TMI Blog2008 (8) TMI 95X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad, Secunderabad, belonged to Mrs. Zenobia Rustom Ranji who passed away on 29.10.1988. She had earlier executed a will on 22.5.1987 appointing the petitioners as executors in respect of her properties including "Rustom Villa". Under the will, the said residential building was to be sold and the sale proceeds was to be donated to nine charitable institutions. Petitioners claim to have got the property valued by two valuers according to whom it was worth Rs.15.32 lakhs and Rs.15.60 lakhs respectively. The petitioners entered into an agreement of sale with Mrs. Sanbar N. Markar on 14.12.1989 for a total consideration of Rs.15.60 lakhs. They filed the statement in Form 37-I, together with the agreement of sale, before the 1 st respondent on 27.12.1989. Another set of Form 37-I was also submitted on 9.2.1990. The 1 st respondent, without giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard, passed orders on 16.2.1990 purchasing the property, on behalf of the Central Government, for Rs.15,31,640. 3. Questioning the said order dated 16.2.1990, the petitioners filed W.P.No.2978 of 1990 and this Court by its order dated 03.12.1997, while setting aside the impugned order dated 16.02 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1993 with effect from 1.6.1993. 5. In C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78., the Supreme Court held that the requirement of providing an opportunity to show cause must be read into Section 269UD(1) as it is a minimal requirement of the rules of natural justice. On the question of relief the Supreme Court observed (page 560): "........This brings us to the question of relief. We find that the order for compulsory purchase under Section 269UD(1) of the Income Tax Act which was served on the petitioner in the night of December 15, 1986, has been made without any show-cause notice being served on the petitioner and without the petitioner or other affected parties having been given any opportunity to show cause against an order for compulsory purchase nor were the reasons for the said order set out in the order or communicated to the petitioner or other concerned parties with the order. In view of what we have stated earlier the order is clearly bad in law and it is set aside. The next question is as to the consequence to follow. In view of the fact that the object of the provisions of Chapter XX-C is a laudable object, namely, to counter evasion of tax in tran ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y operating therein, it would not be possible immediately to take steps and implement the directions contained in the judgment within the time frame stipulated therein. The second aspect relates to pending matters before the authorities, which, though not pending before courts, do not also admit of application of the principles consistent with the statutory limit. After hearing the learned Solicitor General, we are satisfied that the problems and difficulties envisaged, in practical terms, are real and require to be provided for. 47. The first aspect arises out of the limited retrospectivity imported by the judgment. The judgment provides that: "In order to avoid that situation and, yet to ensure that no injustice is caused to the petitioner, we order, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the statement in Form 37-I submitted by the petitioner as set out earlier shall be treated as if it were submitted on the date of signing of this judgment." 48. Learned Solicitor General points out that in the cases where petitions are yet pending in this Court as well as in the various High Courts, the above direction becomes unworkable inasmuch as the interim orders subsisting ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, would submit that when it pronounced its judgment, in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78, on 17.11.1992 the Supreme Court was conscious of the statutory prescription, for submission of the statement in Form 37-I, under the proviso to Section 296UD(1) and had, therefore, prescribed the time limit of two months. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that as this period of two months was later enlarged to three months, by insertion of the second proviso with effect from 1.6.1993, the period of two months in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78 must be held to have been enlarged to three months with respect to all matters which were pending before Courts/Tribunals/other authorities on the date from which the amendment came into force. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that, since this Court had pronounced judgment, in W. P. No. 2978 of 1990 on 3.12.1997, much after the amendment came into force with effect from 01.06.1993, the period for completion of proceedings, as stipulated in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78, must necessarily be read as three months. 9. According to the Learned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... concerned to pass an order under Section 269UD(1) in respect of the property in question, and also to ensure that no injustice was caused to the petitioner, that the Supreme Court ordered that "the statement in Form 37-I submitted earlier by the petitioner should be treated as if it were submitted on the date of signing of the judgment." 11. These directions were issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This power has been conferred only on the Supreme Court and its exercise is not dependent or conditioned by any statutory provision. ( Mohd. Anis v. Union of India [1994] Supp (1) SCC 145; Chandrakant Patil v. State [1998] 3 SCC 38). The plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution inheres in the Supreme Court and exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. ( Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [2005] 3 SCC 284). The phrase "complete justice" in Article 142 is a word of width couched with elasticity to meet myriad situations created by human ingenuity or cause or result of operation of statute law or law declared under Articles 32, 136 and 141 of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ples cannot be extended to judgments of Courts for it is well settled that a decision of a Court is only an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code whereas, it must be acknowledged that, the law is not always logical. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. ( Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647; Delhi Administration (NCT of Delhi) v. Manoharlal [2002] 7 SCC 222 ; Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) [2002] 257 ITR 123; and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2003] 2 SCC 111). 15. In Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills [2002] 3 SCC 496, the Supreme Court observed: "......Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on, and the consequences arising therefrom, cannot be extended to judgments of Courts. It is not for this Court to decide by an interpretative process whether the Supreme Court in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78, intended to create two categories of persons and whether it would have prescribed three months in the light of a subsequent legislative amendment. The time limit specified in C.B. Gautam [1993] 199 ITR 530; [1993] 1 SCC 78, of two months cannot, by application of the principles governing statutory fiction, be construed as having been extended to three months. 18. This question can also be examined from another angle. As noted above, the time limit prescribed earlier under Section 269UD(1), for passing an order in respect of any immovable property, was two months from the end of the month in which the statement in Form 37-I was received by the authority. It is only by virtue of the second proviso that, in cases where the statement in Form 37-I was received by the appropriate authority on or after the 1st day of June, 1993, that the words "two months" stood substituted by "three months". Admittedly, in case on hand, the statement in Form 37-I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd [2001] 4 SCC 139). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. ( Maruti Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S.T.O., I.S.T. Circle, Mattancherry [2001] 3 SCC 735, State of Jharkhand Vs. Govind Singh [2005] 10 SCC 437). The second proviso to Section 269UD(1), which came into force w.e.f. 1-6-1993, has, therefore, no application. The outer limit for passing the order, under Section 269UD(1), thus expired by 28.02.1998. Consequently both the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, and the final order dated 30.03.1998, are barred by limitation. 21. While this would suffice to quash both the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, and the impugned order dated 30.03.1998, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar would urge us to adjudicate on his other grounds of challenge also. Learned Counsel would submit that the show cause notice was issued on 25.3.1998 informing the petitioners that their case stood posted to 30.3.1998 and, though the petitioners had requested that further time be given to them to submit their reply to the show cause notice, they were denied the opportunity to do so. According to the Learned Couns ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 974] 96 ITR 390. 23. The order of this Court in W.P.No.2978 of 1990, setting aside the earlier impugned order dated 06.02.1990, was passed on 03.12.1997. The first respondent kept quiet for more than 31/2 months thereafter and issued a show-cause notice as late as on 25.03.1998, less than a week before the last date on which, according to them, a final order could be passed. Having kept quiet for so long, for which no explanation is forthcoming, the respondents justify their having passed the impugned order less than 5 days thereafter, (thereby denying an opportunity to the petitioners to submit their objections), on the specious plea that the final order was required to be passed before 31.03.1998. The respondents cannot take advantage of their own wrong in issuing the show-cause notice belatedly. They cannot be permitted to use that as an excuse for denying the petitioners a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 24. Further, instead of furnishing reasons in the show-cause notice dated 25.03.1998, as to why they had chosen to proceed under Section 269UD(1), the respondents enclosed thereto a copy of their earlier order dated 16.02.1990 which, as noted hereinabove, was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... same but for the fact that the Supreme Court in Sona Builders [2001] 251 ITR 197; [2001] 10 SCC 280, a case which also arose under Section 269UD(1), had held otherwise. A direction issued by the Supreme Court, in more or less identical circumstances to the case on hand, would require us to pass a similar order for it is well settled that, on the law having been declared by the Supreme Court, it is the duty of the High Court, whatever be its view, to act in accordance with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Judicial discipline to abide by the declaration of law, of the Supreme Court, cannot be forsaken by any Court, be it even the highest Court in a State, oblivious of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. ( Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [2002] 4 SCC 234, State of Orissa Vs. Dhaniram Luhar [2004] 5 SCC 568 ). 27. Viewed from any angle, both the impugned show cause notice dated 25.03.1998, and the final order dated 30.03.1998, require to be set aside and are, accordingly, quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. - - TaxTMI - TMITax - Incom ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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