TMI Blog2021 (9) TMI 1155X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that all pending cases would stand transferred to the fora created by the Act of 2019 by applying its newly prescribed pecuniary limits. In deducing whether there is a contrary intent, the legislative scheme and procedural history may provide a relevant insight into the intention of the legislature. A consumer who has engaged legal counsel at the headquarters of the NCDRC would have to undertake a fresh round of legal representation before the SCDRC incurring expense and engendering uncertainty in obtaining access to justice. Likewise, where complaints have been instituted before the SCDRC, a transfer of proceedings would require consumers to obtain legal representation before the District Commission if cases were to be transferred. Such a course of action would have a detrimental impact on the rights of consumers. Many consumers may not have the wherewithal or the resources to undertake a fresh burden of finding legal counsel to represent them in the new forum to which their cases would stand transferred - It is a developer who opposed the continuation of the proceedings before the NCDRC on the ground that under the new consumer legislation the pecuniary limits of the jurisdic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (1994- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.9. Sudhir G. Angur (2005- Supreme Court 3 judges) C.10. Ramesh Kumar Soni (2013- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.11. Dhadi Sahu (1992- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.12. Ambalal Sarabhai (2001- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.13. HP State Electricity (2013- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.14. Videocon International (2015- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.15. SEBI v. Classic Credit (2018- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.16. Swapna Mohanty (2018- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.17. Om Prakash Agarwal (2018- Supreme Court 2 judges) C.18. Delhi High Court Bar Association (1993- Delhi HC-DB) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sition taken in its case, other Benches of the NCDRC have admitted complaints instituted before 20 July 2020. This grievance apart, the issue which arises in the appeals would turn upon a construction of Section 107 of the Act of 2019, among other provisions of the new legislation, and its interplay with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 18976. The analysis of the Court, despite the new legislation, will not proceed on a clean slate for there is precedent which holds the field. That both sides rely upon the line of precedent in the unfolding of their cases makes the interpretational task intricate. Our task will be to bring a solution that has a sense of cohesion, while harmonizing precedential learning with justice. 4. A brief narration of the facts would assist with context. Upon the payment of an advance of ₹ 3.50 lacs on 25 November 2011 by the Appellants, the Respondent provisionally allotted a residential unit in a real-estate project described as KRESCENT Homes admeasuring a super built area of 114.27 square metres which was being developed by the Respondent at Jaypee Greens, Noida. The total consideration was fixed at ₹ 56.45 lacs and possession was intend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tertain original complaints was rupees twenty lacs7. Under Section 17, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission8 had jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods and services or compensation if any claimed exceeds rupees twenty lacs but does not exceed rupees one crore9. 9. The Act of 2019 was enacted by Parliament taking into account the experience which was gained in the administration of the earlier legislation and to meet new developments in the market place for products and services. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the introduction of the Bill in Parliament elucidates the rationale for the new law: Statement of Objects and Reasons The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986) was enacted to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for the purpose of making provision for establishment of consumer protection councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes, etc. Although, the working of the consumer dispute redressal agencies has served the purpose to a considerable extent under the said Act, the disposal of cases has been fast due to various constraints. Several shortcomings ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Mechanism has also been provided. 6. The Bill provides for several provision aimed at simplifying the consumer dispute adjudication process of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies, inter alia relating to enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies; increasing minimum number of Members in the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions and provisions for consumers to file complaints electronically, etc. 7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives. 10. Section 28(1) provides for the establishment of a District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission10 in every district, subject to its establishment by a notification of the State Government11. The jurisdiction of the District Commission in terms of Section 34 is to entertain complaints where the value of goods and services paid as consideration does not exceed one crore rupees. Section 42 provides for the establishment of a SCDRC in each State. The pecuniary limits of the original jurisdiction of the SCDRC Under Section 47(1)(a) is to entertain original complaints where the value of goods and services paid as consideration exceeds rupees one crore but does not exceed rupees ten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f 2019, the jurisdiction has been conferred on the SCDRC to hear complaints under the new Act. In order to vest the SCDRC with jurisdiction to hear complaints which were instituted before the NCDRC under the old Act, a specific provision for transferring the proceedings was required-which has not been provided. This is not the case where a statute has been amended by enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction but involves the repeal of an old statute in which event a provision for transferring the cases to the new forum is essential; (ii) The new Act of 2019 affects substantive and vested rights and must necessarily be prospective; and (iii) The new legislation does not contain any provision for its retrospective operation. A. Elaborating on the first limb of submissions, learned Counsel urged that in several decisions of this Court, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was applied by the Court in order to save existing proceedings. In the present case, the law makers have specifically incorporated the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, by making a provision in Section 107(3) of the Act of 2019. The question of examining the existence of vested rights arises ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 7 of the Act of 2019 of the new legislation, the jurisdiction of the SCDRC is to entertain complaints under the Act of 2019 above a certain value. The jurisdiction to entertain complaints under the erstwhile legislation could only have been conferred by an express statutory provision that transferred complaints filed under the old Act from the NCDRC to the SCDRC. Any direction for the transfer of existing cases would entail disturbing thousands of cases pending before the NCDRC and SCDRCs across the country. This would cause serious hardship and prejudice to consumers and a waste of judicial time invested till date. A similar question was dealt with by the NCDRC in its Judgment 8 April 2011 in Southfield Paints and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.16 which construed Amending Act 62 of 2002 by which the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction were enhanced with effect from 15 March 2003. Relying on the earlier decision in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Dr. Manoj Ramachandran17, the NCDRC held that the amendments enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction were prospective in nature. The legislature must be considered to be aware of this precedent. D. Finally, it was urged that t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s will receive due consideration at appropriate fora ; (iii) Sections 28, 42 and 53 provide for the establishment of the District Commission, SCDRC and NCDRC. Under Section 58(1)(a), the NCDRC is empowered to entertain complaints where the value of goods or services paid as consideration exceeds rupees ten crores. The expression 'entertain' has been construed in a broad and comprehensive sense to mean 'to adjudicate upon' in the decision of this Court in Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties18; (iv) The basic principle of law is that when a statute is repealed, everything stands obliterated. Section 107(2) of the Act of 2019 covers concluded transactions while Section 107(3) preserves the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 is prefaced with the words unless a different intention appears . Clause (c) of Section 6 is substantive in nature while Clause (e) applies to pending proceedings. The precedents of this Court would indicate that Section 6(e) has been interpreted as extending to substantive proceedings, but a pure matter of procedure is excluded. A change of forum, like matters of evidence and civil procedure is a pure matter o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oncluded transactions continue to be governed by the old law; (b) Where a right of appeal or of action is abrogated or in a situation where clogs are imposed on the right, such rights continue to be preserved notwithstanding the repeal; and (c) Where a substantive liability or a right is imposed or conferred, this would be treated as prospective. On the other hand, the consistent view Under Section 6(e) is that it does not apply to a mere change of forum. B. The sum and substance of the submissions which were urged by Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel is that where a law provides for a change in forum, this is treated as a matter of procedure and not of substance. The Act of 2019 is not a legislation merely enhancing the limits of the pecuniary jurisdiction by an amendment to the Act of 1986. On the contrary, the Act of 2019 is a completely new law, which abolished the hierarchy of tribunals under the erstwhile Act of 1986 and created a new adjudicatory hierarchy. As a matter of interpretation, the Act of 2019 clearly indicates an intention to the contrary as a result of which pending proceedings will not continue before the forums which existed under the Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng proceedings, but whether there is any clear indication against the continuance of pending proceedings to their normal termination. In an earlier part of the judgment, the Court noted that paragraph (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 provides that any legal proceedings in respect of any right acquired or accrued under the repealed enactment may continue as if the repealing Act had not been passed . Noting that the interpretation of this paragraph is not free from difficulty, Justice Varadachariar observed that the view has sometimes been taken that what is saved is a substantive right acquired under the repealed enactment and that the paragraph cannot be invoked in cases where the substantive right is not taken away by the repealing Act but the mere forum for, or the method of enforcing it is changed. On the other hand, the Court noted, it has been maintained that a right to obtain a relief in a suit pending at the time when the repealing enactment comes into operation is itself in the nature of a substantive right. Of the three grounds which had weighed with the High Court in affirming the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, the Federal Court r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t lie to the District Court but to the High Court and that accordingly the second appeal should be heard as a first appeal against the judgment of the District Court. Following the Full Bench decision, the High Court held that the appeal to the District Court was competent and its decision should be reversed only if prejudice were shown on merits. In appeal, this Court noted that on a plaint valuation, the appeal would lie to the District Court whereas on the valuation as determined by the High Court, it was held that it was competent to entertain the appeal. On this basis, it was argued the decision of the District Court was a nullity. This Court rejected the contention that the decree was a nullity, holding that an objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Dealing with the argument that a prejudice had been caused to the Appellants in that by reason of the undervaluation, their appeal was heard by a Court of inferior jurisdiction while they were entitled to a first appeal before the High Court, this Court held: 11. It is next contended that even treating the matter as governed b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ery or inspection; evidence is not recorded in extenso, and there is no right of appeal against its decision. The Defendant thus loses the benefit of an elaborate procedure and a right of appeal which he would have had if the suit had been filed on the original side. It can be said in such a case that the disposal of the suit by the Court of Small Causes has prejudicially affected the merits of the case. No purpose, however, is served by attempting to enumerate exhaustively all possible cases of prejudice which might come Under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. The jurisdiction that is conferred on appellate courts under that Section is an equitable one, to be exercised when there has been an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by a subordinate court as a result of overvaluation or under valuation and a consequential failure of justice. It is neither possible nor even desirable to define such a jurisdiction closely, or confine it within stated bounds. It can only be predicated of it that it is in the nature of a revisional jurisdiction to be exercised with caution and for the ends of justice, whenever the facts and situations call for it. Whether there has been prejudice or n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plication filed on 27 May 1952 under the UP Agriculturist Relief Act for redemption of a mortgage was rendered incompetent upon the passing of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1953 which was brought into force with retrospective effect on 1 July 1952. The question, as Justice M Hidayatullah (as the learned Chief Justice then was) formulated was, whether the right of the Plaintiff to continue the suit under the old law was in any way impaired . Dealing with the provisions of Section 6 of the UP General Clauses Act 1897 (which is pari materia to the corresponding provisions of the General Clauses Act), the Court held: 7...The question is whether a different intention appears in either the Abolition Act or the Amending Act 16 of 1953, for otherwise the old proceeding could continue before the Munsif. There is nothing in the Abolition Act which takes away the right of suit in respect of a pending action. If there be any doubt, it is removed when we consider that the U.P. Agriculturist Relief Act was repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952 only and it is not, therefore, possible to give the repeal further retrospectivity so as to affect a suit pending f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the provisions of Schedule II read with Section 200 of the Abolition Act cannot be applied because the legislature has in 1956 said expressly what was implicit before, namely, that pending actions would be governed by the old law as if the new law had not been passed. In our judgment, therefore, the proceedings before the Munsif were with jurisdiction because they were not affected by the passing of the Abolition Act or the amending Act, 1953, regard being had to the provisions of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act in the first instance and more so in view of the provisions of Section 23 of the amending Act, 1956 which came before the proceedings between the parties had finally terminated. The appeal must, therefore, fail. It will be dismissed with costs. (emphasis supplied) 20. The Constitution Bench relied on the absence of a provision for transfer of pending actions under the repealing legislation to save the proceedings at the old forum. The Constitution Bench observed that provisions of transfer of pending cases are commonly found in such legislations. It is pertinent to mention that the subsequent repealing legislation materially altered the position of the part ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... previous operation of Section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act or the transfer of the suit to the Controller or anything duly done Under Section 29. That being the correct position in law the High Court was right in holding that in spite of the deletion of Section 29 the Controller still had the jurisdiction to proceed with the said suit transferred to him. (emphasis supplied) 22. The above extract indicates that the Amending Act did not contain a savings Clause Under Section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act 1899. Despite the absence of a savings clause, the Court held that the deletion of Section 29 did not have the effect of altering the law applicable to the claim in the litigation and there was nothing in the amending Act to indicate a contrary intention. At this stage, it may be necessary to note that the second issue involved was the right of the thika tenant as defined by the Act to the notice provided under the deed of lease. On this aspect, the decision in Manujendra Dutt (supra) has been overruled in the seven judge Bench decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214. It is pertinent to mention that the decision in Manujendra Dutt (supra), ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general Rule is to make it retrospective. The expressions arising out of an accident occurring in Sub-section (1) and over the area in which the accident occurred , mentioned in Sub-section (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way... (emphasis supplied) Dealing with the bar of limitation Under Section 110A(3), this Court held that it could be said that strictly speaking the bar would not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which had occurred prior to the constitution of the Tribunal. However, in directing the institution of claims before the Tribunal, this Court held: 10. Apropos the bar of limitation provided in Section 110-A(3), one can say, on the basis of the authorities aforesaid that strictly speaking, the bar does not operate i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was extended to the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu with effect from 15 June 1966 by Act 30 of 1965 and the corresponding provision and the corresponding Portuguese Code were repealed. The legislative assembly of Goa enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act 1965 under which the suit which was pending before the Court at Margao was transferred to and decreed by the Senior Civil Judge. Since the suit was of a value exceeding ₹ 10 lacs an appeal lay directly to the High Court which Under Section 2(f) meant the Judicial Commissioner's Court. Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar, speaking for the two judge Bench held: 5. On the question as to where the appeal could be lodged we are clearly of the view that the forum was governed by the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Arbitration Act, 1940) Act, 1965 (Central Act 30 of 1965) read with the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu civil court Act, 1965 (Goa Act 16 of 1965) both of which came into force simultaneously on June 15, 1966 and the appeal was required to be filed in the Judicial Commissioner's Court. Under the Central Act 30 of 1965 with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stitute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions. It is true that under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of Central Act 30 of 1965 (which corresponds to Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897) it is provided that a remedy or legal proceeding in respect of a vested right like a right to an appeal may be instituted, continued or enforced as if this Act (meaning the repealing Act) had not been passed. But this provision merely saves the remedy or legal proceeding in respect of such vested right which it is open to the litigant to adopt notwithstanding the repeal but this provision has nothing to do with the forum where the remedy or legal proceeding has to be pursued. If the repealing Act provides new forum where the remedy or the legal proceeding in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act. We may point out that such a view of Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Purshotam Singh v. Narain Singh and State of Rajasthan [AIR 1955 Raj 203]. It is thus cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g terms: 26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows: (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jurisdiction to entertain this suit. (emphasis supplied) C.10 Ramesh Kumar Soni (2013- Supreme Court 2 judges) 28. It is trite law to state that all procedural law is retrospective, unless a contrary legislative intention can be observed. A two judge Bench in Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of Maharashtra27 considered a case where an FIR was registered under the provisions of Sections 408, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. On the date of the registration of the case, the offences were triable by the Magistrate of the First Class in terms of the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result of Madhya Pradesh Act 2 of 2008, the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended. As a consequence, offences Under Sections 467, 468 and 471 were triable by a Court of Sessions instead of a JMFC. Consequent to the amendment, the JMFC committed the case to the Sessions Court. A reference was made to the High Court on whether the amendment would apply retrospectively and whether cases pending before the JMFC and committed to the Sessions Court should be tried de novo by the Sessions Judge or should be remanded back to the Magistrate for further tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... essions Court to the JMFC may have in the meantime been concluded or would have reached an advanced stage. An exception to those cases was made as a change of forum at that stage would cause unnecessary and avoidable hardship to the Accused, if they were committed to the Sessions Court for trial after the amendment and the view of this Court. However, the principle of change of forum being procedural, generally retrospective and applicable to pending proceedings was upheld. C.11 Dhadi Sahu (1992 Supreme Court 2 judges) 29. Now, in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to consider the 1992 decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. Dhadi Sahu28 and several decisions which adverted to it. This was a case where the Assessee had preferred appeals to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals and set aside the penalties holding that in view of the amendment made to Section 274(2) of the Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 1 April 1971, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner29 lost his jurisdiction. The power of the Income Tax Officer to impose a penalty Under Section 271 was subject to Section 274. As a result of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... indicated, that vested right will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different tribunals or forums. 30. This Court then adverted to the decision in Manujendra Dutt (supra) and Mohd. Idris (supra) and observed that amending an Act does not show that the pending proceedings before the court on reference abate . Therefore, the decision of the two judge Bench in Dhadi Sahu (supra) held that a litigant had a crystallized right to a forum when proceedings have been initiated and are pending. Such a right vested, in the view of the Court, is distinct from a pure procedure to be followed before the forum concerned. In taking this view, the two judge Bench in Dhadi Sahu (supra) did not consider a three judge bench decision in New India Assurance (supra) as well as a previous co-ordinate Bench decision in Maria Cristina (supra), which relied on common law jurisprudence and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to hold that a change in forum is purely a procedural matter which operates retrospectively in the absence of a contrary legislative mandate. The latter principle has since been followed in the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra); Sudhir G. Angur (supra); ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... repeal of the Act in view of Section 6(c) and the pending proceeding is saved Under Section 6(e) of the Act. (emphasis supplied) 32. This Court noted that a pending proceeding would be saved Under Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act only if it is in relation to a right, privilege or obligation that has been acquired or accrued Under Section 6(c) of the Act. It is pertinent to mention that the landlord under the amended act would have lost his right to evict the tenant on the ground of sub-letting since the Rent Control Act ceased to be applicable to premises where the monthly rent exceeded ₹ 3500. Further, pursuant to the amendment, not only was his right of action before the Rent Controller terminated but also the landlord was relegated to common law remedies. The amendment substantially affected the right of action of the landlord and did not merely change the forum. It was in this context, that this Court held that a right had accrued to the landlord to continue the eviction proceeding under the unamended Rent Control Act. 33. The Court observed that there are two sets of cases, one where Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable and the other where i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to hear the appeal. The High Court held that even after the enforcement of the new legislation in 2003, it continued to have jurisdiction. The judgment of the High Court was assailed on the ground that the appeal was not maintainable before it, upon a separate forum being constituted. Section 185 contained a repeal and savings provision. Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned chief Justice then was) speaking for a two judge Bench held that a right of appeal as well as forum is a vested right unless it is taken away by the legislature either by express provision or by necessary intention. The Court held: 25. At this stage, we may state with profit that it is a well-settled proposition of law that enactments dealing with substantive rights are primarily prospective unless they are expressly or by necessary intention or implication given retrospectivity. The aforesaid principle has full play when vested rights are affected. In the absence of any unequivocal expose, the piece of legislation must exposit adequate intendment of legislature to make the provision retrospective. As has been stated in various authorities referred to hereinabove, a right of appeal as well as forum is a vest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (Ord. 6 of 2002), is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (Ord. 6 of 2002), anything done or any action taken under the principal Act as amended by the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act, as amended by this Act. 37. The judgment of the High Court was assailed, citing the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) and Maria Cristina (supra) amongst others, and it was urged that the amendment by which the appellate forum was changed from the High Court to the Supreme Court must be treated as merely procedural. On the other hand, the Respondent relied on the decision in Dhadi Sahu (supra) and Ambalal Sarabhai (supra). Justice J.S. Khehar (as the learned Chief Justice then was) examined whether the amendment envisaged a mere change of forum 33. 38. In this context, this Court noted that while under the un-amended Section 15Z, an appeal lay before the High Court on any question of fact or law arising out of such order the amendment had curtailed and restricted the right of appeal since the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eedings, except where the amending provision expressly or by necessary intendment provides otherwise. Pending proceedings are to continue as if the unamended provision is still in force. This Court has clearly concluded, that when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get crystallised on that date, and the mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, simply ensures, that pending proceedings under the unamended provision remain unaffected.... As regards the decisions inter alia in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) and Maria Cristina (supra), this Court held that the principle that the forum is a procedural matter and that an amendment which alters the forum would apply retrospectively cannot be doubted but the same is not an absolute rule . On this aspect, the Bench relied upon the decision in Dhadi Sahu (supra) in support of the principle that an amendment of a forum would not necessarily be an issue of procedure. 45. Having concluded in the manner expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not necessary for us to examine the main contention, advanced at the hands of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, namely, that the amendment to Section 15-Z of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... remedy is altered by an amendment, the change in the forum, would constitute a procedural amendment, as contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Consequently even in the facts and circumstances of the present case, all such appeals as had been filed by the Board, prior to 29-10-2002, would have to be accepted as vested, and must be adjudicated accordingly. (emphasis supplied) The conclusion of this Court was held to be in accordance with the mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The appeals which had been filed by SEBI before the High Court were therefore held to be maintainable. C.15 SEBI v. Classic Credit (2018- Supreme Court 2 judges) 39. We have already noticed the earlier decision of Justice J.S. Khehar in Videocon International (supra). Subsequent to the aforesaid decision, in Securities and Exchange of Board of India v. Classic Credit Limited (2018) 13 SCC 1, a two judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice Khehar, considered a claim for transfer of pending proceedings under the SEBI Act 1992. At the time when the complaints were filed Under Section 26(2), the Accused was required to be tried by a Metropolitan Magistrate (or a JMFC) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... shall be taken cognizance of and tried by the Special Court established for the area in which the offence is committed or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court concerned. 41. SEBI argued before this Court that a change of the forum for trial was a matter of mere procedure and would therefore be retrospective, there being no express or implied intent either in the 2002 and 2014 Amendments that the amendments were intended to be of prospective effect. Justice J.S. Khehar speaking for the two judge Bench of this Court adverted to the decisions inter alia in New India Assurance (supra), Ramesh Kumar Soni (supra) and Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra), and observed in that context: 49...In our considered view, the legal position expounded by this Court in a large number of judgments including New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840]; SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal [SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal, (2010) 3 SCC 765 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 491] and Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P. [Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., (2013) 14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ght. The view which was formulated by the Court was that where a remedy has been availed of prior to the amendment then unless the amending provision mandates either expressly or by necessary implication, the transfer of proceedings to the forum introduced by the amendment, the forum as it exceeded prior to the amendment would continue to have jurisdiction: 55. In the latter situation referred to (and debated) in the preceding paragraph, where the remedy had been availed of prior to the amendment, even according to the learned Counsel for the private parties, unless the amending provision by express words, or by necessary implication, mandates the transfer of proceedings to the forum introduced by the amendment the forum postulated by the unamended provision, would continue to have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon pending matters (matters filed before amendment). In view of the above, we are of the considered view, that no vested right can be claimed with reference to forum , where the court concerned, had not taken cognizance and commenced trial proceedings, in consonance with the unamended provision. Where, however, proceedings had already commenced before the am ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s set aside. C.16 Swapna Mohanty (2018- Supreme Court 2 judges) 45. A two judge Bench of this Court in Swapna Mohanty v. State of Odisha (2018) 17 SCC 621 dealt with the provisions of Section 24B of the Orissa Education Act 1969. The State Education Tribunal obtained jurisdiction to decide appeals in respect of colleges only from the date on which they were admitted to grant-in-aid. The appeal was filed in August 2002 before the College was admitted to grant-in-aid in February 2004 and the issue examined was whether the Director of Higher Education had competence to hear the appeal after the college was admitted to grant-in-aid. Justice L Nageswara Rao speaking for the two judge Bench held that the Director continued to have jurisdiction to decide the appeal which was filed before him prior to the admission of the college to grant-in-aid as there is no provision in the Orissa Education Act providing for a change-over of all proceedings to the Tribunal .35 In arriving at this conclusion, the two judge Bench relied on the judgment in Dhadi Sahu (supra). C.17 Om Prakash Agarwal (2018- Supreme Court 2 judges) 46. In Om Prakash Agarwal v. Vishan Dayal Rajpoot (2019) 14 SCC ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s small causes cases. By a subsequent amendment, the Small Causes Court presided over by the Civil Judge, became empowered to decide cases up to a value of twenty-five thousand rupees while those above would be taken cognizance of by the Additional District Judge. The Court held: 54...When a small cause suit not exceeding value of ₹ 1 lakh is cognizable by the Court of Small Causes, obviously, no other court can take cognizance. The Additional District Judge to whom small causes suit in question was transferred since its valuation was more than of ₹ 25,000 was not competent to take cognizance of the suit after the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 7-12-2015, when the suit in question became cognizable by the Small Cause Court i.e. the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. C.18 Delhi High Court Bar Association (1993- Delhi HC-DB) 48. We will now advert to a few High Court decisions which have come to varying conclusions due to the ambiguity introduced in the position of law by Dhadi Sahu (supra) vis- -vis Maria Cristina (supra) and New India Assurance (supra) by creating an exception to the Rule that a change of forum is purely a procedural matter. I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ature by express words or by necessary implications so indicates. The Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Gordhan Das Baldev Das v. The Governor General in Council AIR 1952 Punjab 103 (FB), had also said that such a vested right of appeal to a particular forum could be taken away by a later statute if the intention of the legislature was clearly manifested in the later Act. (emphasis supplied) C.19 Mahendra Jain (2008- Bombay HC-DB) 49. In Mahendra Panmal Duggad Jain v. Bhararilal Panmal Duggad Jain (2008) 4 Mah LJ 803, a controversy arose before the Bombay High Court where an amendment was made to Section 26 of the Bombay Civil Court Act, 1869, which increased the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court from ₹ 50,000 to ₹ 2 lakhs. Consequently, the Registrar of the Bombay High Court transferred an appeal which was pending when the amendment came into force to the District Court. The applicants applied to the District Court for re-transferring the appeal to the High Court contending that the appeals filed and entertained by the High Court prior to the amendment coming into force on 13 January 1999 were not liable to be transferred to the District Court. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as on the date the amendment came in force, the appeal in relation to those suits would be filed before a forum created under the amended Act depending on the pecuniary limits. If the appeal has been presented before the date of the amended Act coming into force and the appeals were pending as on the said date, the amendment would not have any effect on such pending appeals. The judgment of the High Court was premised on the principle that when the right to appeal and forum are inextricable, they both become substantive rights and travel together. The Special Bench of the High Court observed: 96. .... if the forum is changed and the right of the appeal in the forum are so inextricable that they cannot be separated by clear cut measure. It has to be that the right of appeal as well as the forum are both substantive rights and therefore, they only apply to the cases in future and not applied to the pending cases. C.21 Gobardhan Lal Soneja (1991- Patna HC-FB) 51. In Gobardhan Lal Soneja v. Binod Kumar Sinha (1991) 2 PLJR 783, the Patna High Court relied on the decision in New India Assurance to hold that the transfer of pending proceedings from the Sub-Judge to the Munsif af ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aring has to be applied. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment cited supra (Sudhir G. Angur), held as under: In our view Mr. G.L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is the law on the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this submission, Mr. Sanghi relied upon the judgment in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass AIR 1952 Bom. 365, wherein it has been held that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum. It has been held that it is well-settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the Legislature expressly states to the contrary. It has been held that the procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal. It has been held that a Court is bound to take notice of the change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a Court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted. We are in com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ving of vested rights of the litigants that were being impacted by the repealing acts therein, and not because a right to forum is accrued once proceedings have been initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi Sahu (supra), to hold that a litigant has a crystallized right to a forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigant's vested right (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights envisaged Under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute. 54. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra) saved proceedings in relation to a benefit which although not vested, accrued to the landlord to evict the tenant by virtue of a proviso to a Section which accorded protection to the tenant from ejectment. This Court reasoned that since the right of the landlord flows from a Section which protects the tenant, it cannot be enlar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e NCDRC against an order of the SCDRC lies on a substantial question of law. 60. The original jurisdiction of the NCDRC Under Section 58(1)(a) is to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration exceeds rupees ten crores and complaints against unfair contracts of a similar value. The NCDRC is vested with an appellate jurisdiction Under Section 51, a revisional jurisdiction Under Section 58(1)(b) and a review jurisdiction Under Section 60. An appeal against an order of the NCDRC passed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction lies to this Court Under Section 67. The second proviso of Section 67 requires a pre-deposit of 50 per cent of the amount ordered by the NCDRC. 61. Under the earlier Act of 1986, the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of (i) the District Commission was up to rupees 20 lacs Under Section 11(1); (ii) the SCDRC between rupees twenty lacs and rupees one crores Under Section 17(1); and (iii) the NCDRC above rupees one crore Under Section 21. The requirement of pre-deposit for filing an appeal before the SCDRC against an order of the District Commission was 50 per cent of the amount or twenty-five thousand rupees, whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ently means the right which has been adverted to in Clause (c). The plain consequence of Clause (c) and Clause (e), when read together is twofold: first, the right which has accrued on the date of the institution of the consumer complaint under the Act of 1986 (the repealing law) is preserved; and second, the enforcement of the right through the instrument of a legal proceeding or remedy will not be affected by the repeal. 64. Having stated the above position, we need to harmonize it with the principle that the right to a forum is not an accrued right, as discussed in Part C of this judgment. Simply put, while Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act protects the pending legal proceedings for the enforcement of an accrued right from the effect of a repeal, this does not mean that the legal proceedings at a particular forum are saved from the effects from the repeal. The question whether the pending legal proceedings are required to be transferred to the newly created forum by virtue of the repeal would still persist. As discussed, this Court in New India Assurance (supra) and Maria Christina (supra) has held that forum is a matter pertaining to procedural law and therefore the li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the alteration of pecuniary limits by the Act of 2019. A consumer who has engaged legal counsel at the headquarters of the NCDRC would have to undertake a fresh round of legal representation before the SCDRC incurring expense and engendering uncertainty in obtaining access to justice. Likewise, where complaints have been instituted before the SCDRC, a transfer of proceedings would require consumers to obtain legal representation before the District Commission if cases were to be transferred. Such a course of action would have a detrimental impact on the rights of consumers. Many consumers may not have the wherewithal or the resources to undertake a fresh burden of finding legal counsel to represent them in the new forum to which their cases would stand transferred. 68. It would be difficult to attribute to Parliament, whose purpose in enacting the Act of 2019 was to protect and support consumers with an intent that would lead to financial hardship, uncertainty and expense in the conduct of consumer litigation. Ironically, the objection which has been raised in the present case to the continued exercise of jurisdiction by the NCDRC in regard to the consumer complaint filed by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... otect pending proceedings through Section 107(2) of the Act of 2019. This intention appears likely, particularly in light of previous decisions of the NCDRC which had interpreted amendments that enhanced pecuniary jurisdiction, with prospective effect. The NCDRC, in Southfield Paints and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.16 construed amending Act 62 of 2002 by which the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction were enhanced with effect from 15 March 2003 as prospective by relying on its earlier decision in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Dr Manoj Ramachandran17, where the NCDRC held that the amendments enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction are prospective in nature [albeit on a reliance of the principle in Dhadi Sahu (supra)]. Parliament would be conscious of this governing principle and yet chose not to alter it in its application to the consumer fora. 70. It is accepted, that in defining the jurisdiction of the District Commission, Section 34 of the Act of 2019 entrusts the jurisdiction to entertain complaints. A similar provision is contained in Section 47 and Section 58 in regard to the SCDRC and NCDRC. The expression entertain has been considered in a two judge Benc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tuted by the Appellants; (iii) All proceedings instituted before 20 July 2020 under the Act of 1986 shall continue to be heard by the fora corresponding to those designated under the Act of 1986 as explained above and not be transferred in terms of the new pecuniary limits established under the Act of 2019; and (iv) The Respondent shall bear the costs of the Appellant quantified at Rupees Two lakhs which shall be payable within four weeks. 72. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. 73. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 1 Act of 2019 2The Act was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, No. 54 dated 9 August 2019 3Consumer Case No. 566 of 2020 (NCDRC) 4 NCDRC 5 Act of 1986 6 General Clauses Act 7The pecuniary limits were enhanced from rupees one lac to rupees five lacs by Act 50 of 1983 with effect from 18 June 1993. The limits were enhanced from rupees five lacs to rupees twenty lacs by Act 62 of 2002 with effect from 15 March 2003. 8 SCDRC 9By Act 62 of 2002, these limits had been enhanced from the previous limits of rupees five lacs - rupees 20 lacs 10 District Comm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he SEBI Act remained unaffected by the amendment of the said provision; and on the basis of the above assumption, the learned Counsel's submission, that the present controversy relates to an amendment which envisaged a mere change of forum. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it would be pertinent to mention, that a right of appeal can be availed of only when it is expressly conferred. When such a right is conferred, its parameters are also laid down. A right of appeal may be absolute i.e. without any limitations. Or, it may be a limited right. The above position is understandable, from a perusal of the unamended and amended Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act. Under the unamended Section 15-Z, the appellate remedy to the High Court, against an order passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, was circumscribed by the words ... on any question of fact or law arising out of such order . The amended Section 15-Z, while altering the appellate forum from the High Court to the Supreme Court, curtailed and restricted the scope of the appeal, against an order passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, by expressing that the remedy could be availed of ... on any que ..... 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