TMI Blog1984 (3) TMI 11X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iled his returns before the ITO, who by his orders dated December 8, 1969, December 9, 1970, and March 24, 1973 (exhibits A to D), concluded the assessments for the said years. But in the four notices bearing No. PN 4461 dated March 18, 1978, (exhibits M to P), issued under s. 148 of the Act, the ITO has called upon the petitioner to file his returns for the aforesaid assessment years, the validity of which are challenged by him in these petitions under article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner has asserted that he had made a full and true disclosure of all material facts for the relevant assessment years and accepting the same, the ITO had completed the assessments under the Act and there was no justification to reopen those concluded assessments under s. 147 of the Act. On this premise, the petitioner has urged that the notices issued on March 18, 1978, were also barred by time. In his return, the respondent has asserted that the order made by this court in M.F.A. No. 279 of 1972 (exhibit F) and the amounts received thereto have necessarily to be brought to tax for the relevant assessment years and for such cases, the bar of limitation stipulated in s. 153(1) and (2) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct was attracted. In this view, the primary reason recorded by the ITO to reopen the concluded assessments cannot be sustained. Even the petitioner does not dispute the legal proceedings he had initiated for enhancement of compensation, the order made by this court in M.F.A. No. 279 of 1972 (exhibit F) and the receipt of enhanced compensation on January 27, 1975, to which the ITO has alluded in his proceedings to reopen the concluded assessments. On these facts that are not in dispute, the notices were legally sustainable under s. 147(b) and s. 153(3)(ii) of the Act, though the ITO had sought to reopen them only under s. 147(a) of the Act, which is now found to be erroneous by this court. In support of his contention, Sri Raghavendra Rao strongly relies on the Division Bench rulings of the Punjab and Haryana, Gujarat and Delhi High Courts in CIT v. Ess Ess Kay Engineering Co. P. Ltd. [1982] 137 ITR 446, Addl. CIT v. New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. [1979] 117 ITR 849 and Ganga Saran and Sons (HUF) v. ITO [1981] 130 ITR 212. In answer to this contention urged by Sri Raghavendra Rao, Sri Ramabhadran contends that the Revenue should not be permitted to urge an entirely different ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... possible to hold that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment because of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts but still, on those very facts, an opinion may be reasonably formed that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The second reason given, even according to the learned counsel for the, parties, has no significance because in the notice issued, it is not necessary to specify the particular clause of s. 147 under which it is issued. The third reason has hardly any bearing on the disputed problem. If the notice is issued within the period of four years, resort can be had to either of the two clauses by the ITO and if it is issued beyond that period, cl. (b) cannot be invoked under any circumstance and proceedings can be taken only under cl. (a). None of the reasons given in this decision, therefore, can justify the view that if the proceedings are purported to have been taken by the ITO under cl. (a) of s. 147, the same cannot be sustained by invoking cl. (b) if the proceedings had been initiated within a period of four years. On the other hand, in Mriganka Mohan Sur's case [1974] 95 ITR 503, a Division Ben ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... conditions under which notices under clause (a) or clause (b) can be issued and assessment has to be completed do not indicate that clause (a) or clause (b) deal with two separate jurisdictions. It is true that there are separate limitations prescribed for different contingencies but some of the conditions are common and provided the conditions which are common are all fulfilled and the other limitation of the other clause is also fulfilled, then action taken in respect of one might be justified with reference to the powers under the other clause. In the aforesaid decision Manchanda J. observed that even though the ITO might have chosen to make the assessment under the more stringent and onerous provisions of section 34(1)(a), there was nothing to prevent the appellate court from invoking section 34(1)(b) provided the pre-requisite conditions were satisfied and these were found on record. The learned judge further observed that section 34 was not a charging section. It merely provided a machinery whereby an income which had escaped assessment or had been underassessed in the relevant assessment years could be brought into the net work of taxation. With respect, we are in agreement ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent period either before a High Court or the Supreme Court that can deal with an assessment under the Constitution and not to every order of every court in other legal proceedings like the land acquisition proceedings. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (eleventh edition) states the very first principle of construction of statutes in these words ; " A statute is the will of the legislature, and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded 'according to the intent of them that made it'. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound these words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. Bearing this very first principle, it is necessary to ascertain the true scope and ambit of s. 153(3)(ii) of the Act. The language of ss. 150 and 153(3)(ii) of the Act, which are not also similar, govern two entirely different situations. The two provisions do not govern one and the same situation. While s. 150 of the Act, as explained by me in Consolidated Coffee Limited's case [19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of limitation would not arise for consideration. That is the prima facie view which appears to us at the present stage. " Sri Ramabhadran contends that this enunciation made by their Lordships of the Gujarat High Court, without any discussion and reasons, was not necessary for deciding the case that arose before this court. Even assuming that Sri Ramabhadran is right in his submission, in that event also, the above conclusion accords with the view expressed by me. With respect, I am in complete agreement with the view expressed by their Lordships in New Jehangir Vakil Mills' case [1979] 117 ITR 849 (Guj). On the above discussion, it follows that the impugned notices have to be upheld as validly issued under section 147(b) and s. 153(3)(ii) of the Act. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 1, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in all these cases. Bat, in the circumstances of the cases, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. I grant 60 days time from this day to the petitioner to file his return before the ITO in pursuance of the impugned notices that are upheld. Let this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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