TMI Blog2023 (12) TMI 836X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ating the very purpose of enactment of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881; therefore, the Parliament decided to provide that 20% amount shall be deposited by the appellant. In the present case, the words of the statutes are clear that the amounts shall be deposited within 60 days or within such further time not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown. These words are capable of only one interpretation that an initial time of 60 days can be granted which can be extended by 30 days on sufficient cause being shown. There is no ambiguity in the words of the statute, hence, the plain words are to be given effect - In the present case, the mischief was delay by the drawer in the payment of the compensation by filing an appeal; hence the interpretation to avoid the delay has to be preferred. By considering the provision as mandatory the mischief would be avoided whereas by considering the provision as directory the mischief will be perpetuated and the purpose of enacting the provision would be defeated. It was submitted that provision of Section 148 of the N.I. Act, 1881 binds the Appellate Court and not this Court. This Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pended the sentence subject to furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹ 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court and also to deposit 20% of the compensation amount within two months from the date of the order. The petitioner could not comply with the order and sought extension of time, which was granted to him. The petitioner again could not comply with the order and he filed another application for seeking more time, however, this application was dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate court wrongly construed the provisions of the N.I.Act and held that no further time could be granted. It failed to appreciate that petitioner could not comply with the order on the genuine ground. In case the petitioner is sent to jail for non-compliance of the order dated 28.06.2023, he would be unable to arrange the requisite amount. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Appellate Court Sahib be set aside. 2. I have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rajul Chauhan, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act has been amended from time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offence of dishonour of cheques. However, the Central Government has been receiving several representations from the public including the trading community relating to the pendency of cheque dishonour cases. This is because of delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to the easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings. As a result of this, injustice is caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque. Such delays compromise the sanctity of cheque transactions. 2. It is proposed to amend the said Act with a view to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of cheque dishonour cases so as to provide relief to payees of dishonoured cheques and to discourage frivolous and unnecessary litigation which would save time and money. The proposed amendments will strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce in general by allowing lending institutions, including banks, to continue to extend financing to the producti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SEBI, (2015) 4 SCC 33], relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore, considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act stated hereinabove, on a purposive interpretation of Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act were filed prior to Amendment Act 20 of 2018 i.e. prior to 1-9-2018. If such a purposive interpretation is not adopted, in that case, the object and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act would be frustrated. Therefore, as such, no error has been committed by the learned first appellate court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial court considering Section 148 of the NI Act, as amended. 8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that eve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in the court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and having observed that such delay has compromised the sanctity of the cheque transactions, Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the NI Act. Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the NI Act and also Section 138 of the NI Act. 10. The Punjab and Haryana High Court considered this provision inHarwinder Singh Vs. Mohan LalAIROnline 2021 P H 1555, and held that the Court has power to extend the time by 30 days but this time cannot be extended beyond 90 days. It was observed: 18. A perusal of the provisions of Section 148 N.I. Act as well as the law laid down in the abovesaid judgments affirmatively bring out that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C..1973, wherein an appeal is filed against conviction under Section 138 N.I.Act, the Appellate Court has the power to ask the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or the compensation awarded by the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. [(2000) 5 SCC 515] ) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by the judicial interpretative process. The language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in the Narasimhaiah case [(1996) 3 SCC 88]. In the Nanjudaiah case [(1996) 10 SCC 619] the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1) but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. 15. Two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when the reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be rea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oid such disadvantage. When the legislature chooses appropriate words to express its intention, such intention must be employed so long as this does not result in absurdity. 23. It is also a settled rule of construction that all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together to ascertain the legislative intent. Each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the act itself. Words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the act itself. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. The principle that the statute must be read as a whole equally applies to different parts of the same section. 14. In the present case, the words of the statutes are clear that the amounts shall be deposited within 60 days or within such further time not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown. These words are capable of only one interpretation that an initial time of 60 da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... don's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637]; purposive construction: mischief rule When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) is the rule laid down in Heydon's case [Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] which has now attained the status of a classic (Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907] ). The rule which is also known as purposive construction or mischief rule (Anderton v. Ryan [1985 AC 560 : (1985) 2 WLR 968 : (1985) 2 All ER 355 (HL)] ), enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act: (i) What was the law before the making of the Act; (ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide; (iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided; and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy . The rule was explained in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [AIR 1955 SC 661] by S. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t some of the amount, the Court cannot circumvent the intention of the legislature by holding that the time can be extended by the High Court. This would defeat the intention of the legislature as the power would be conferred on the High Court. Even otherwise, it was laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327 that inherent power cannot be exercised to give a go-by to the statutory provisions. It was observed at page 439: 5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of the law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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