TMI Blog2012 (1) TMI 412X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Water Supply Scheme - disputes arose between the parties - resolve such disputes, sole arbitrator was appointed u/s 11 - Appellants filed application u/s 16 questioning the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator - no arbitration clause in the agreement - application rejected by the sole arbitrator and passed two awards - Appellants made two applications for setting aside the awards. HELD THAT:- Section 4, enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines 'period of limitation' which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1. Two contracts were entered into between the Appellants and the Respondents -(i) for construction of Tezpur Town Water Supply Scheme and (ii) for construction of Tinsukia Town Water Supply Scheme. Certain disputes arose between the parties concerning these contracts and to resolve such disputes, sole arbitrator was appointed by the Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court on March 26, 2002 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, '1996 Act'). On May 10, 2002 the Appellants filed application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act questioning the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator as according to the Appellants there was no arbitration clause in the agreement. This application came to be rejected by the sol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d has no application to the peculiar facts of the present case where extension was sought by the Appellants under Section 4 of the 1963 Act. In support of his argument, Mr. Bijender Singh, Learned Counsel, referred to Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act that defines 'period of limitation' and Section 43 of the 1996 Act that makes the 1963 Act applicable to arbitration matters. 6. Mr. Shyam Divan, Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the High Court did not commit any error in upholding the view of the District Judge, Kamarup, Guwahati. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the High Court's view is consistent with Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, particularly proviso (3) thereof. 7. Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... harashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited (2010) 4 SCC 518, a two Judge Bench of this Court speaking through one of us (R.M. Lodha, J.) emphasized the mandatory nature of the limit to the extension of the period provided in proviso to Section 34(3) and held that an application for setting aside arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act has to be made within the time prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 34, i.e., within three months and a further period of 30 days on sufficient cause being shown and not thereafter. 10. Section 43(1) of the 1996 Act provides that the 1963 Act shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in court. The 1963 Act is thus applicable to the matters of arbitration covered by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iod for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation.-A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day. 13. The above Section enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are 'prescribed period'. What is the meaning of these words? Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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