TMI Blog2023 (9) TMI 635X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the statutory authorities to decide the same. It was held the authorities under the Act being creatures of the statute would not be able to determine the same. Thus, it is for this Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to determine what would constitute reasonable period for passing orders under Section 27 of the TNVAT Act - A reading of the above judgment would show that it is for this Court to decide as to what would constitute reasonable time for taking actions or passing order in the absence of statutory prescription of limitation. It is thus clear that even if the notice was issued within the prescribed period of limitation, inordinate/unreasonable delay in completing the proceedings would vitiate the same. In the present case, there is no explanation as to why it has taken more than six years after the issuance of the first notice on 23.07.2014 to issue the second notice on 23.06.2020 while proceeding to pass the impugned order on 05.02.2021 after almost 10 years from the deemed assessment - This Court in the case of J.M.Baxi [ 2016 (6) TMI 813 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] found that failure to explain the delay of 5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is kept aside then the first of the notices would only be on 23.06.2020 which is 9 years since the date of the deemed assessment proceeding dated 29.04.2011 and thus clearly barred by limitation of 6 years from the date of assessment prescribed in terms of Section 27 of the TNVAT Act for the purposes of reassessment. Assuming that the notice dated 23.07.2014 purportedly issued under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act was in fact traceable to Section 27 of the TNVAT Act and thus the initiation of reassessment is not hit by limitation under Section 27 of the TNVAT Act, nevertheless the respondent after having chosen to issue notice on 23.07.2014 went into slumber for almost 6 years before the second notice came to be issued on 23.06.2020, the above delay is unreasonable and therefore, the consequential order of assessment is unsustainable. 4. To the contrary, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that notice dated 27.03.2014 though makes a reference to Section 84 of the TNVAT Act is only a case of misquoting of the provision and a closer look at notice would clearly show it did not intend to rectify any error apparent, instead it intended to make reassessment thus th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. (ii)S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India, reported in (1976) 2 SCC 181: 15 ....It may well be that for an exercise of the suo moto power of revision also, the revisional authority has to initiate the proceeding within a reasonable time. Any unreasonable delay in exercise may affect its validity. What is a reasonable time, however, will depend upon the facts of each case. 9. The question that now arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can determine as to what would constitute reasonable period for passing orders under Section 27 of the TNVAT Act or should it be left to the assessing author ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... notice would not by itself provide immunity to the assessment orders being challenged as having been made beyond reasonable period and thereby suffering from the vice of arbitrariness. In this regard, it may be relevant to refer to the following judgments: (i) J.M.Baxi and Co. Vs. UOI reported in 2016 (336) E.L.T. 285 (Mad): 16. In the order of adjudication dated 07.01.2000, there is nothing to indicate as to what transpired from 23.5.1995 up to 07.01.2000, except for two dates. One is a letter dated 23.10.1999 where the appellant sought an injury to be inflicted upon them voluntarily, reminding the Department of the pendency of the show cause notice. The next date is 04.01.2000 when a personal hearing took place. Therefore, the order of adjudication certainly had not taken place within a reasonable period. Though the statute does not prescribe a period of limitation for passing an order of adjudication, the law is well settled that anything in respect of which no period of limitation is prescribed, should be done at least within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of this nature, where the we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssment stretch from 1989-1990 to 1994-1995. The pre-assessment notices have been sent only on 23.08.1999 and proceedings completed in 2015. Thus even on this score, the time taken for conclusion of proceedings appears inordinately delayed and it thus unacceptable. The impugned orders are quashed. (emphasis supplied) 11. It is thus clear that even if the notice was issued within the prescribed period of limitation, inordinate/unreasonable delay in completing the proceedings would vitiate the same. In the present case, there is no explanation as to why it has taken more than six years after the issuance of the first notice on 23.07.2014 to issue the second notice on 23.06.2020 while proceeding to pass the impugned order on 05.02.2021 after almost 10 years from the deemed assessment. This Court in the case of J.M.Baxi (cited supra) found that failure to explain the delay of 5 years after initiation would vitiate the proceeding on the ground of unreasonable delay. In view of the same and following the above orders of this Court and in particular, the case of Kanthimathy Estate vs. The Assistant Commissioner Commercial Taxes in W.P.(MD)Nos.3056 of 2016 etc., batch, where ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
