TMI Blog2021 (12) TMI 1075X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ented on above applications, states that the assessee had not brought out sufficient reasons to condone the delay (for only 8 quarters out of 21 quarters). Therefore, we hold that the CIT(A) has erred in dismissing the appeal pertaining to 8 quarters on the ground of delay in filing the appeal before him. The assessing Officer cannot make any adjustment other than one prescribed in section 200A of the Act. Prior to 01.06.2015, there was no enabling provision in section 200A of the Act for making adjustment in respect of statement filed by the assessee with regard to tax deducted at source by levying fees u/s 234E of the Act. The Parliament for the first time enabled the Assessing Officer to make adjustment by levying fees u/s 234E of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oner of Income Tax Appeals is so far as it is against the appellant, is opposed to law, equity, weight of evidence, probabilities, facts and circumstances of the case. 4. The learned Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals has erred in upholding the order not passing as a separate order under section 234E levying fee for delay in filing the statement under section 200A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 5. That on the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Commissioner Appeals was not justified in not condoning the delay and giving the opportunity to explain. 6. That on the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Commissioner Appeals was not justified in not condoning the delay and giving the opportunity to explain. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Departmental Representative relied on the order of the CIT(A). 7. We have heard the learned DR and perused the material on record. There was a delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A). The assessee had filed application for condonation of delay vide its letter dated 05.07.2019. The relevant extraction of the same reads as follows:- I request you to kindly condone the delay in filing of the appeal against late filing fee u/s 234E before your Honour, as my father was not keeping good health during the period September 2013 to August 2015, being the only one to my father, I had frequently accompany him to Chennai for medical treatment. During the period of September 2013 to August 2015, my hotel project was under implementat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re law demands that all litigants, including the State as litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administrated in an evenhanded manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. 7.2 The Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh (2010) 6 SCC 786 had held that ordinarily the matter should be disposed of on merits and not on technicality. It was held by th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... foresaid observations and discussion, two aspects may transpire one, for section 234E providing for fee and given privilege to the defaulter if he pays the fee and hence, when a privilege is given for a particular purpose which in the present case is to come out from rigors of penal provision of section 271H(1)(a), it cannot be said that the provisions of fee since creates a counter benefit or reciprocal benefit in favour of the defaulter in the rigors of the penal provision, the provisions of section 234E would meet with the test of quid pro quo. However, if section 234E providing for fee was brought on the state book, keeping in view the aforesaid purpose and the intention then, the other mechanism provided for computation of fee and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ayment of fee under section 234E was provided but, it did not provide for making of demand of such fee under section 200A payable under section 234E. Hence, considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, the contention of the respondent-revenue that insertion of clauses (c) to (f) under section 200A(1) should be treated as retroactive in character and not prospective is unacceptable. It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, it is found that substitution made by clauses (c) to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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