TMI Blog2004 (6) TMI 640X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... January 9,2004 having been communicated to the petitioners by fax on January 30, 2004, i.e. beyond 30 days from the issue of order of suspension dated December 10, 2003, was liable to be set aside. 4. On February 17, 2004, this matter was moved for the first time after service of the copy of the writ application upon the State respondent. Since pure questions of law were agitated by the petitioners, this Court, to enable Ms. Chakraborty, the learned advocate appearing for the State respondents to take instruction in the matter, fixed February 27, 2004, for further hearing with a direction upon Ms. Chakraborty to produce the records. 5. On February 27, 2004, Ms. Chakraborty produced records showing that the decision impugned was really faxed to the petitioners on January 30, 2004. Ms. Chakraborty further informed the Court that the hearing, however, had taken place on January 7, 2004, and the order was actually passed on January 9, 2004. On that day, Ms. Chakraborty emphatically asserted before this Court that she had definite instruction that on January 9, 2004, immediately after passing of the order, the officer concerned tendered the order to a representative of the petitio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned in the order dated March 30, 2004, were those of the Minister concerned. 13. In spite of the admission made by the officers of the State respondents that the Minister concerned interfered with the duties conferred upon the Director of Consumer Goods, this Court issued a notice upon the said Minister giving him an opportunity to verify from the records whether those endorsements were really made by him. Notwithstanding such opportunity being given, the Minister concerned did not appear before this Court to deny his endorsement or the signature. It is, therefore, established beyond any doubt that those endorsements in green ink were really made by the said Minister. 14. On the basis of the aforesaid available materials, Mr. Asoke Banerjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has strenuously contended that apart from the points taken in this writ application, the order impugned should be quashed simply on the ground of unauthorized interference of the Minister concerned when the Control Order has vested the power to decide the question of cancellation of licence with the Director of Consumer Goods. According to Mr. Banerjee, the Director of Consumer Go ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the petitioners deliberately took a false plea through his learned advocate that he had been sent to Manipur on election duty and that he would not be coming back before May 25, 2004. 17. Mr. Banerjee contends that it has already been proved that during the aforesaid period he was all along in Kolkata and performed duty in the Kolkata-office. Mr. Banerjee, thus, prays for the relief claimed in the application. 18. This application is opposed by the State of West Bengal and Mr. Chakraborty, the learned advocate appearing on its behalf, has seriously disputed all the points raised by the petitioners. According to Mr. Chakraborty, the suspension order having been passed on December 10, 2003, and the order of cancellation having been passed within 30 days from such order, there was no illegality in passing such order. He contends that the date of communication is immaterial for the purpose of scrutinising the validity of such order. Mr. Chakraborty further contends that for the cancellation of licence of an agent, Director of Consumer Goods is the competent authority. As regards the allegation of the unauthorised interference by the Minister, he contends that the Minister bei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he learned Counsel for the State, that the minister, being the administrative Head of the department, has the right to supervise all the activities of his subordinate officers including that of a Director even in the matter of discharging statutory duty. In my view, the Minister was oblivious of the fact that he was bound by the mandate of the statute and it was his duty to respect the desire of the legislature. 23. At this juncture, I cannot help mentioning the unbecoming attitude of the Director. When the Minister called for the file, it was his duty to point out that the statute having invested him with the duty to investigate the allegation against the agent, it was not possible for him to oblige the Minister by sending the file and to take approval of the Minister before taking final decision. In stead of doing that, he readily sent the file and as per direction of the Minister, after passing of the order impugned, sent the same to the Minister for approval, and consequently, the order, although passed on January 9, 2004, could not be faxed to the petitioner before January 30, 2004, till the Minister accorded approval. In order to conceal such fact, the Director made out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unities to explain the reason why did he call for records of a case of the District Purulia involving allegation of misconduct of an agent and what prompted him to direct an appropriate statutory authority to seek his approval before passing final order, decided to remain absent for the reason best known to him; equally curious is the conduct of the Director, who took shelter under falsity in order to avoid discloser of the truth before the Court. Thus, the manner in which the licence of the petitioner No. 1 has been cancelled proves beyond any doubt that the statutory requirements of the Control Order have not been complied with in cancelling the licence of the petitioner No. 1 and the aforesaid facts are sufficient for setting aside the order impugned in this application. In other words, the licence of the petitioner No. 1 has been cancelled by not following the due process of law . 25. In view of my aforesaid findings, although the other point inyolved in this application has become academic, I propose to answer that point also, as the learned Counsel for the parties laboriously advanced their submissions on that point. 26. As indicated earlier, the question is if an orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g to be made within 30 days from the date of suspension of the licence. The order shall be passed ex parte if the dealer whose licence has been so suspended fails to appear at the hearing. (Emphasis Supplied) Paragraph 10. Appeal.--Any person aggrieved by an order passed under Paragraph 8 or Paragraph 9 of this order may within 30 days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal, (a) in Calcutta, - (i) where the order is passed by the Director of Consumer Goods, Department of Food and Supplies, to the State Government, (ii) where the order is passed by any other officer authorised by the State Government under Clause (d) of Paragraph 3, to the Director of Consumer Goods, Department of Food and Supplies, and (b) elsewhere, -- (i) where the order is passed by the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner of District, to the State Government, (ii) where the order is passed by any officer authorised by the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner of a District under Clause (e) of Paragraph 3, to the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the District. 29. After going through the aforesaid two paragraphs, I find ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... equently, the order of suspension had automatically ceased to have any effect from January 10, 2004, and the order of cancellation not having been passed in accordance with law within 30 days from December 10,2003, the Director could not pass any such order beyond that date. Thus, the order impugned is liable to be quashed also on the aforesaid ground. 32. I, therefore, set aside the order dated January 9, 2004, passed by the Director of Consumer Goods, cancelling the licence of the petitioner No 1. The order of suspension dated December 10, 2003 also stands revoked. The respondents are directed to immediately restore supply of kerosene to the petitioner No. 1. 33. The writ application thus succeeds with costs, which I assess at Rs. 20,000/-, to be borne equally by the Minister concerned and the Director of Consumer Goods personally. As the order impugned is the outcome of extra statutory process resorted to by the Minister, and accepted by the Director without any protest, the public exchequer cannot be saddled with the liability of the consequences, arising thereof. 34. The petitioners are also at liberty to file separate suit against those respondents for recovery of da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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