TMI Blog1963 (2) TMI 74X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... payment of the full price or pay something more by way of margin and informed them that otherwise the goods would be sold. As no reply was received these 2300 bags were sold on May 24 - some at the rate of Rs. 11/11/6 per maund and the rest at the rate of Rs. 11/12/- per maund. Apart from these transactions in cotton-seeds the respondent firm, according to the plaint, also purchased 100 bales of cotton of which 50 bales were also sold on behalf of the appellant firm, so that after February 14, 1947, 50 bales of cotton purchased by the appellant firm were lying with the respondent. These 50 bales were also sold by the respondent on May 24, 1947 at the rate of Rs. 27/12/- per maund, as the appellant took no action when the respondent asked them either to take away these bales on payment of the price or to put in more money by way of margin. On the accounts, it was said, Rs. 15,556/10/- remained due to the plaintiff firm from the defendant firm. The suit was brought for the recovery of this amount together with interest. 2. In contesting the suit the appellant while admitting trade relations with the plaintiff firm disputed the correctness of the accounts. The plaintiff's case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rds the debits and credits for 2300 bags of cotton seeds for the purchases and sales on February 23, 1947. The High Court accepted the plaintiff's contention in part and held that the plaintiff was entitled to an extra amount of Rs. 3,244/12/-. In the result, the High Court dismissed the defendant's appeal but allowed the plaintiff's appeal to the extent that the decretal amount was increased by Rs. 3,244/12/- thus making the decree one for Rs. 12,694/. 6. On the strength of the certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution; the defendant firm has preferred the present appeal. 7. The appellant's first contention is, as in the courts below, that the suit should have been dismissed altogether. Two grounds of law are urged in support of this. The first is based on the requirement of s. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. It is no longer disputed that the firm was registered by the Registrar of Firms, Punjab, on August 16, 1946, under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, as it stood on that date. That was an order made before the partition of India took place. The entire Province of Punjab was then within British India; there was one ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt in Bombay Cotton Export Import Co., v. Bharat Sarvodaya Mill Co. AIR1959Bom307 , and is, in our opinion, the only possible view. 9. It is unnecessary for us to consider, for the purpose of the present appeal, whether such a registration would be effective registration, in an area which was outside British India, at the time of the registration; and on that we express no opinion. 10. For his next legal contention, viz., that the transactions were prohibited by law, Mr. Aggarwala argued, first that forward contracts in cotton as also oil seeds were prohibited by the orders made in 1943 under the Defence of India Rules and these prohibitions remained effective up to the date of the contracts in the present case by virtue of s. 5 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946). That these were forward contracts is not disputed. It does appear that forward contracts in cotton and in oil-seeds including cotton seeds were prohibited by the Cotton Options (Forward contracts and prohibition) Order, 1943 of May 1, 1943 and oilseeds (Forward Contracts and Prohibition) Order, 1943 of May 29, 1943 respectively. The Defence of India Rules under which these or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oilseed but it cannot be for a moment be suggested that it is fit for human consumption. So, clearly, it is not an oilseed which is edible. Mr. Aggarwala as a last resort argued that what edible oil seed means is a seed from which edible oil can be prepared. Such an argument has only to be mentioned to deserve rejection. The phrase edible oil-seed can never mean what the learned Counsel suggests and can and does mean only an oil seed which is edible as an oil-seed. Cotton-seed, not being edible, falls outside the class of edible oil-seed and so is not foodstuff within the meaning of s. 2 of the Ordinance or the Act of 1946. The Cotton Seeds Order of 1943 which has been mentioned above is therefore not in respect of a matter specified in s. 3 of the Ordinance or the Act so was not kept alive by s. 5. The Cotton Order has also not been kept alive, for raw cotton is not one of the articles included in the definition of essential commodity in s. 2. It may be added that s. 5 continues only such previous Orders as are consistent with the new law and clearly, as cotton and cotton-seeds are not included in the definition of Essential Commodity, any previous Order with respect to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Ex. P-8; but for the purchase price which had to be debited against the defendant it rejected the figure of Rs. 14/8/- shown in Ex. P-8 but took the figure of Rs. 13/8/- and Rs. 13/10/- as shown in the plaintiff's account book. It seems to us likely that the arrangement between the parties was that the debits and credits in the running account should be on the basis of the rate at which the purchases and sales were actually made and not at the rate mentioned in the Saudabahi. This is clear from the fact that for both the sale and the purchase the account book shows the actual rates at which the purchases and sales were made (the purchase price being at the rate of Rs. 13/8/- and Rs. 13/10/- per maund and sales being at the rate of Rs. 13/5/- and Rs. 13/7/- per maund). It is difficult to understand why the Trial Judge, though making the debits against the defendant at the lower rate of actual purchase thought it fit to accept the Saudabahi rate for the sale. If for both debits and credits the actual rates at which the purchases and sales were effected are accepted, it is clear that the Trial Court's direction had resulted in crediting the defendant with Rs. 3,244/12/- more ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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