TMI Blog2009 (1) TMI 946X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o result from principles stated by judicial pronouncement. In English and American Law, the component of justice model is the constriction of judicial discretion by the promulgation of standards with which the Judge must substantially comply. The main three strategies are : (a) the enactment directly by legislature of a detailed set of principles of sentencing, indicating a normal or presumptive sentence for given classes of case, with specified aggravations and mitigations, leaving the sentencing Judge very limited discretion; (b) the promulgation of standards, by a Commission composed of Judges and other interested persons, which would be more detailed than a direct legislative enactment, less exposed to change but at the same time more flexible and capable of amendment in the light of experience; and (c) the evolution of guidelines based on an empirical study of current sentencing practice within the jurisdiction concerned. In most of the systems, discretion is vested with the Courts in matters of sentencing and passing other related orders. Continuous efforts are made to avoid disparity of sentencing as individualisation of sentencing will naturally undermine uniformity of sent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with which the Courts have to deal with. An offender's previous conviction and gravity of that offence is of definite significance in subsequent proceedings or orders of sentence or conviction. An assumption is current that exemplary sentence will have a salutary effect on the minds of the potential offenders especially when a particular type of offence is very much prevalent in a community at a given time and punishment being treated as a deterrent. Therefore, while awarding consecutive and/or concurrent sentences the Court decides and records its direction in that regard in specific terms. (Ref: Sentencing By Courts in India by G.N. Sabhahit, First Edition - 1975 published by Dixit Publications, Bangalore.) 3. Sentencing of convicted criminals engages the interest, and sometimes the passion, of the public at large more than anything else Judges do. The requirements of deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation, punishment and restorative justice all of which are identified as purposes of sentencing, do not point in the same direction and requirements of justice, in the sense of Just deserts' and of mercy often conflict. The purpose of sentencing principles or guidelines ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... founded on any codified statutes as under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. 7. The extent of judicial discretion thus could emerge from either enacted law or through the guidelines and precepts which are recognised over a span of time. Both these sources would have a direct impact on the exercise of, discretion by the Courts while imposing punishment. It could be at the stage of first conviction or at a subsequent conviction of the same accused. Besides, imposition of punishment in such cases, the Court also have an additional obligation to direct whether the sentences awarded would run' concurrently or consecutively. This aspect of criminal jurisprudence has been statutorily recognised in Indian Criminal Law where the legislature has introduced Sections 31 and 427, respectively of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'). 8. Section 31(1) of the Code vests a discretion in the Court to direct that the punishment shall run concurrently when a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences. The Court may sentence the accused for such offences to the several punishments prescribed therefore which such Court is competent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce. The order of reference reads as follows: The submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant and the learned A.P.P were heard on the last date. This application has been received from jail. The prayer in this application is for passing a direction for concurrent running of substantive sentences imposed on the petitioner in two separate cases. The applicant has been convicted by judgment and order dated 30th November 2005 passed by the learned Judge of the Special Court at Amritsar under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. By the said judgment and order, the applicant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. By order dated 26th February, 2004 passed by the learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge,. Satara the applicant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 395 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code and he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for Seven years and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ant (supra) is concerned, the Division Bench referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohammed Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector, Customs AIR 1988 SC 2143. After referring to paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Division Bench observed thus: It is evident from the observations of Their Lordships of the Apex Court that in cases which do not arise from a single transaction but, arise out of different transactions, it would not be just and proper to order sentences to run concurrently. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decision, with which we are in, respectful agreement and also keeping in mind that all the three cases in which the petitioner has been convicted are cases under Section 395, Indian Penal Code, which is an anti-social offence, we do not think it expedient in the interest of justice to direct that the sentences of petitioner to run concurrently. 5. Another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sadashiv Sable (supra) considered the question of applicability of Section 427 of the said Code of 1973. In paragraph 5 the Division Bench has held thus: 5. Having regard to the fact that the offences are quite distinct and we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cised by the Court... in the circumstances stated in the question. This obviously means that the Court has the power in terms of Section 427 of the Code to issue directions to order as to whether the sentences awarded upon conviction on a subsequent trial would run concurrently or consecutively. How this discretion is to be exercised would primarily be a matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Before we venture into the various judgments relating to exercise of judicial discretion under Section 427 of the Code, it will be appropriate to examine first the legal provisions, principles of interpretation and application of statutory law to such cases. 12. Let us analyse Section 427 of the Code. The application of this provision will be attracted: (i) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is convicted; (ii) While undergoing such a sentence, such person is subsequently convicted and awarded a sentence of imprisonment including imprisonment for life; (iii) then such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced; and (iv) the Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d run concurrently or consecutively with the previous sentence of imprisonment awarded to the accused by the earlier Court. While passing such an order the Court would have to consider the facts of each case, nature or character of the offence for which the accused was punished in the earlier case, prior criminal record of the offender, age, sex, impact of such sentencing on social fabric of the society, attendant circumstances and amongst others as to whether the crime committed was heinous, etc. The provisions of Section 427 obviously have no application to the cases which fall under Section 31 of the Code as they are controlled by that provision. In a case where a person has committed different offences and is facing one trial for committing two or more offences, even in such cases, the sentences awarded for different offences would commence one after the expiration of the other unless the Court directs that the sentence shall run concurrently. The provisions of Section 427 would come into play obviously where the case of the convict is not covered under Section 31 and he is tried for two different offences in two different cases, one in the earlier trial and then the other in t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ught not to do violence to the language in order to bring people within it, but ought rather to take care that no one is brought within it who is not brought within it by express language. (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition). 15. The rule of literal, liberal or strict construction may be applied while interpreting a statute but in either of them it is hardly permissible to add or read into the provisions. The expression or the words which are non-existent in the statute cannot be read into it when the provisions on its plain reading is clear and unambiguous. Maxwell while interpreting the narrow distinction between the liberal' and strict construction stated as under: The tendency of, modern decisions, upon the whole, is to narrow materially the difference, between what is called a strict and a beneficial construction. All statutes are now construed with; a more attentive regard to the language, and criminal statutes with a more rational regard to the aim and intention of the legislature, than formerly. It is unquestionably right that the distinction should not altogether erased from the judicial mind, for it is required by the spirit of our free institutions th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al statute. Thus, the basic rules of construction would still remain the same. 19. Lord Esher, MR, even in relation to penal Sections observed that if there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. 20. In the case of Tolaram v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 496, the Supreme Court said: If two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature. 21. The provisions of Section 427 of the Code are titled to provide a benefit in favour of a convict. Whether the sentence awarded earlier or the sentence awarded on subsequent conviction to run consecutive or concurrent is a matter of importance not only from the point of view of the accused but even administration of criminal justice. The Court has been vested with this power and is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... It is not the function of this Court to supply the casus omissus. If there be one. As long as the presumption of innocence of the accused prevails in this country, the benefit of any lacuna or casus omissus must be given to the accused. The job of plugging the loopholes must strictly be left to the legislature and not assumed by the Court. 25 . These principles Are applied to interpretation of criminal statutes and they further would support the proposition that indictment of unstated 'restriction on the powers of the Court is hardly permissible. A Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court dealt with somewhat similar question in the case of Pardeep and Ors. v. State of Haryana Criminal Misc. No. 7268 of 1997 in Criminal Appeal No. 312-DB of 1997 in Criminal Appeal No. 290-DB of 1997 and other connected master) decided on 28th May, 1997, where a view of another Bench that in murder appeals a convict sentenced to life imprisonment would not be entitled to bail during the pendency of the appeal except on the grounds stated therein was under consideration. It Was, firstly, on medical ground, secondly, on the ground of some natural calamity and, thirdly, if his kith or kin sufferi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s regard. We find it difficult to define the limitation in such cases which could be imposed on the powers exercisable by the Appellate Court as prescription of such limits by judicial intent, we fear, may neither be possible nor permissible keeping in view the statutory provisions governing the subjects. It has been repeatedly held by various Courts that laying down of conditions which would universally apply in granting or refusing a bail application irrespective of other factors, grounds and reasons, may ultimately prove more disadvantageous then furthering the cause of these statutory provisions which give a definite right to an accused or convict. In the famous case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 2147, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with the arguments identical to the one advanced on behalf of the State in Subhash Chand's case (supra), before the learned Division Bench of, this Court and accepted by the Division Bench, was repelled by the Supreme Court while declining the relief and it expressed its view as follows: The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xercisable by the Courts under these provisions. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx The grounds indicated by the Division Bench in the case of Subhash Chand (supra) in fact are the grounds specifically incorporated by the Legislature under Sections 3 and 4 of the Punjab Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act. This Act is limited in its operation and scope. Thus, to us it appears that these provisions are ancillary to the basic provisions regulating the bail during appeal and consequently cannot circumscribe or limit the scope of the larger provisions. Though they operate in different fields but on some spheres and grounds they indicate the same legislative intent. To impose limitations which are not incorporated in the statute itself to the disadvantage of the convict, may result in decimate of valuable right arising out of a statute. Expressum facit cessare taciturn is a well accepted principle of interpretation of statutes. In other words expression precludes implications and to imply what is not provided for by the Legislature is normally not permissible. To our mind reading of such limitations into the provisions of Section 389 is not necessitated on the principles of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would be that sentence would run consecutively and exception is that they would run concurrently. The pre-requisite of the exception being that Court has to apply its mind and pass a specific order directing that the sentences shall run concurrently with the previous sentence but for such specific exercise of discretion, the rule of sentence running consecutively would cover the case. We have already noticed that this requirement of law has to be satisfied by the Court. The law intends to provide a benefit to the accused of calling upon the Court to exercise discretion where a sentence awarded in a subsequent trial would run consecutively or concurrently with the previous sentence. Wherever the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are applicable the Court would be required to apply the provisions of Section 427 of the Code unless their application was specifically barred by the Legislature or by its necessary implication. The language of Section 427 read cumulatively does not command an accused or a convict to make such an application as consideration of this aspect of sentencing requires, the Courts to exercise the discretion in terms of Section 427 of the Code. No doubt, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous as well as that the Court would not read into the provisions what has not been stated in the language of the provision. (A.N. Roy, Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh (2006) 5 SCC 745 : AIR 2006 SC 2677. Section 31 and Section 427 both should be read in conjunction with the other provisions of the Code which vests the Court with judicial discretion in regard to imposition of imprisonment and should be seen in the backdrop of the scheme of the Code and basic rule of criminal jurisprudence with an interpretation which provides an advantage to the under-trial is preferred to the one against him. May be parameters and criteria in awarding sentence under different provisions of the Code would largely be applicable even to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 427 of the Code. The nature and gravity of the previous offence, the punishment inflicted, the circumstances leading to the occurrence, conduct of the accused could be looked into by the Court through the judgment of the previous conviction while deciding whether the sentence in a subsequent conviction would run consecutively or concurrently. The gravity, nature and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r and the crime. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 14....The sentencing stage should not be treated as a mere matter of formality. In the matter of sentencing a person, the Courts will have to take note of the fact that human behaviour is the product of antecedent circumstances. The measures employed to treat a convicted offender should serve a therapeutic function. Such measures should be designed to effect changes in the behaviour of the convicted person, the interest of his own happiness, health and satisfaction and the interest of social defences. A person who is sincerely trying to rehabilitate himself ought not to be demoralised. 31. The undergoing of sentence of imprisonment indicates a previous conviction and an order of sentence awarding imprisonment to the accused upon subsequent conviction, obviously in a different case, for a different offence there shall be a subsequent order of conviction and imprisonment. Unless these essential features are in existence, the Court dealing with the subsequent conviction and imprisonment would not be in a position to exercise the discretion within its meaning even if called upon to do so and once they are satisfied, it will otherwise be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther the power vested in the Court under the exception to the rule should or should not have been exercised by the Court. 34. Let us examine the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel. In the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad and Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183 : AIR 1988 SC 2143, the Court was concerned with a case where a foreign national was charged Under Section 85(1)(ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 pursuant to seizure of 7000 tolas of gold of foreign mark and had been convicted and sentenced to maximum punishment for 7 years and fine of Rs. 10 lakhs under Section 85 of the said Act. This conviction even on appeal became final. While undergoing sentence, he was tried for another offence alongwith others and was prosecuted under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and was convicted, upon pleading guilty, for a sentence of 4 years and fine of Rs. 2 lakhs. The two sentences were ordered to run concurrently by the Court which passed the subsequent order. On appeal, the High Court increased the sentence to 7 years. While referring to the facts of the case, and the nature of the offence, the Supreme C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct relates to possession of 7000 tolas of primary gold prohibited under Section 8 of the said Act. The complaint under the Customs Act is with regard to smuggling of gold worth Rs. 12.5 crores and export of silver worth Rs. 11.5 crores. On these facts, the Courts are not unjustified in directing that the sentences should be consecutive and not concurrent. 35. The above dictum of the Supreme Court has thus stated the principle that it is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences and it may not have application in cases relating to different offences. Firstly, on facts where the accused had been punished for two different offences, one under Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and in the other under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 in two different transactions, the Supreme Court held that principle of concurrent sentencing should have been followed in the facts of the case. In this very judgment, the Supreme Court also observed that the broad expanse of discretion left by legislation to sentencing Courts should not be narrowed only to the seriousness of the offence. No single consideration can definitely determine the proper sentence. In arriving at an appro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d be decided in accordance with law and the doctrines. The mind of the Court should be clearly reflecting on the material in issue with regard to the facts of the case. The reason and spirit of case make law and not the letter of a particular precedent. Halsbury's The Laws of England , explained the word ratio decidendi as It may be laid down as a general rule that that part alone of a decision by a Court of law is binding upon Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and inferior Courts which consists of the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which the question before the Court has really been determined. This underlying principle which forms the only authoritative lament of a precedent is often termed the ratio decidendi. It is by the choice of material facts that the Court create law. The law so created would be a good precedent for similar subsequent cases unless it falls within the exceptions hereinafter indicated. 7. The doctrine of precedent relates to following of previous decisions within its limitations. It introduces the concept of finality and adherence to the previous decisions and while attaining it, it creates consistency in application of law. The la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court directed that punishment in subsequent three cases would run concurrently but would run consecutively to the first sentence awarded to the accused. 39. In the case of M.R. Kudva v. State of A.P. (2007) 2 SCC 772 : AIR 2007 SC 568, the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with entertaining an application, filed after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, with a prayer to direct sentence already awarded to accused to run concurrently on the strength of provisions of Section 427 of the Code. While dismissing the application as not maintainable and that such provision had to be invoked in regular proceedings at the first instance by the Trial Court, the Court observed that the case of Amavasai (supra) was not the, proposition of law that it is obligatory upon the Court to direct in these kind of cases that the sentences shall run concurrently and not consecutively. In the said case, the Appellant who was an employee of the Bank was involved in two cases under Sections 120-B/420, 468 and 471 of IPC read with Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 while the subsequent case was also on similar charges registere ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inding precedent in relation to the referred question. 42. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hariom alias Kalicharan Shriram Gopal Agarwal alias Saxena v. The State of Maharashtra 1994 (2) Bom CR 219 : 1995 AIHC 489 had taken the view that the sentence would be directed to run consecutively. Though the Bench did not rely upon any of the judgments of the Supreme Court of India it adopted the approach that was1 adopted in the case of Amavasai's case AIR 2000 SC 3544 (supra) and directed that the Bench was adopting a midway approach and ordered the two sentences to run concurrently and third sentence to run consecutively. While adopting this approach the Bench specifically held as under: In other words, where several sentences are passed against the same person, such sentences should run consecutively i.e. The one after the expiration of the other, unless the Court directs that they should run concurrently. Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code also enacts the rule that the sentences are to run consecutively unless the Court directs that they should run concurrently when a person is convicted on trial of several offences and several sentences are given. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... warded could run concurrently with the first awarded sentence. The Court held as under: 6. Section 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that if a person is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment and is subsequently convicted to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, the second imprisonment shall commence at the expiration of first imprisonment. However, the Courts have been given powers to direct that subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence. 7. In this case, the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions case No. 316 of 1990 delivered on 18-1-1992 is the judgment of 1st conviction and sentence and; while the accused was undergoing for that sentence, he came to be again convicted and sentenced in Sessions Case No. 244 of 1991 by the judgment dated 13-3-1992. 8. Therefore, the prayer of the accused in this appeal, through jail, is that if both the sentences are not made to run concurrently, then he will have to be-in jail for 20 years commencing from the date of his arrest on 2-5-1990 and then in that case will be released in 2010 (excluding the sentence imposed upon him in (default of payment of fine). The learned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 5 years with fine of Rs. 500/-. The Division Bench took a view that the provisions of Section 427 of the Code were attracted and rejected the contention of the Public Prosecutor that since the accused was not actually in jail, he was not covered by the phrase undergoing a sentence of imprisonment as contemplated under Section 427(1) of the Code and specifically held as under: There cannot be legislative intention to deny the benefit of provision even in a deserving case by virtue of the only fact that the convict is on bail or in custody or could not be taken within the portals of prison for some genuine reason. Literal construction on the terminology undergoing a sentence of imprisonment as suggested on behalf of the State - would lead to absurd results specially where to separate sentences are awarded one after the other on one day in two different trials. Either the learned Judge would not exercise the discretion only because in the earlier case he had not gone inside the jail by that time or he will have to actually send the convict inside the jail for some time, and call him back immediately to pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term,' the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, provides for an offender already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse AIR 1961 SC 600 and reiterated in Maru Ram AIR 1980 SC 2147 that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the Court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in Sub-section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as a sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unle ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom the observations of their Lordships of the Apex Court that in cases which do not arise from a single transaction but, arise out of different transactions, it would not be just and proper to order sentences to run concurrently. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decision, with which we are in respectful agreement and also keeping in mind that all the three cases in which the petitioner has been convicted are cases under Section 395, Indian Penal Code, which is a anti-social offence, we do not think it expedient in the interest of justice to direct that the sentences of petitioner to run concurrently. 50. Some of the judgments above referred take the view that even in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence should be ordered to run concurrently while in the other cases, they have been ordered to run consecutively. The two judgments, i.e. Amavasai' case AIR 2000 SC 3544 (supra) of the Supreme Court and Hariom alias Kalicharan's case 1995 AIHC 489 (supra) of the Bombay High Court, had adopted a midway while deciding the question as contemplated under Section 427 of the Code. In these two cases, the approach adopted by the Court was partial ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... concurrent. Merely because the accused has been punished under two different enactments in two different set of facts which are independent of each other would not deprive the accused of a benefit available to him in the discretion of the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code. None of the provisions of the language of Section 427 of the Code neither by specific language nor even by necessary implication indicate that the legislature intended to put any limitations of this nature on the power of the Court. Once the legislature has left it open and vested wide discretion in the Court, it would be impermissible to introduce such limitations through the process of interpretation of statute. 51. We have already discussed at some length the principles of interpretation which need to be adopted while examining the provisions of a criminal statute. The power is vested in the Court to direct the sentences to run concurrently but such power need not be exercised on impulses, whims or unregulated benevolence. It has been held that casual directions made for making the sentences to run concurrently often go against the express provisions of the statute and such exercise may not be Justifi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... policy with reference to the facts and circumstances of a given case. 52. In the case of Ranjit Singh AIR 1991 SC 2296 (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the application of Section 427(1) of the Code at some length and particularly in paragraph 8 of the Judgment. A person undergoing sentence of imprisonment including imprisonment for life on subsequent conviction is sentenced to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall commence at the expiration of imprisonment to which the accused is previously sentenced unless the Court directs the subsequent sentence' to run concurrently with previous sentence. This clearly indicates the desire of the framers of law that this power is explicit and is not circumscribed by any specified limitations. The discretion of the Court Would be guided by settled norms. The date of expiry of the first sentence which the accused is undergoing is known and as regards the subsequent sentence, the Court has to pass a direction in relation to the subsequent sentence as to whether it is to run consecutively or concurrently to the previous sentence. 53. Even in the case of Mohammed Akhtar Hussein AIR 1988 SC 2143 (supra), ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to prejudicially affect the society at large. 55. Thus, there is hardly any judgment brought to the notice of this Court which lays universal principle that wherever the accused is convicted for two different transactions under two, different enactments at two different points of time, then the Court is divested of its power and jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 427(1) of the Code. The emphasis in the language under Section 427(1) is not on different offences but the application thereof is on the premise of undergoing sentence of imprisonment in a previous conviction and directing sentence of imprisonment on a subsequent conviction to run consecutively unless directed to run concurrently by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The exclusion of the provisions of Section 427(1) with reference to different transactions, different offences and different cases, is not comprehensible within the language, particularly, in view of the unambiguous and clear terms used by the legislature in Section 427(1) of the Code, The Section is probably intended to achieve a twin purpose, one which is beneficial to the accused where the Court is expected to consider directing the impositio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... maintainability will have to be decided by the learned single Judge and that the power of the Court Under Section 427(1) of the Code is not excluded and is available to be exercised by the concerned Court. In other words, application filed by the accused; would have to be decided by the learned single Judge in accordance with law and keeping in view the above enunciated principles. The jurisdiction of the Court would not be ousted only on the ground that the accused was involved in two different cases for committing distinct offences on different set of facts. 58. In view of our detailed discussion,' now we proceed to answer the question referred as under: a) Neither the Court of competent jurisdiction is divested Of its power to pass appropriate order in terms of Section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 nor does the accused lose this statutory benefit of right of consideration by the Court, only on the ground that the accused has been tried in two or more cases separately and they arise from distinct and separate offences arising out of different transactions/ incidents. b) It is neither permissible nor possible to spell out universal principle or fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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