9911796707
TMI Blog1981 (2) TMI 40X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been filed some time in June, 1961. It was, however, filed only on 4th April, 1962. The assessment was made in due course and, thereafter, the ITO initiated proceedings for the levy of a penalty under s. 271(1)(a) of the I.T. Act, 1961. This was because under s. 297(2)(g) of the Act of 1961 the penalty in a case where the assessment had been completed, after the first day of April, 1962, had to be imposed under the 1961 Act. The ITO levied a penalty of Rs. 18,306 under s. 271(1)(a). The assessee appealed unsuccessfully to the AAC and thereafter to the Appellate Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the assessee had raised the following contentions: (1) No penalty was leviable in the present case, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. P. Ltd. [1970] 77 ITR 518. (2) The penalty had been levied without considering the contents of a reply filed by the assessee on 31st January, 1966. (3) The delay in the submission of the return was not without reasonable cause having regard to all the circumstances of the case.. (4) The notice calling upon the assessee to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed had been issued by one ITO while ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... na High Court in Addl. CIT v. Dongarsidas Biharilal [1979] 116 ITR 897 and in Addl. CIT v. Raghunandan. Prasad Radhey Shyam [1979] 116 ITR 948 and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chunnilal and Bros. v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 199, have held that the imposition of a penalty under s. 271(1)(a) for the delayed submission of return under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) of s. 139 is not precluded merely because a return has been filed under s. 139(4) of the Act. It is not necessary to refer to all these decisions in detail. In our opinion, it is sufficient to refer to the Full Bench decisions of two High Courts which have considered the matter in some detail. The Orissa High Court has considered the identical issue in CIT v. Gangaram Chapolia [1976] 103 ITR 613 [FB]. It had been argued before the Full Bench, inter alia, that as the assessee had filed the return within the time allowed under s. 139(4), it should be deemed, by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kulu Valley Transport Co. P. Ltd. [1970] 77 ITR 518, to have filed the return within the time allowed under s. 139(1) and, consequently, no penalty under s. 271(1)(a) was imposable and that s. 139(4) was in the nature ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also pointed out that on its language, cl. (a). of s. 271 (1) referred only to sub-ss, (1) and (2) specifically but not to sub-s. (4) and that if the Legislature had intended that sub-s (4) should act as a proviso to sub-s. (1) or (2), the Legislature would have used the appropriate language. It was also pointed out that such a construction would render the second part of cl. (a) of s. 271(1) totally inoperative and redundant. There Was no justification for imputing to Parliament an intention to make the basis of distinction a point which renders a part of the, enactment otiose. Moreover, the time limit prescribed under sub-s. (4) of s. 139 has no relevance to the accrual of the default, attracting penalty under s. 271 (1)(a). The Full Bench also considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Kulu Valley's. case [1970] 77 ITR 518 distinguishable for the reasons given by the Madras, Gujarat and Orissa High Courts. The earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Seth Devi Chand.& Sons [1978] 111 ITR 724 was approved and a decision in the cast of ITO v. Adarsh Construction Co. [1968] 70 ITR 796 (All) was distinguished. Mr. Monga, learned counsel for the assessee, co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... T. Act, 1961. As pointed out by the Allahabad and Orissa High Courts, the result of such a construction will be to render a part of s. 271(1)(a) completely redundant and otiose. The principle of statutory construction is well settled that no statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to render any provision completely meaningless or redundant. It appears to us that, having regard to the context of s. 271(1)(a), the reference to sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 139 in that clause should be confined only to returns filed within the time prescribed in sub-ss. (1) and (2) and cannot be extended to a return which may be filed validly but under sub-s. (4) of such section. We do not think that it is necessary to elaborate the point further as it is already covered by a series of decisions and the real ground of decision is within very narrow compass as already outlined. We, therefore, agree, with respect, with the various decisions cited before us and hold that the Tribunal was not correct in applying the principle laid down in Kulu Valley's case [1970] 77 ITR 518 (SC) and in holding that the imposition of penalty under s. 271(1)(a) was not justified. Before parting with the matter we ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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