TMI Blog2022 (2) TMI 1219X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Redressal Forum. Thereafter, the proceedings instituted before the commencement of 2019 Act would continue before the fora corresponding to the provisions under the 1986 Act. The change of forum and period of limitation have been held to be procedural law even in the judgments reported in VIDEOCON INTERNATIONAL LTD. VERSUS SECURITIES EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA [ 2015 (2) TMI 735 - SUPREME COURT ] and MARIA CRISTINA DE SOUZA SODDER VERSUS MARIA ZURANA PEREIRA PINTO [ 1978 (8) TMI 225 - SUPREME COURT ]. The onerous condition of payment of 50% of the amount awarded will not be applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act - application allowed. - I.A. No. 99210 of 2021 in Civil Appeal No. 1842 of 2021 - - - Dated:- 15-2-2022 - Hemant Gupta And V. Ramasubramanian, JJ. ORDER Hemant Gupta, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against an order passed by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission [National Commission] whereby the Appellant herein was directed to pay a sum of ₹ 265.01 Crores along with interest @ 10% p.a. from 19.9.2016 within a period of three months. In case of failure to deposit the said amount, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a person who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless that person has deposited fifty per cent of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed. 5. Learned Attorney General appearing for the Appellant submitted that the appeal has been preferred Under Section 23 of the 1986 Act and not under the 2019 Act which came into force from 20.7.2020. It was stated that the condition of deposit of 50% of the amount is more onerous than what was provided under the 1986 Act. Therefore, keeping in view the principle that the law which is applicable at the time of initiation of the lis would be applicable, the provisions of 1986 Act would govern the present appeal and not the provisions of 2019 Act. The Appellant has deposited ₹ 50,000/- vide demand draft in terms of second proviso to Section 23 of the 1986 Act while exercising its right of appeal under the 1986 Act. Hence, the present appeal be heard on merits. 6. The learned Attorney General inter alia argued that Section 107 of 2019 Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 [For short, the 'General Clauses Act'] ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the particular matters in Sub-section (2) shall not prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act with regard to the effect of repeal. Referring to Clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it was argued that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Further, Clause (e) stipulates that the repeal shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment which may be imposed as if the repealing Act or the Regulation has not been passed. It was thus argued that the repeal of enactment does not affect any right acquired or accrued under the enactment so repealed or affect any legal proceeding in respect of such a right. Such effect was to be construed only when a different intention appears from the repealing statute. It was thus argued that the right to file an appeal under the 1986 Act has accrued in favour of the Appellant in terms of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act and that no different int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in, and before a decision is given by, the inferior court. In the language of Jenkins, C.J. in Nana bin Aba v. Shaik bin Andu to disturb an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedure. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. 9. .... In our view the above observation is apposite and applies to the case before us. The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... crual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself. 10. Subsequently, the Constitution Bench in a judgment reported as Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Ors. AIR 1957 SC 540 approved the judgment in Hoosein Kasam Dada, though the issue was in respect of right of appeal to the Federal Court under the Government of India Act, 1935. The argument was that the Appellant had a right to file an appeal as the suit, out of which the proceedings arose before this Court, was filed on 22.4.1949. Hence, he had acquired a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court which has since been replaced by the Supreme Court. It was the said argument which was accepted by the Constitution Bench when the following principles were delineated: 23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. 12. The Constitution Bench in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Nagpur AIR 1967 SC 344 was considering a matter where the date on which sales tax returns were filed was not disclosed. In the absence of the date of filing of the return, this Court held as under: 9. The decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case, 1953 SCR 987 : (AIR 1953 SC 221), proceeded on the ground that when a lis commences, all rights get crystallised and no clog upon a likely appeal can be put, unless the law was made retrospective, expressly or by clear implication. From the record of this case, we cannot say when the lis commenced, and unless it can be proved conclusively that it was before the amendment of the law, the Rule in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case, 1953 SCR 987 : (AIR 1953 SC 221), cannot apply. There is no averment that right of appeal had vested, and has been wrongly taken away. 13. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es and Suits Valuation Act, 1959. 16. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 175, a four-Judge Bench of this Court held that since the authority entertaining appeal has a jurisdiction to dispense with the compliance of requirement to deposit the amount of property tax, it is not onerous as discretion was vested with the appellate court. In another judgment reported as Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 468, the judgment in Anant Mills was followed. 17. This Court in a judgment reported as Ramesh Singh and Anr. v. Cinta Devi and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 142 held that an appeal under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contemplating deposit of twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount whichever is less will not be applicable to the claim applications filed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Similar is the view of another Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as M/s. Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh and Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 428 wherein the right of appeal conferred under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 could not be said to be taken away after repeal of such Act by the M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion in accordance with law on the basis of the findings recorded by us... 20. Mr. Gupta also referred to the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court reported as Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [2021 SCC On Line SC 1044] wherein pre-deposit was required to be made while filing an appeal under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The said judgment is not applicable as while framing the statute, Section 43(5) contemplating pre-deposit was part of the initially enacted provision. Similarly, another judgment reported as Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [2019 SCC On Line SC 1228] is also in respect of right of appeal on pre-deposit which was enacted originally in the Punjab Value Added Tax Act. 21. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has also relied upon Division Bench judgments in Sri Satya Nand Jha v. Union of India and Ors. [2016 SCC OnLine Jhar 2323] and M/s. Indian Oil Corporation v. Orissa Sales Tax Tribunal, CTC and Ors. [2009 SCC OnLine Ori 353] It is to be noted that the Orissa High Court in Indian Oil Corporation was in fact considering the reverse proposition wherein condition of pre-deposit of 5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Private Limited v. Sanjeev Kumar Sharma and Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 7098 of 2021 with Ors. decided on 7.12.2021] in which the dispute was that the NCDRC had granted stay subject to deposit of the entire decretal amount. No argument was raised or decided for retrospectivity of Section 51 of the 2019 Act but the question raised was whether the NCDRC could direct such deposit of the entire decretal amount pending appeal though the statute prescribes pre-deposit of 50% of the amount in dispute. 24. It was contended that the consumer protection legislation is a beneficial legislation, therefore, the interpretation which benefits the consumer should be preferred as held by this Court in Neena Aneja and Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 225] 25. It is to be noted that in Neena Aneja, this Court held that right to forum is not an accrued right. Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act protects the pending legal proceeding for enforcement of the accrued right from the effect of repeal; it does not mean the legal proceeding at a particular forum was saved from the effect of repeal. This Court found that there was no express intention in the repealing enactment t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry jurisdiction, with prospective effect. The NCDRC, in Southfield Paints and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Consumer Case No. 286 of 2000 (NCDRC) construed amending Act 62 of 2002 by which the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction were enhanced with effect from 15 March 2003 as prospective by relying on its earlier decision in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Dr. Manoj Ramachandran, Revision Petitions Nos. 400 to 402 of 1993, where the NCDRC held that the amendments enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction are prospective in nature [albeit on a reliance of the principle in Dhadi Sahu (supra)]. Parliament would be conscious of this governing principle and yet chose not to alter it in its application to the consumer fora. 26. Having said so, this Court held that serious hardship would be caused to the consumers if the cases already instituted before National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission were required to be transferred to the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. Thereafter, the proceedings instituted before the commencement of 2019 Act would continue before the fora corresponding to the provisions under the 1986 Act. 27. Reliance was also placed upon judgm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... site , thus exempt from the purview of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. We are not concerned with interpretation to be given to a Clause in the statute as in the judgments referred to by the Respondents but only with the effect of substitution of a provision than earlier provisions. 32. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in M/s. Dream Castle and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [W.P. No. 13431 of 2015 etc. decided on 18.4.2016] dealing with amended Section 35 of the Central Excise Act by Finance Act No. 2 of 2014 held that when the unamended condition gave only a chance or hope for an Assessee to get a total waiver at the discretion of the Appellate Authority, the same cannot be equated to a vested right or stated to be retrospective, unless it is definitely shown that the amended condition is more onerous than the unamended condition. It was held as under: 54. Therefore, it is well settled that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and the legislature is well within its competence to impose conditions for the exercise of such a right subject only to the restriction that the conditions so imposed are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restric ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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