greater to retrospective operation than its language rend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... express reference in the first Sub-section of Section 32 to Section 106, and Section 146 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, upon the omission of any reference in this Sub-section to Section 108, and upon the repeal in Sub-section 2 of Section 32 of Section 108. He contended that if the Legislature had meant to include Section 108 in the first Sub-section it would have referred to it in express berms and would not merely have repealed it by the second sub-section. In the first Sub-section mention is made of other Sections of the Income Tax Acts, but not of Section 108. It must be taken, he argued, that Parliament had in mind the difficulties created by Section 108, which were pointed out in Aramayo's Case by the House of Lords, and that Parliament intended to remove these difficulties by the repeal of Section 108 so as to prevent its operation in future, but did not mean to change the law as regards acts done before passing of the statute. The question must depend upon the construction of the language of Section 32. The Rules to be applied are well settled. It is a fundamental Rule of English law that enactments in a statute are generally to be construed as prospective and intended to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to the accrued right. This Court, while dealing with retrospectivity of a statute, observed that retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh; otherwise, it runs the risk of being struck down for being unconstitutional. Following observations have been made: 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular Section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n contemplation either of the Assessee or even the legislature, when the housing project was accorded approval by the local authorities. 26. Having regard to the above, let us take note of the special features which appear in these cases: 26.1. In the present case, the approval of the housing project, its scope, definition and conditions, are all decided by and are dependent on the provisions of the relevant DC Rules. In contrast, the judgment in Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 1 SCC 139 was concerned with income tax only. 26.2. The position of law and the rights accrued prior to enactment of the Finance Act, 2004 have to be taken into account, particularly when the position becomes irreversible. 26.3. The provisions of Section 80-IB(10) mention not only a particular date before which such a housing project is to be approved by the local authority, even a date by which the housing project is to be completed, is fixed. These dates have a specific purpose which gives time to the developers to arrange their affairs in such a manner that the housing project is started and finished within those stipulated dates. This planning, in the context of facts in these ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent. The provisions of Section 24, as introduced in the said Bill, read as under: 24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case where a notification Under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA was issued before the commencement of this Act but the award Under Section 11 thereof has not been made before such commencement, the process shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government shall initiate the process for acquisition of land afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where possession of land has not been taken, regardless of whether the award Under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA Act has been made or not, the process for acquisition of land shall also be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government shall initiate the process of acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 162. It is apparent from Section 24(1), as introduced originally, contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made, but it was later on amended, and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a), there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case award has not been passed. The earlier ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... new law will be applicable. Secondly, if the award has been passed and no compensation has been given and no physical possession has been taken the new law will be applicable. The third situation where this Clause will be applicable is when award has been passed but farmer has not been given more than 50 per cent compensation which will entail enforcement of this law. The hon'ble member and several others have raised this apprehension that this Act will ultimately give vast powers to the bureaucracy. In regard to this apprehension I would like to say that we have fixed time limit at every level of the procedure and I hope that the states will adhere to these timelines. 165. It is clear that while replying to the debate, the Minister concerned has stated that there would be lapse only if in case possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid. The emphasis right from the beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of debate too, it is apparent that the word "or" had been understood as "and". In Re: Objectives of the Act 166. It was submitted on behalf of the landowners that the consideration of difficulties, harsh consequences, the importance of perfo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... distress resulting from its operation. In Re: proviso to Section 24(2) 167. In reference to the question whether the proviso is part of Section 24(2) or Section 24(1), it was submitted on behalf of the acquiring authorities and the States that the proviso needs to be read along with the main provision of Section 24(2) and cannot be read with Section 24(1)(b). It was pointed out that this Court has taken the view in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh and Ors., (2018) 14 SCC 161 that the proviso should be read as part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, cannot be construed as proviso to Section 24(1)(b) whereas in Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri and Ors. (supra), a different view has been taken while referring the matter, and it has been observed that it should be treated as a proviso to Section 24(1)(b) and not to Section 24(2). As the interpretation of Section 24(2) is involved in the matter, it is absolutely necessary to socio-justice and whether the proviso is part of Section 24(2) or has to be read as an independent provision or it has to be treated as part of the proviso to Section 24(1)(b), the question is required to be decided as it ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d. It was also submitted that if the proviso is read with Section 24(2), arbitrary results will follow. The proviso would be arbitrary and liable to be struck down Under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case notification Under Section 4 applies only to a single plot of land or single owner, the conditions of Section 24(2) are not fulfilled acquisition would lapse, and in a case where several pieces of land have been acquired, if compensation in respect of majority landholdings has not been deposited, such acquisition will not lapse, but only higher compensation under the Act of 2013 would be paid. The words "award being made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act" are absent in the proviso. Reading these words to proviso would do violence to the literal language, and its plain meaning proviso and being a beneficial provision must be construed in the way which furthers its performance. It was also submitted that in respect of large chunks of land carved out by the same notification, the compensation in respect of the majority of landholdings has been deposited. In such a case no lapse will take place because the proviso in such a case will not apply and whether in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 24(2) not only deals with failure to take physical possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. If both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition proceeding. But where payment has been made though possession has been taken or payment has been made to some of the persons but not to all, and it has also not been deposited as envisaged in the proviso, in that event all beneficiaries (under the same award) shall get higher compensation. This is because once possession is been taken, there can be no lapse of the proceedings, and higher compensation is intended on failure to deposit the compensation. Once an award has been passed and possession has been taken, there is absolute vesting of the land, as such higher compensation follows under the proviso, which is beneficial to holders. In a case where both the negative conditions have not been fulfilled, as mentioned in Section 24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso, in our opinion is a wholesome provision and is, in fact, a part of Section 24(2); it fits in the context of Section 24(2) as deposit is related with the payment of compensation and lapse is provided due to non-payment along with not tak ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovisions to which it is attached such an interpretation, doing violence to the express provision, is not a legitimate interpretative exercise. There is no need to add it as the proviso to Section 24(1)(b) as it has not been done by the legislature, and it makes sense where it has been placed. It need not be lifted. (b) Punctuation used in Section 24(2): 174. Parliament has used the full stop (.) after Section 24(1) and colon (:) after Section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate any part of the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a Sub-clause that follows logically from the text before it. We are examining this aspect of the colon, additionally. Though as the interpretation of the provision of Section 24(2) and its proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its placement, the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). Use of punctuation colon reinforces our conclusion and punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes punctuation can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop aft ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rovision. It is usually of little weight, however, since the sense of an Act should be the same with or without its punctuation. ... Although punctuation may be considered, it will generally be of little use since the sense of an Act should be the same with or without it. Punctuation is a device not for making meaning, but for making meaning plain. Its purpose is to denote the steps that ought to be made in oral reading and to point out the sense. The meaning of a well-crafted legislative proposition should not turn on the presence or absence of a punctuation mark. 177. In Marshall v. Cottingham (1981) 3 All ER 8 : (1982) Ch 82 at 88, at 12 while referring to the change of position and establishing that punctuation may be used in interpretation, it was held that: the day is long past when the courts would pay no heed to punctuation in an Act of Parliament. In Hanlon v. Law Society (1981) AC 124 at 197 it was held as under: ... not to take account of punctuation disregards the reality that literate people, such as parliamentary draftsmen, punctuate what they write, if not identically, at least in accordance with grammatical principles. Why should not other literate people ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the punctuation. I need not deny that punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text. ********* ******* 77. The High Court has rejected the contention of the Petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh on two grounds. In the first place it has been said that the comma was no part of the Act. That the orthodox view of earlier English Judges was that punctuation formed no part of the statute appears quite clearly from the observations of Willes, J. in Claydon v. Green. Vigorous expression was given to this view also by Lord Esher, M.R. in Duke of Devonshire v. Connor where he said: In an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets any more than there are such things as stops. This view was also adopted by the Privy Council in the matter of interpretation of Indian statutes as will appear from the observations of Lord Hobhouse in Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh, namely, that "it is an error to rely on punctuation in construing Acts of the legislature". Same opinion was expressed by the Privy Council in Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen. If, however, the Rule regarding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of the High Courts is dealt with in Entry 11-A under the caption "administration of justice", which has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well as criminal justice. The expression "administration of justice" has been used without any qualification or limitation wide enough to include the "powers" and "jurisdiction" of all the courts except the Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after the words "administration of justice" in Entry 11-A has significance and meaning. The other words in the same entry after "administration of justice" only speak in relation to "constitution" and "organisation" of all the courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows that under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has no power to constitute and organise the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an accepted principle of construction of a Constitution that everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the grant of power. The State Legislature being an appropriate body to legislate in respect of "administration of justice" and to invest all courts within the State including the High Court with general jurisdiction and powers in all matters, civil and criminal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry 3 there is a semicolon, and this punctuation cannot be discarded as being inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a definite object of making this topic as distinct and not having relation only to the topic that follows thereafter. Under Entry 78 of List I, the topic of jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts is not dealt with. Under Entry 3 of List II the State Legislature can confer jurisdiction and powers or restrict or withdraw the jurisdiction and powers already conferred on any of the courts except the Supreme Court, in respect of any statute. Therefore, the State Legislature has the power to make a law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court. 180. There are several other decisions, which support the proposition that punctuation marks, especially colons have a significant role in the interpretation of words in a statute. These judgments include Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2006) 6 SCC 530. It was submitted that the semicolon after the word "cotton" did not mean that the first part of the Section was disjunctive from "such produce" as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process. It was further submitted that p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... C 28 With respect to 'Full Stop' and 'Colon', Vepa P. Sarathi in the Interpretation of Statutes, Fifth Edition discussed the issue thus: The Stop.-The most important punctuation mark is the period or full stop. It has to be placed at the end of a complete sentence which is neither exclamatory nor interrogatory. Of course, in legislative drafting exclamatory or interrogative sentences will not occur. An incomplete sentence should however end with a dash. It should be noticed carefully whether the final stop should be inside or outside the quotes. One can tell easily by the sense. Colon.-It implies that what follows explains and amplifies the sentence that comes before it. It is generally used before a quotation, or to take the place of some word such as "namely". 181. Aswini Kumar Ghose and Anr. (supra) also dealt with full stops and held that as long as punctuation does not detract from the meaning of the words in the text, it can be a controlling factor in interpretation. In State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors. (1982) 1 SCC 561, this Court observed that grammar and punctuation are hapless victims of the pace of life and sometimes are used both as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is provided to complete the acquisition proceedings where the award has been passed, and the provisions of the Act of 1894 shall be applied as if it has not been repealed. Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause; it plainly is notwithstanding Section 24(1), and the proviso to Section 24(2) enlarges the scope of Section 24(2). When the window period has been provided Under Section 24(1)(b), i.e., Section 24(2) and its proviso, higher compensation cannot follow in case of an award which has been passed within 5 years of the enactment of the Act of 2013 otherwise anomalous results shall accrue. In case proviso is read as a part of Section 24(1)(b), it would be repugnant to the consideration of the provision which has been carved out saving acquisition and providing window period of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings. There were cases under the Act of 1894, in which award may have been made in December 2013, a few days before the Act was enforced on 1.1.2014. As the provisions of the Act of 1894 are applicable to such awards, obviously notice of the award has to be given Under Section 12 of the said Act. There is no question of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ken for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land on the date of notification Under Section 4. If the proviso is added, Section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of Section 24(1)(b) providing proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which is not the function of the proviso to substitute the main Section but to explain it. It is not to cause repugnancy with the main provision. The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope. It is a settled proposition of law that the proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. The proviso would travel beyond the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of Section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the Act of 1894. Thus, the proviso has no space to exist with Section 24(1)(b), and it has rightly not been attached by Parliament, with Section 24(2) and has been placed at the right place where it should have been. 186. It is in the cases where there ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction 24(2) deals with the lapsing of the acquisition. We are unable to accept the submission. Section 24(2) also deals with payment of compensation and taking of possession. Section 24(1)(a) is concerning a situation where no award has been made, higher compensation under the new Act to follow. In Section 24(1)(b) where the award is made (at the time of coming into force of the new Act) further proceedings would be under the new law; subject to Section 24(2), the provisions of the Act of 1894 would apply to such an award. Thus, the main part of Section 24(2) deals with payment of compensation; also the proviso which provides for higher compensation to be paid to all is in the context of Section 24(2) and cannot be lifted and added to Section 24(1)(b) in the aforesaid circumstances. What would be the majority of the landholdings has to be seen in the context, what has been acquired in the case of a single plot being acquired, and in case compensation has not been deposited with respect to that, it will constitute the majority. The majority does not depend upon the number of holdings acquired, but what constitutes the majority as per the acquired area under the notification. 189. S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that 1965 (1) SCR 276: 14. ...So far as a general principle of construction of a proviso is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a proviso is to limit the main part of the Section and carve out something which but for the proviso would have been within the operative part. .... Similarly, this Court in Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad 1967 (1) SCR 831 stated that: 5. .... It is well-recognised that a proviso is added to a principal Clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principal Clause what is included in it and what the Legislature desires should be excluded. .... In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc. AIR (1968) SC 59 it was observed: 8. ... Generally speaking, it is true that the proviso is an exception to the main part of the section; but it is recognised that in exceptional cases a proviso may be a substantive provision itself. .... 191. In S. Sundaram Pillai and Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman and Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 591, the scope of a proviso was clarified. The relevant discussion is quoted as under: 27. The next question that aris ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision. *** 35. A very apt description and extent of a proviso was given by Lord Loreburn in Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale Railway Co., 1909 AC 253, where it was pointed out that insertion of a proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly adhered to its legitimate use and at times a Section worded as a proviso may wholly or partly be in substance a fresh enactment adding to and not merely excepting something out of or qualifying what goes before. To the same effect is a later decision of the same Court in Jennings v. Kelly, 1940 AC 206, where it was observed thus: We must now come to the proviso, for there is, I think, no doubt that, in the construction of the section, the whole of it must be read, and a consistent meaning, if possible, given to every part of it. The words are:... 'provided that such licence shall be granted only for premises situate in the ward or district electoral division in which such increase in population has taken place...' There seems to be no doubt that the words "such increase in population ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h have been addressed to us, which depend solely on taking words absolutely in their strict literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration that they are appearing in the proviso. 193. Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai 1966 (1) SCR 367, considered the effect of a proviso and said that its function is "to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the proviso would be within that clause. It may ordinarily be presumed in construing a proviso that it was intended that the enacting part of the Section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso." Similar observations and considerations weighed in Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Banks Employees Union and Anr. (2004) 1 SCC 574 and other decisions noted below.24 In Subhaschandra Yograj Sinha (supra) it was observed that: (9) The law with regard to provisos is well settled and well understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. But, provisos are ofte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR (34) 1947 PC 94, it was held that where a Section of an enactment contains two provisions and the second proviso is repugnant in any way to the first, the second proviso must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and speaks the last intention of the makers. The following observations were made: (7) Proviso 2 qualifies the main enactment in the matter of delivery no less than does proviso 1 and it also qualifies proviso 1 itself. For it provides "further" that "in any case where there is no physical delivery of the goods," the tax is to be payable when the property in the goods passes to the purchaser. Thus where there is no physical delivery the notional delivery which proviso 1 introduces is rendered inapplicable. Anger J. found in proviso 2 an alternative ground for his decision against the Crown and it is the main ground of Hudson J.'s judgment in the Supreme Court. In their Lordships' view this proviso presents an insuperable obstacle to the Crown's claim. There has been no physical delivery of the goods by the Dominion Company to the Pulp Company. The proviso enacts that "in any case" where there has been no physical d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is no lapse, but amount not deposited as required. Higher compensation is contemplated by the Act of 2013, which intention is fully carried forward by the placement and interpretation. In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word "paid" used in Section 24(2) and "deposited" used in the proviso to Section 24(2) 198. Connected with this issue are questions like what is the consequence of payment not being made Under Section 31(1) and what are the consequences of amount not deposited Under Section 31(2). The provision of Section 24(2) when it provides that compensation has not been paid where award has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013. In contradistinction to that, the proviso uses the expression "an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries". We have to find out when an amount is required to be deposited under the Act of 1894 and how the payment is made under the Act of 1894. The provisions of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 are attracted to the interpretation of provisions of Section 24(2) to find out the meaning of the words 'paid' and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er Section 24(2), if the amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited with respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have been specified in the proviso as it is part of Section 24(2) and has to be read with it, particularly in view of the colon and placement by the legislature as held above. Two different consequences of non-deposit of compensation are: (i) higher compensation in a case where possession has been taken, payment has been made to some and amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case there is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest as envisaged Under Section 34 from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum. 202. The word "paid" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean thus: "paid past and past participle of pay"; Give a sum of money thus owned. Cambridge English Dictionary, defines "paid" as follows: being given money for something. P. Ramanatha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of 1894, in case payment has not been tendered or paid, nor deposited the interest has to be paid as specified therein. In Section 24(2) also lapse is provided in case amount has not been paid and possession has not been taken. 205. In our considered opinion, there is a breach of obligation to deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference court in exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section 31(2). The default will not have the effect of reopening the concluded proceedings. The legal position and consequence which prevailed from 1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only the liability for interest and all those transactions were never sought to be invalidated by the provisions contained in Section 24. It is only in the case where in a pending proceeding for a period of five years or more, the steps have not been taken for taking possession and for payment of compensation, then there is a lapse Under Section 24(2). In case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, higher compensation has to follow. Both lapse and higher compensation are qualified with the condition of period of 5 years or more. 206. It ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , neither during the time when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the compensation amount in court. This is a significant aspect which none of the previous decisions have noticed. Thus, it would be incorrect to imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, Under Section 31(2)] would entail lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act of 2013. Such an interpretation would lead to retrospective operation, of a provision, and the nullification of acquisition proceedings, long completed, by imposition of a norm or standard, and its application for a time when it did not exist. 209. If the expression "deposited" is held to be included in the expression "paid" used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section, which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 31(2) is not fatal. Even if the amount has not been deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency proviso to Section 24(2). 210. In Black's Law Dictiona ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccept the wages he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by the employer. Therefore, though Section 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment, for otherwise a workman could always make the Section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. So far as the second condition about the making of the application is concerned, the proviso requires that the application should be made for approval of the action taken by the employer. 213. In The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi and Anr. 1965 (1) SCR 998, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law to the similar effect. It is not actual payment, but tender of amount which is necessary to fulfil obligation to pay. This Court observed thus: 4....The proviso does not mean that the wages for one month should have been actually paid, because in many cases the employer can only tender the amount before the dismissal but cannot force the employee to receive the payment before dismissal becomes effective. In this case the tender was definitely made before the orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d the different words carrying the same meaning in the same provision, whereas words "paid" and "deposited" carry a totally different meaning. Payment is actually made to the landowner and deposit is made in the court, that is not the payment made to the landowner. It may be discharge of liability of payment of interest and not more than that. Applying the Rule of literal construction also natural, ordinary and popular meaning of the words "paid" and "deposited" do not carry the same meaning; the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given to them, as observed in Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (at page 91) thus: ... Natural and grammatical meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary." "The true way", according to LORD BROUGHAM is, "to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further". The Rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court ....... 216. The same work also notes that when two different expressions are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. The following passage is relevant (Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh at page 395): ....... When in relation to the same subject matter, different words are used in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. In construing the words 'distinct matters' occurring in Section 5 of the Stamp Act, 1899, and in concluding that these words have not the same meaning as the words 'two or more of the descriptions in Schedule I' occurring in Section 6, VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J., observed: "When two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense." Simil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d words into an Act unless it is necessary to do so. Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the statute. Speaking briefly the court cannot reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. 218. In V.L.S. Finance Ltd. (supra) this Court observed that: 17. Ordinarily, the offence is compounded under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the power to accord permission is conferred on the court excepting those offences for which the permission is not required. However, in view of the non-obstante clause, the power of composition can be exercised by the court or the Company Law Board. The legislature has conferred the same power on the Company Law Board which can exercise its power either before or after the institution of any prosecution whereas the criminal court has no power to accord permission for composition of an offence before the institution of the proceeding. The legislature in its wisdom has not put the rider of prior permission of the court before compounding the offence by the Company Law Board and in case the contention of the Appellant is accepted, same would amount ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r the Appellants that the omission of the word "only" from Section 2(2) indicates that applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not limited to the arbitrations that take place in India. We are also unable to accept that Section 2(2) would make Part I applicable even to arbitrations which take place outside India. In our opinion, a plain reading of Section 2(2) makes it clear that Part I is limited in its application to arbitrations which take place in India. We are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Respondents, and the interveners in support of the Respondents, that Parliament by limiting the applicability of Part I to arbitrations which take place in India has expressed a legislative declaration. It has clearly given recognition to the territorial principle. Necessarily therefore, it has enacted that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 applies to arbitrations having their place/seat in India. *** 82. Another strong reason for rejecting the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is that if Part I were to be applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries, certain words would have to be added to Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mport are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that the expression "distinct matters" in Section 5 and "descriptions" in Section 6 have different connotations. 222. In Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East West Import and Export (P) Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 760, it was observed as under: 7. The Explanation has reference to the point of time at two places: the first one has been stated as "at the end of the previous year" and the second, which is in issue, is "in the course of such previous year". Counsel for the revenue has emphasised upon the feature that in the same Explanation reference to time has been expressed differently and if the legislative intention was not to distinguish and while stating "in the course of such previous year" it was intended to convey the idea of the last day of the previous year, there would have been no necessity of expressing the position differently. There is abundant authority to support the stand of the counsel for the revenue that when the situation has been differently expressed the legislature must be taken to have intende ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amed Under Section 55 and the Standing Orders issued by State Governments 225. It was urged on behalf of acquiring Authorities that various State Governments have framed Rules Under Section 55 of the Act of 1894 and/or have issued the Standing Orders/instructions with respect to the Government money Under Article 283 of the Constitution of India. These Standing Orders and Rules have remained in force from time immemorial; their provisions require the amount to be tendered, notice to be issued to the landowners to collect the amount of compensation awarded to them. If they do not appear and apply to the reference Under Section 18, the officer shall cause the amounts due to be paid into the treasury as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due and vouched for in the accompanying form (marked E). When the payee ultimately claims the payment, they shall be paid in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The Land Acquisition (Bihar and Orissa) Rules were framed Under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. Rule 10 thereof is extracted hereunder: 10. In giving notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and tendering payment Under Section 31(1), to such of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... WW as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are respectively due, and vouched for in the form prescribed or approved by Government from time to time. He shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in which the deposits have been made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amount will be paid to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The Collector should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payment due in or near the village to which the land pertains in order that the number of undisbursed sum to be placed in deposit on account of nonattendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a representative, such representative, must show legal authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of the principal. 227. In the State of Karnataka too similar Rules were framed in 1965 Under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. Similarly, in the State of Kerala also Rule 14(2) of the Land Acquisition (Kerala) Rules, 1990 were framed Under Section 55 of the Act of 1894, provided that payment relating to award shall be made or the amount shall be credited to the court or rev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s passed. When a notice is given to receive the payment of compensation and in case they fail to appear, the amount has to be paid to the treasury as revenue deposit payable to the landowner. 229. Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned Authorities and they have to follow them. They deposit the amounts in court only when a reference (for higher compensation) is sought, not otherwise. Even if a person refuses to accept it and the amount is deposited in court or even it is not tendered, only higher interest follows Under Section 34. Once Rules have prevailed since long and even if it is assumed that deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from payment as envisaged Under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State. The liability to pay the amount with interest would subsist. When amounts are deposited in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity and the adverse consequence envisaged is Under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. The consequence of non-deposit in the court is that the amount of the landowner cannot be invested in the Government securities as envisaged Under Sections 32 and 33 of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right. Here the question was a simple one, viz. whether the measurement book prepared for the contract work had been properly scrutinised and checked by the Appellant or not. He did the checking in March 1954 and immediately thereafter in May 1954 the Executive Engineer re-checked the measurements and found that the previous checking had not been done properly. Between March and May there could not be much rainfall, if at all, and the marks of digging according to the witnesses could not be obliterated during that time. It is however said that at the 6th and 7th mile the checking was done in July and by that time rains might have set in. Even so the witnesses at the sites of the pits could not be so considerably altered as to present a totally wrong picture. If anything had happened the earth would have swollen rather than contracted by reason of rain and the pits would have become bigger and not smaller. Anyway the questions which were put to the witnesses were recorded and sent to the Chief Engineer and his replies were received. No doubt the replies were not put in the hands of the Appellant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ravancore-Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 24; Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B., AIR 1969 SC 381 We are similarly of the view that failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules does not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer is able to establish prejudice. In this case the learned Single Judge the High Court as well as the learned Judges of the Division Bench found that the Appellant was in no way prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of Rule 8(19). The Appellant cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all stages. The Appellant was fully alive to the allegations against him and dealt with all aspects of the allegations in his written defence. We do not think that he was in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with Rule 8(19). A similar view has been taken in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 and other decisions. 233. There is a dual obligation, namely, part mandatory and part directory. In Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975) Q.B. 235, Lord Denning has c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... opments Ltd. (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 at p. 1032, a distinction was made between essential and supportive provisions. The following observations are pertinent: By way of final comment I would add that I am strongly attracted to the view that legislation of the present kind should be evaluated and construed on an analytical basis. It should be considered which of the provisions are substantive and which are secondary, that is, simply part of the machinery of the legislation. Further, the provisions which fall into the latter category should be examined to assess whether they are essential parts of the mechanics or are merely supportive of the other provisions so that they need not be insisted on regardless of the circumstances. In other words, as in the construction of contractual and similar documents, the status and effect of a provision has to be assessed having regard to the scheme of the legislation as a whole and the role of that provision in that scheme-for example, whether some provision confers an option properly so called, whether some provision is equivalent to a condition precedent, whether some requirement can be fulfilled in some other way or waived. Such an approach whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... old that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. 236. Similarly, in Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 735 this Court observed that non-compliance with the directory provision does not affect the validity of the act done in breach thereof. In Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 401, this Court considered the mode of publication and held that publication in a newspaper was the only effective mode and that the provision was mandatory. 237. This Court also considered the effect of non-deposit of the amount in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr. 1990 Supp SCC 806 and held that in case compensation has not been paid or deposited, the State is liable to pay interest as provided in Section 34. The Court held thus: 5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to the landowner in the event of the compensation not being paid or deposited in time in court. Before taking possession of the land, the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount awarded, as stated in Section 31, failing which he is liable to pay interest as provided in Section 34. 6. In the cir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oped and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have been given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense infrastructure. We are unable to accept the submission that merely by deposit of amount in treasury instead of court, we should invalidate all the acquisitions, which have taken place. That is not what is contemplated Under Section 24(2). We are also not able to accept the submission that when law operates these harsh consequences need not be seen by the court. In our opinion, that submission is without merit in as such consequences are not even envisaged on proper interpretation of Section 24(2), as mentioned above. 242. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends that the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect to the majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not been paid or deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation. In case money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in court with respect to majority of landhold ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roceedings shall continue' under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if the said Act has not been repealed'. The expression "proceedings shall continue" indicates that proceedings are pending at the time; it is a present perfect tense and envisages that proceedings must be pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force. It does not apply to concluded proceedings before the Collector after which it becomes functus officio. Section 24 of the Act of 2013, does not confer benefit in the concluded proceedings, of which legality if question has to be seen in the appropriate proceedings. It is only in the pending proceedings where award has been passed and possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid, it is applicable. There is no lapse in case possession has been taken, but amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings in a pending proceeding, higher compensation under the Act of 2013 would follow under the proviso to Section 24(2). Thus, the provision is not applicable to any other case in which higher compensation has been sought by way of seeking a reference under the Act of 1894 or where the validity of the acqu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case. 246. It was urged on behalf of acquiring authorities and the states that there is no conflict of opinion with respect to the mode of taking possession in IDA v. Shailendra and Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. (supra), and that the latter is not a decision as to the aspect of possession. A two-Judge Bench decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) has been overruled in the Indore Development Authority case (supra). The view taken in Indore Development Authority (supra) has to prevail as the decision in Velaxan Kumar (supra), was rendered by a two judge Bench of this Court. This Court, however, proceeds to examine the matter afresh as issues have been framed. 247. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. If the land is not c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on. First, there must be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, the physical control is not possession unless accompanied by intention hence if a thing is put into the hand of a sleeping person he has no possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention must be visible or evidence by external signs for if the thing shows no signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not possession. 250. In order to constitute possession, a person should be in physical control. The same is not possession unless and until the intention is there and thirdly, possibility and intention must be visible; otherwise, it is not possession. Mitra has further dealt with how to determine possession. The relevant extract is quoted hereunder: 36. Who is in possession-Determination of.--In Jones v. Chopman, (1849) 2 Ex. 803 : 18 LJ Ex. 456 : 76 PR 794; Maule, J, expounded the doctrine thus: If there are two persons in a field, each asserting that the field is his, and each doing some act in the assertion of the right of possession, and if the question is, which of these two is in actual possession, I answer, the person who has the title is in actual possession and the other person is a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Dias and Hughes, ibid.) 14. According to Pollock and Wright, when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual control of it at pleasure, and so far as regards other persons, the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or land occupied by him or in any receptacle belonging to him and under his control, he is in physical possession of the thing. 15. While recognising that "possession" is not a purely legal concept but also a matter of fact, Salmond (12th Edn., p. 52) describes "possession, in fact", as a relationship between a person and a thing. According to the learned Author the test for determining "whether a person is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it. 252. In Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004) 3 SCC 684, this Court stated that possession and occupation in common parlance may be used interchangeably, but in law possession amounts to holding property as an owner, while to occupy is to keep possession by being present in it. In Bhinka and Ors. v. Charan Singh, Bhinka and Ors. v. Charan Singh 1959 (Suppl 2) SCR 798, this Court considered th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to notification Under Section 4(1) is void and no title passes on the basis of such sale deed. This Court held that once land vested in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. Once land has been acquired, it cannot be restored to tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it is so acquired. Once possession of land has been taken, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances. Under Sections 16 and 17, the acquired property becomes the property of the Government without any limitation or condition either as to title or possession. Reliance has been placed on Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union (supra): 19. That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that "such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver". The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing, being limited, in title as well as duration. Thus, the word "vest" clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in the statute. The expression "vest" is a word of ambiguous import since it has no fixed connotation and the same has to be understood in a different context under different sets of circumstances. [Vide Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1976 SC 2602, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy AIR 1987 SC 802, Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 605, SCC p. 404, para 41, Govt. of A.P. v. Nizam, Hyderabad (1996) 3 SCC 282, K.V. Shivakumar v. Appropriate Authority (2000) 3 SCC 485, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation AIR 2001 SC 3630 and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport (2010) 8 SCC 467.] 256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it. But it cannot be disputed that the word 'vesting' may mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in possession. 15. We are, therefore, of the view that the word "vest" means vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. 258. The word 'vest' has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting of land, once possession has been taken, Section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of the property from the State as mentioned above. 259. Now, the court would examine the mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 as laid down by this Court. In Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) it was observed that the act of Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. Thereafter, it would not be open to the Government or the Commission to withdraw from the acquisition Under Section 48(1) of the Act. It was held thus: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it. 260. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (supra) it was held that drawing of Panchnama in the presence of witnesses would constitute a mode of taking possession. This Court observed: 9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or Panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not cooperate in taking possession of the land. 261. In Banda Development Authority (supra) this Court held that preparing a Panchnama is sufficient to take poss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ars Under Section 11 of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31-8-1990 does not render the initial award invalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further proceedings necessarily could not be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided in the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. Equally, even if there is an irregularity in service of notice Under Sections 9 and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and on account thereof, award made Under Section 11 does not become invalid. Award is only an offer on behalf of the State. If compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party but subject to Section 28-A. Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested Under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n and proceed to pass the order on the basis of his understanding of the law that symbolic possession did not amount to actual possession, and that the power to withdraw from the acquisition could be exercised at any time before "actual possession" was taken. This view appears to be contrary to the majority decision of this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, wherein this Court observed that how such possession would be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard-and-fast Rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. In the instant case the lands of which possession was sought to be taken were unoccupied, in the sense that there was no crop or structure standing thereon. In such a case only symbolic possession could be taken, and as was pointed out by this Court in the aforesaid decision, such possession would amount to vesting the land in the Government. Moreover, four acres and odd belonging to the Appellant was a part of the larger area of 118 acres notified for acquisition. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 0 SCC 721, Mahavir v. Rural Institute (1995) 5 SCC 335, Gian Chand v. Gopala (1995) 2 SCC 528, Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 and Tika Ram v. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689 More importantly, as on the date of the suit, the Respondents had not completed 12 years in possession of the suit property so as to entitle them to claim adverse possession against BDA, the true owner. The argument that possession of the land was never taken also needs notice only to be rejected for it is settled that one of the modes of taking possession is by drawing a panchnama which part has been done to perfection according to the evidence led by the Defendant BDA. Decisions of this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam (1996) 8 SCC 259 and Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387, sufficiently support BDA that the mode of taking possession adopted by it was a permissible mode. 267. In Ram Singh v. Jammu Development Authority 2017 (13) SCC 474, this Court stated that the mode of taking possession is by drawing a Panchnama. Concerning the mode of taking possession in any other land, law to a similar effect has been laid down in NAL Layout Residents Association v. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot evidence as to whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a Panchnama is an accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-entry, a photograph can be taken; equally, it taken be taken after committing trespass. Such documents cannot prevail over the established mode of proving whether possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can be of little use, much less can they be a proof of possession. A person may re-enter for a short period or only to have photograph. That would not impinge adversely on the proceedings of taking possession by drawing Panchnama, which has been a rarely recognised and settled mode of taking possession. 271. In the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792, the observation made was that it is not possible to take the possession of entire land in a day on which the award was declared, cannot be accepted as laying down the law correctly and same is contrary to a large number of precedents. The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7 SCC 639, is confined to particular facts of the case. The Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot. DVDs. and CDs were seen to hold that the landown ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... i) the person possessing, (ii) the things possessed and, (iii) the persons excluded from possession. A man may hold an object without claiming any interest therein for himself. A servant though holding an object, holds it for his master. He has, therefore, merely custody of the thing and not the possession which would always be with the master though the master may not be in actual contact of the thing. It is in this light in which the concept of possession has to be understood in the context of a servant and master. ************** ***** ************** Principles of law which emerge in Maria Margadia Sequeria (supra) are crystallized as under: 1. No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. 274. In the decision reported as National Thermal Power Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta 2009 (8) SCC 339 this Court held that: 28. When possession is to be taken over in respect of the fallow or Patit land, a mere intention to do so may not be enough. It is, however, the positive stand by the Appellant that the lands in questio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rative Officer and Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133, the land was acquired and possession was handed over to the authorities. Later on the land was sold, documents were manipulated, and flats were constructed in an illegal manner. It was held that the land once acquired, cannot be restored. The State has no right to reconvey the land and no person can claim such a right nor derive an advantage. Sale of land after a notification Under Section 4 of the LA Act was held to be void. It was held in the facts of the case that the judicial process cannot be used to subvert its way. Such persons must not be permitted to profit from the frivolous litigation, and they must be prevented from taking false pleas by relying on forged documents or illegal action. 276. We have seen the blatant misuse of the provisions of Section 24(2). Acquisitions that were completed several decades before even to say 50-60 years ago, or even as far back as 90 years ago were questioned; cases filed were dismissed. References were sought claiming higher compensation and higher compensation had been ordered. Now, there is a fresh bout of litigation started by erstwhile owners even after having received the compensation in ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... It was also submitted even in the absence of the provisions specifically excluding the period of interim stay/injunction having been made in Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the aforesaid principles are attracted and the period has to be excluded. 279. The landowners, on the other hand argued that there is no valid reason to exclude the period spent during the interim order by the court from the prescribed period of 5 years Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. For the main reason that the legislature has not specially provided for exclusion of such period in Section 24 and secondly, where Parliament has desired to exclude the period of interim order has made provision for exclusion of such period in proviso to Section 19 and explanation to Section 69 of the Act of 2013. In the Act of 1894, there was a similar provision made in Section 6 and explanation to Section 11A. During the process of consultation of the stakeholders while enacting the Act of 2013, the Government of NCT of Delhi had suggested that an explanation be added in the provisions of Section 24 to exclude the period of interim order passed by the court. The suggestion was not accepted by the Department of Land Refor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... objectives of the Act of 2013. Section 24 contemplates that the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894, are pending as on the date on which Act of 2013 has been enacted and if no award has been passed in the proceedings, then there is no lapse and only determination of compensation has to be made under the Act of 2013. Where an award has been passed, it is provided Under Section 24(1)(b), the pending proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894 as if the old Act has not been repealed. The provisions totally exclude the applicability of any provision of Act of 2013. There are two requirements Under Section 24(2), which are to be met by the Authorities, where award has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. If possession has been taken, compensation has to be paid by the acquiring authorities. The time of five years is provided for authorities to take action, not to sleep over the matter. In case of lethargy or machinery and default on the part of the Authorities and for no other reason the lapse is provided. Lapse is provided only in c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ors. (supra), which is relied upon by the landowners, that time limit is fixed for the executive authorities to take steps. In case they are prevented by the court's order, obviously, as per the interpretation of the provisions is that such period has to be excluded. In case such a provision would have been made, it would have been "ex abundanti cautela". There was no necessity of making such a provision even if this proposition has been discussed during the formulation of legislation. However, the provision providing exclusion has been enacted. It casts an obligation upon the Authorities to take requisite steps within five years, that by itself excludes such period of interim order. 284. It was pointed out that in certain States, amendments have been incorporated in Section 24(2), excluding the period of interim order passed by the Court. In our opinion, there is no such necessity for providing exclusion of time and it has been done by the States "ex abundanti cautela" and there is no doubt about it that Central Government has also tried to introduce the provision of the exclusion of time by issuance of ordinances, however, they lapsed. It was due to the interpretation and th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted the compensation within 5 years and handed over the possession too, are to be benefited, in case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of holdings. There are cases in which projects have come up in part and as per plan rest of the area is required for planned development with respect to which interim stays have been obtained. It is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage to relentless litigants. It cannot be said hence, that it was due to the inaction of the authorities that possession could not be taken within 5 years. Public policy is not to foment or foster litigation but put an end to it. In several instances, in various High Courts writ petitions were dismissed by single judge Benches and the writ appeals were pending for a long time and in which, with respect to part of land of the projects, efforts were made to obtain the benefit of Section 24(2). Parliament in our view did not intend to confer benefits to such litigants for the aforementioned reasons. Litigation may be frivolous or may be worthy. Such litigants have to stand on the strength of their own case and in such a case provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he same. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed Rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... even the structure of the sentence. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar (1988) 2 SCC 513, it was held that absurdity has to be avoided. In that decision reliance was placed on the decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra), wherein it was observed that when a defect or omission appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. It is the duty to give force and life to the intention of the legislature. The court has to construe the words of the statute in a reasonable way having regard to the context. 290. Again, in Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 459, the decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra) has been followed. Following observations have been made: 18. Applying the above rule, we are of the opinion that the rule-makers did not intend to deprive the army personnel of the benefit of the disability pension solely on the ground that the cost of the journey was not borne by the public exchequer. If the journey was authorised, it can make no difference whether the fare for the same came from the public exchequer or the army personnel himself. 291. There cannot be any dispute with the above propositions. However, in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tification No. 255/77-C.E. dated July 20, 1977, Notification No. CER-8(1)/55-C.E. dated September 2, 1955, Notification No. CER-8(9)/55-C.E. dated December 31, 1955, Notification No. 95/61-C.E. dated April 1, 1961, Notification No. 23/55-C.E. dated April 29, 1955 and similar other notifications. But, here said the Respondents, no such words of limitation are used in the two notifications in question and the expression "duty of excise" must, therefore, be read according to its plain natural meaning as including all duties of excise, including special duty of excise and auxiliary duty of excise. Now, it is no doubt true that in these various notifications referred to above, the Central Government has, while granting exemption Under Rule 8(1), used specified language indicating that the exemption, total or partial, granted under each such notification is in respect of excise duty leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. But, merely because, as a matter of drafting, the Central Government has in some notifications specifically referred to the excise duty in respect of which exemption is granted as "duty of excise" leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be said to have become obsolete and, more so, if it is a penal law and has become incapable of user by a drastic change in the circumstances. Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, has discussed about different classes of enactments such as expired, spent, repealed in general terms, virtually repealed, superseded and obsolete. 293. The Act of 2013 operates prospectively. Section 114 of the Act of 2013, effects a repeal, but with certain savings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, acquisition proceedings are preserved under the Act of 1894, till the stage of making of award; where award is not made, the provisions of compensation under the Act of 2013 apply; where award is made, further proceedings would be under the new Act (of 2013). In case possession has been taken by the authorities concerning awards which were made 5 years or before, under the Act of 1894 and such proceedings are pending, that would be due to inaction of the authorities on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force. The lapse (of acquisition) and higher compensation to follow only Under Section 24(2), where compensation is not paid, nor possession of lands is taken. A period of 5 years or more has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4 to add Explanation 1 for the purpose of excluding the period when the proceeding suffered stay by an order of the court, in the context of limitation provided for publishing the declaration Under Section 6(1) of the Act. To a similar effect was the Explanation to Section 11-A, which was added by Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Clearly, the legislature has, in its wisdom, made the period of five years Under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act absolute and unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on account of any order of stay by a court. The plain wordings used by the legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In such a situation, the court is not required to depart from the literal Rule of interpretation. 296. This Court held that the conscious omission by Parliament in Section 24(2) to exclude the period, an interim order operates is to be given effect and that the court should not fill in the gap. In Indore Development Authority (supra), the decision rendered in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) was overruled with consensus and it was not the subject matter in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). However, the learned Counsel for the parties had u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -vis the writ Petitioners therein. The question that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the Respondents from publication of the declaration Under Section 6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the Appellants. We proceed on the premise that the Appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the Petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531, Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634, Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145, Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261 and Roshnara Be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt observed thus: 17. It was argued that the words 'commencement of this Act' should be construed to mean the date on which the moratorium period expired and the Act became applicable to the demised building. Such a view would require this Court to give different meanings to the same expression appearing at two places in the same section. The words 'on the date of commencement of this Act' in relation to the pendency of the suit would mean July 15, 1972 as held in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, (1982) 2 SCC 61, but the words 'from such date of commencement' appearing immediately thereafter in relation to the deposit to be made would have to be construed as the date of actual application of the Act at a date subsequent to July 15, 1972. Ordinarily, the Rule of construction is that the same expression where it appears more than once in the same statute, more so in the same provision, must receive the same meaning unless the context suggests otherwise. Besides, such an interpretation would render the use of prefix 'such' before the word 'commencement' redundant. Thirdly such an interpretation would run counter to the view taken by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... med to be retrospective unless the amending Act provides otherwise. We have carefully looked into the new substituted Section 15 brought in the parent Act by the Amendment Act, 1995 but do not find it either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective in operation which may affect the rights of the parties on the date of adjudication of the suit and the same is required to be taken into consideration by the appellate court. In Shanti Devi v. Hukum Chand, (1996) 5 SCC 768, this Court had occasion to interpret the substituted Section 15 with which we are concerned and held that on a plain reading of Section 15, it is clear that it has been introduced prospectively and there is no question of such Section affecting in any manner the judgment and decree passed in the suit for pre-emption affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal. We are respectfully in agreement with the view expressed in the said decision and hold that the substituted Section 15 in the absence of anything in it to show that it is retrospective, does not affect the right of the parties which accrued to them on the date of the suit or on the date of passing of the decree by the court of the first instance. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra. (2008) 10 SCC 139) 304. When the authorities are disabled from performing duties due to impossibility, would be a good excuse for them to save them from rigour of provisions of Section 24(2). A litigant may be right or wrong. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of a situation created by him of interim order. The doctrine "commodum ex-injuria sua Nemo habere debet" that is convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. Provisions of Section 24 do not discriminate litigants or non-litigants and treat them differently with respect to the same acquisition, otherwise, anomalous results may occur and provisions may become discriminatory in itself. 305. In Union of India v. Shiv Raj 2014 (6) SCC 564, this Court did not consider the question of exclusion of the time. In Karnail Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., (supra) and in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), various aspects including the interpretation of provisions of Section 24 were not taken into consideration. Thus, the said rulings cannot be said to be laying down good law. 306. In Union of India an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary Rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid," Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277. 13. In D.R. Venkatchalam v. Deputy Transport Commissioner (1977) 2 SCC 273, it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n made. We are not applying casus omissus as urged. In Padma Sundara Rao (supra), this Court considered the period of limitation for issuances of declaration Under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. The period has been stretched further in the case of State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619. Few expressions in the aforesaid decision were held to be incorrect. In Padma Sundara Rao (supra), this Court held that when a period, which the legislature has specifically provided, is covered by orders of stay and injunction, no other period could be intended to be excluded by providing time period to run from the date of service of the High Court's order and it would not be open to court to add to that period. The question in Padma Sundara Rao (supra) was totally different and it was of counting the period over and above excluded in the provisions, inter alia, from the very interpretation of Section 24. 310. As regards application of the maxim to a statute, in Rana Girders Ltd. v. Union of India 2013 (10) SCC 746, this Court observed that the statutory provision would prevail upon the common law principles. The decision in Rana Girders Ltd. (supra) was considered in Union of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," it has been considered in the decision rendered by the Queen's Bench in the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund, (1955) 2 QB 120. The Court considered the said maxim and held that after all, it is no more than an aid to construction and has little if any, weight where it is possible to account for the "inclusio unius" on grounds other than the intention to affect the "exclusio alterius." Thereafter, the Court referred to the following passage from the case of Colquhoun v. Brooks, (1887) 19 QBD 400, QBD at 406 wherein the Court called for its approval-- ... 'The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court below by Wills, J., about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes or documents. The exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.' In my opinion, the application of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and injustice, and w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398 and Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1996) 2 SCC 459. 314. Another Roman Law maxim "nemo tenetur ad impossibilia", means no one is bound to do an impossibility. Though such acts of taking possession and disbursement of compensation are not impossible, yet they are not capable of law performance, during subsistence of a court's order; the order has to be complied and cannot be violated. Thus, on equitable principles also, such a period has to be excluded. In Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. and Ors. 2002 (5) SCC 54, this Court observed that where law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default and has no remedy over, there the law will in general excuse him. This Court relying upon the aforesaid maxim observed as under: 30. The Latin maxim referred to in the English judgment lex non cogit ad impossibilia also expressed as im ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first subsequent opportunity (see Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi, (1898) 8 MLJ 265). The underlying object of the principle is to enable a person to do what he could have done on holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a court or office, and that period expires on holiday, then the act should be considered to have been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which the court or office is open. The reason is that the law does not compel the performance of an impossibility. (See Hossein Ally v. Donzelle, ILR (1880) 5 Cal 906.) Every consideration of justice and expediency would require that the accepted principle, which underlies Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, should be applied in cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The principles underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of court shall prejudice no man). Above being the position, there is nothing infirm in the or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... disable to fulfill the obligation. Thus, when they were incapable of performing, they have to be permitted to perform at the first available opportunity, which is the time prescribed by the statute for them, i.e., the total period of 5 years excluding the period of the interim order. 318. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the principle due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In case the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order is automatically dissolved. In case the matter has been filed without any merit, the maxim is attracted commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is, convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. No person ought to have the advantage of his own wrong. In case litigation has been filed frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in order to delay and by that it is delayed, there is no equity in favour of such a person. Such cases are required to be decided on merits. In Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1353, this Court o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as been passed and ultimately petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized. 322. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33, it has been observed that the Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the Defendants by the act of the court. Such action is necessary to put a check on abuse of process of the court. In Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v. Devi Ratan and Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 417, and Ram Krishna Verma (supra), it was observed that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair advantage of the interim order must be neutralized. In Amarjeet Singh (supra), this Court observed: 17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of the case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case, and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of restitution that is attracted. When on account of an act of the party, persuading the court to pass an order, which at the end is held as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered, but for the order of the court and the act of such party, then the successful party finally held entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the same manner in which the parties would have been if the interim order of the court would not have been passed. The successful party can demand: (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost. 11. In the facts of this case, in spite of the judgment of the High Court, if the Appellants would not have persuaded this Court to pass the interim orders, they would not have been entitled to operate the mining leases and to raise and remove and dispose of the minerals extracted. But for the interim orders passed by this Court, there is no difference between the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is cause. Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Judicial opinion heavily leans in favour of this view that a mistake of the court can be corrected by the court itself without any fetters. This is on principle, as indicated in (Alexander) Rodger case (1869-71) LR 3 PC 465. I am of the view that in the present situation, the court's inherent powers can be exercised to remedy the mistake. Mahajan., J. speaking for a Four Judge Bench in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, 1953 SCR 136 at Page 153 stated: The judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree-holder or the objections raised by the judgment-debtors. 325. In Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust (1976) 1 SCC 766, this Court considered the conduct of the State Government in not questioning the interim order at any stage in seeking variation or modification of the order of injunction. It was held that the State could not take advanta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me during which an interim order operated, means that Parliament intended such omission. The maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterious' means that express mention of one or more persons or things of a particular class may be regarded as by implication excluding all others of that class. The maxim, however, does not apply when the provisions of the legislation in question show that the exclusion could not have been intended. In Colquhoun v. Brooks (1889) 21 QBD 52, the House of Lords opined that: The maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterious' has been pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court below by Wills, J. about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes or documents. The 'exclusio' is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied when its application, having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice. Lewis Sutherland's Statutory Construction (2nd ed.), Section 491, applies the Rule as follows: Expressio unius est exclusio alterious-The maxim, like all Rules of construc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ers of public importance without any indications of any other limits except that they must relate to subjects found in the Lists. I have also indicated why a provision like Section 3 of the Act would, in any case, fall under entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII read with Articles 248 and 356 of the Constitution even if all subjects to which it may relate are not found specified in the lists. Thus, there is express provision in our Constitution to cover an enactment such as Section 3 of the Act, hence, there is no room whatsoever for applying the "Expressio Unius" Rule to exclude what falls within an expressly provided legislative entry. That maxim has been aptly described as a "useful servant but a dangerous master" (per Lopes L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks (1888) 21 Q.B.D. The limitations or conditions under which this principle of construction operates are frequently overlooked by those who attempt to apply it. To advance the balder and broader proposition that what is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution must be deemed to be deliberately excluded from its purview, so that nothing short of a Constitutional amendment could authorise legislation upon it, is really to invent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court in the case of Asst. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. 1978 (2) ELT 416 (SC), the Court in that case considered the question whether there was or was not an implied power to hold an inquiry in the circumstances of the case in view of the provisions of the Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 10(A) of the Central Excise Rules and referred to the aforesaid passage "the maxim" is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master ...' and held that the Rule is subservient to the basic principle that Courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a Rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may defeat these. Moreover, the Rule of prohibition by necessary implication could be applied only where a specified procedure is laid down for the performance of a duty. In the case of Parbhani Transport Co-op Society Ltd. v. R.T.A. Aurangabad (1960) 3 SCR 177, this Court observed that the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature and where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... interim orders subsisted, while determining whether or not acquisitions lapsed, in the present case, is a clear result of inadvertence or accident, having regard to the subject matter, refusal to apply the principle underlying the maxim actus curae neminem gravabit would result in injustice. In Re: Principle of Restitution: 332. The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed in the matter. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. and Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648, it was held that no party could take advantage of litigation. It has to disgorge the advantage gained due to delay in case lis is lost. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final order going against the party successful at the interim stage. Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the fountain source of restitution. It is rather a statutory recognition of the Rule of justice, equity and fair play. The court has inherent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed. The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 Code of Civil Procedure speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favor of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. x x x 27. x x x This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1 MLJ 220). In the exercise of such inherent power, the courts have applied the principle ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ivolous litigation has to be eliminated if the faith of people in the judiciary has to be sustained. The Court observed: 37. This Court, in another important case in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (of which one of us, Dr. Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) had an occasion to deal with the concept of restitution. The relevant paragraphs of that judgment dealing with relevant judgments are reproduced hereunder: (SCC pp. 238-41 & 243-46, paras 170-76, 183-88 & 190-93) 170. x x x 171. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 630, para 16) 16. The 50 operators, including the Appellants/private operators, have been running their stage carriages by blatant abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as directed in Jeewan Nath Wahal's case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of the grant after 29-9-1959, they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law, they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending the hearing of the objections. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e proceedings take undue advantage, and the person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of the immovable property, its execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the interest of the judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. Inappropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the [Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the Plaintiff in whose favor the decree is passed and to protect the property, including further alienation. 174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh decided by the Delhi High Court on 6-11-2008, the Court held as under: (DLT p. 413, para 6) 6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defenses and frivolous litigation is a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the courts. 176. Against this judgment of the Delhi High Court, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 29197 of 2008 was preferred to this Court. The Court passed the following order: (SCC p. 460, para 1) 1. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. We find no ground to interfere with the well-considered judgment passed by the High Court. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. *** 183. In Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. this Court in para 4 of the judgment observed as under: (SCC pp. 326-27) 4. ... It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage, and a person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... undermining of public purposes underlying acquisition proceedings. A different approach would mean that, for instance, where two landowners (sought to be displaced from their lands by the same notification) are awarded compensation, of whom one allows the issue to attain finality-and moves on, the other obdurately seeks to stall the public purpose underlying the acquisition, by filing one or series of litigation, during the pendency of which interim orders might inure and bind the parties, the latter would profit and be rewarded, with the deemed lapse condition Under Section 24(2). Such a consequence, in the opinion of this Court, was never intended by Parliament; furthermore, the restitutionary principle requires that the advantage gained by the litigant should be suitably offset, in favour of the other party. 336. In Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 286, it was observed that an unintentional mistake of the Court, which may prejudice the cause of any party, must and alone could be rectified. Thus, in our opinion, the period for which the interim order has operated Under Section 24 has to be excluded for counting the period of 5 years Under Section 24(2) for the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d, as the deposit (of compensation amount) in the treasury was not in accordance with the law, the amount should have been deposited in reference court. Further, this Court also notes that there have been cases in which after taking possession, when development is complete, infrastructure has developed despite which claims are being made Under Section 24, on the ground that either the possession has not been taken in accordance with law or compensation has been deposited in the treasury, thus questioning the acquisitions. The decision in Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588 was an instance in which a claim was made that acquisition was made more than a century ago, and compensation has not been paid as such acquisition has lapsed relating to the land of Raisina Hills in New Delhi. The importance of Raisina Hills is well-known to everybody. The grossest misuse of Section 24 has been sought to be made, which is intended to confer benefit. It was never intended to revive such claims and be used in the manner in which it has been today, where large numbers of acquisitions and development projects, such as construction of roads, hospitals, townships, housing projects, etc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 321, submission was raised by the State of Assam that physical possession has been taken over by the competent authority and it was submitted on behalf of landowner that procedure prescribed Under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, was not followed. It was before taking possession Under Section 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the notification Under Section 10(5) was necessary; thus, no possession can be said to have been taken within the meaning of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The question this Court had to consider was whether actual physical possession was taken over in that case by the competent authority. The State of Assam submitted that though possession was taken over in the year 1991, may be unilaterally and without notice to the landowner. It was urged that mere non-compliance with Section 10(5) would be insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. This Court repelled the submission of the landowner and held as under: 15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice Under Section 10(5) of the Act. A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. 17. Reliance was placed by the Respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram case. That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the Respondents. We say so because this Court was in State of UP v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 considering whether the word "may" appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question Under Section 10(6). The question of whether the breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the Act of dispossession itself or render it non-est in the eye of the law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant Under Section 10(6). In the case at hand, if the Appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice Under Section 10(5) will be of no consequ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uch challenges cannot be entertained at all under the purview of Section 24(2) as it is not what is remotely contemplated in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 343. In matters of land acquisition, this Court has frowned upon, and cautioned courts about delays and held that delay is fatal in questioning the land acquisition proceedings. In case possession has not been taken in accordance with law and vesting is not in accordance with Section 16, proceedings before courts are to be initiated within reasonable time, not after the lapse of several decades. 344. In Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1020, there was a delay of two and a half years in questioning the proceedings. This Court held that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. 345. In State of T.N. and Ors. v. L. Krishnan and Ors. (1996) 1 SCC 250, this Court held that Petitioners could not raise their claim at a belated stage. Following observations were made: 45. There remains the last ground assigned by the High Court in support of its decision. The High Court has held that the non-compliance with Sub-rules (b) and (c) of Rule 3 of the Rules made by the Governme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. *** S.B. MAJUMDAR, J. (concurring)--I have gone through the judgment prepared by my esteemed learned brother K. Ramaswamy, J. I respectfully agree with the conclusion to the effect that Respondents 1 and 2 had missed the bus by adopting an indolent attitude in not challenging the acquisition proceedings promptly. Therefore, the result is inevitable that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches. 35. x x x The acquired land got vested in the State Government and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus right to get more compensation got vested in diverse claimants bypassing the award, as well as the vested right, was created in favor of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by virtue of the vesting of the land in the State Government for being handed over to the Corporation. All these events could ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court is requested to deal with the relevant issues in detail. More so, if the Respondents are so aggrieved regarding withdrawal of their appeals, which had been remanded by this Court for determining the entitlement of interest Under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and an application is made by the Respondent to revive the same, the High Court may consider and decide the said application in accordance with law. All the matters shall be heard simultaneously by the same Bench if the appeals are restored. 3. Thereafter, the High Court considered the contention of the Appellants that the award in respect of compensation was no award in the eye of the law and though the possession was taken long back and railway line had been laid out, the acquisition proceedings were liable to be set aside, and compensation was liable to be awarded at present market rate. The High Court rejected the said plea vide judgment dated 30-5-2014 in Jasvir Singh v. the State of U.P.,. It was observed that objection of the Appellants against the award had already been considered and remand by the Supreme Court on 12-9-2005 was only in respect of statutory benefits. For the first time plea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation and Ors. v. Under Secretary, Delhi Admn. and Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 268 349. There is a plethora of decisions where, owing to delay of 6 months or more, this Court has repelled the challenge to the acquisition proceedings. In our opinion, Section 24 does not revive the right to challenge those proceedings which have been concluded. The legality of those judgments and orders cannot be reopened or questioned under the guise of the provisions of Section 24(2). By reason of our reasoning in respect of that provision (which we have held that Under Section 24(2) that word "or" is to be read as 'and' or as 'nor,' even if one of the requirements has been fulfilled, i.e., either possession taken or compensation paid), there is no lapse unless both conditions are fulfilled, i.e., compensation has not been paid nor has possession been taken; the legality of the concluded proceedings cannot be questioned. It is only in the case where steps have not been taken by the Authorities. The lapse or higher compensation is provided Under Section 24(2) and its proviso under the Act of 2013. 350. In U.P. State Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and Anr. (2006) 11 SCC 464, this Court h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s become stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be rejected. It has also held that lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable (vide Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, 2000) 2 SCC 455; Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways, (2001) 1 SCC 133; Asstt. Executive Engineer v. Shivalinga, (2002) 10 SCC 167 and S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom Distt. Manager, (2003) 4 SCC 27). When belated claims are considered as stale and non-existing for the purpose of refusing or rejecting a reference Under Section 10(1)(c) or (d), in spite of no period of limitation is prescribed, it will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act inserting Section 10(4-A) prescribing a time-limit of six months, should be interpreted as reviving all stale and dead claims. *** 31. Section 10(4-A) does not, therefore, revive non-existing or stale or dead claims but only ensures that claims which were life, by applying the six-month Rule in Section 10(4-A) as on the date when the Section came into effect, have a minimum of six months' time to approach the Lab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -section (3)(b) to make that application, but it should be done within the limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no Article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such an application, the residuary Article Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b), i.e., the date on which cause of action had accrued to the Respondent claimant. Since the application had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Council, (1969) 1 SCC 873 which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is unsustainable. This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kerala SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634. It may be seen that under the Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment, there was no right to approach the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to compel a referen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... requires compliance with formalities, will not allow such statute (assumedly passed to prevent fraud) to be used to promote fraud and will do so by imposing a trust or equity upon a legal right. ... 355. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of 1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. (2018) 16 SCC 228, where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judicata where the challenge to the legality of the proceedings had been negatived and the proceedings of taking possession were upheld. Section 24 does not intend to reopen proceedings which have been concluded. The decision in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) is of no avail. Similar is the decision in Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar (supra). No doubt about it that proceedings (i.e., the original acquisition, or aspects relating to it) can be questioned but within a reasonable time; yet once the challenge has been made and failed or has not been made for a reasonable time, Section 24 does not provide for reopening thereof. 358. So far as the proposition laid down in Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (supra) is concerned, inaction and delay on the part of acquiring authorities have been taken care of Under Section 24. The mischief Rule (or Heydon's Mischief Rule) was pressed into service on behalf of landowners relying upon the decision in Bengal Immunity Co v. the State of Bihar (supra), it was submitted that Act of 1894 did not provide for lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of acquiring Authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings. M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y that focuses on the conversion of Government-owned vacant, abandoned, unutilized acquired lands and tax-delinquent properties into productive use. 361. Section 24 deals with lapse of acquisition. Section 101 deals with the return of unutilized land. Section 101 cannot be said to be applicable to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The provision of lapse has to be considered on its own strength and not by virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to give back the land to the original owner or owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank. Return of lands is with respect to all lands acquired under the Act of 2013 as the expression used in the opening part is "When any land, acquired under this Act remains unutilized". Lapse, on the other hand, occurs when the State does not take steps in terms of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section 101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions made under the Act of 1894. Thus, no such sustenance can be drawn from the provisions contained in Section 101 of the Act of 2013. Five years' logic has been carried into effect for the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose of returning the land remaining unutilized Under Section 24(2). 362 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation Under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest Under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided Under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed Under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount Under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed Under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eral Rule or presumption which is itself based on considerations of fairness and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell quoted, ante, p. 494C-E, and recently emphasised by Staughton L.J. in Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe (1991) 2 All E.R 712, 724.." 2 BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552; Howard de Walden (Lord) v. IRC, (1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 278; and Ram Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 18. 3 Brown v. Harrison 1927 All ER 195@ pp. 203, 204 (CA); Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. Union of India 1961 (3) SCR 718; State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala 1957 (1) SCR 874 (hereafter "RMDC"); Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao, 1965 (2) SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 1971 SCR 977; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Ors. v. State of UP 1969 (1) SCR 219; Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. 1987 (3) SCC 308; Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan 1998 (7) SCC 59. Prof. Yashpal and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. 2005 (5) SCC 420 4 Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., (2003 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ilisers (india) Pvt. Ltd. v. Employee State Insurance (1987) 4 SCC 203 in support of the rule of beneficial construction of a welfare and remedial statute. 11 Seksaria Cotton mills v. State of Bombay 1953 SCR 325 Para 21; Superintendent v. Anil Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 (Paras 11-16); B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995) 5 SCC 238 (Para 5-6) Guruchand Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 (Paras 21-24). Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 (2 Judges) Para 11 to 15 endorsing contextual interpretation of the term 12 G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 and Kuldip Nayar v. Union Of India (2006) 7 SCC 1-both decisions of Constitution Benches. 13 Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 (5 Judges); R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay 1984 (2) SCC 183; and Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J. Bahadur 1981 (1) SCC 315. 14 Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta 1966 (1) SCR 543; Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Keshab Chandra Mandal 1950 SCR 435; and State of Maharashtra v. Nanded Parbhani Sangh 2000 (2) SCC 69. 15 1997 (6) SCC 71 and M.V. Javali v. Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd. 1997 (8) SCC 72; and Nanded Parbhani Sangh (s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1: para 96-98). 22 Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 258, Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors., 2002 (3) SCC 533; Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr., 2013 (10) SCC 765; B. Premanand and Ors. v. Mohan Koikal and Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 266 and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 23 Dingmar v. Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v. Information Commissioner and Anr. (Secretary of State for Justice intervening) (2012) 1 WLR 3524 24 Shimbhu and Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318; Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., 1965 (3) SCR 626. Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596; Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1976 (1) SCC 128; The Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 (Supp 2) SCR 256 In Romesh Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 510. 25 B.R. Enterprises v. Sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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