TMI Blog2024 (2) TMI 1012X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ith special laws which prescribed a period of limitation and the expression of the language contained in the law is very clear that under no circumstances can such a limitation be condoned. The relevant provisions have already been discussed earlier. Appeal dismissed. - SUDHANSHU DHULIA And PRASANNA BHALACHANDRA VARALE , JJ. For the Appellant : Mr. Vijay Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Chetan Manchanda, Adv. Mr. Md. Shahid Anwar, AOR For the Respondent : Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mrs. Priyanka Das, Adv. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, Adv. Mrs. Merusagar Samantaray, Adv. Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Adv. JUDGMENT SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J. Leave granted. 1. The present appellant was one of the four accused in a case instituted, inter-alia under Section 135(1)(b) of Customs Act, 1962. He faced trial (S.C. No. 33 of 2009) where he was ultimately acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi vide order dated 06.10.2012. 2. Against the order of acquittal, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence filed an appeal before the High Court on 27.06.2013. That appeal against acquittal filed under Section 378 of CrPC was accompanied by a delay condo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etermination before this Court was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under sub-section 3 of Section 417 of the old CrPC. 6. This Court on its interpretation of sub-section 4 of Section 417 1 Section 417 of the old CrPC is as follows: 417 (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of a acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon the complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ability of the Limitation Act will be only as regarding Section 4 and Sections 9 to 18 22 of the Limitation Act. The meaning thereby afforded is that Section 5 of the old Act was expressly excluded in cases where special law or local law provides for a period of limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that although in the present case, we are dealing with present Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the new Limitation Act, 1963 however, the provisions in the present Code for appeal against acquittal i.e., under Section 378 of CrPC are of similar nature regarding the prescription of a period of limitation for filing an appeal and therefore the law as laid down by Kaushalya Rani (supra), would apply in the present case as well. 7. This submission of the learned counsel is not correct. Subsequent to the decision of this Court in Kaushalya Rani (supra), this Court in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, while dealing with a similar problem of limitation (in an appeal against acquittal), distinguished Kaushalya Rani as Kaushalya Rani was dealing with the old Criminal Procedure Code,1898 and the old Limitation Act, 1908, where provisions w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. As Kaushalya Rani (supra) was decided under provisions of old Limitation Act of 1908, this Court in Mangu Ram (supra) distinguished Kaushalya Rani and held as under: There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 insofar as the provision contained in Section 29, subsection (2), is concerned. Whereas, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, sub-section (2), clause (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aw that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. (emphasis supplied) 8. Mr. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, learned counsel would then rely upon two cases, namely, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [AIR 1974 SC 480] and subsequently Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar [2004 (4) SCC 252]. 9. Both the above mentioned cases were dealing with special laws where a period of limitation was prescribed. Whereas Hu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... election statute thus expressly bars filing of an election petition beyond 45 days. The language of the statute, leaves no ambiguity in this regard. The High Court shall dismiss an election petition , is the language given in the statute. Simply put the Court has no choice but to dismiss an election petition, which is filed beyond a period of 45 days. There is no scope for condoning the delay in an election matter. Therefore in Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra) it was stated as under:- 17. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has been made applicable to appeals both under the Act as well as under the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case has been brought to our notice where Section 29(2) has been made applicable to an election petition filed under Section 81 of the Act by virtue of which either Sections 4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been attracted. Even assuming that where a period of limitation has not been fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is different from that fixed under Section 81 of the Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly excluded ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... finding that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply in the case of appeal but it will not apply in a case when the proceedings itself had to be initiated in form of suit under Section 8 of the Act which had to be done within a period of 4 months. Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 reads as under: 8. Right of purchase by co-sharer or contiguous tenant. (1) If a portion or share of a plot of land of a raiyat is transferred to any person other than a cosharer of a raiyat in the plot of land, the bargadar in the plot of land may, within three months of the date of such transfer, or any co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land may, within three months of the service of the notice given under subsection (5) of Section 5, or any raiyat possessing land adjoining such plot of land, may, within four months of the date of such transfer, apply to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for transfer of the said portion or share of the plot of land to him, subject to the limit mentioned in Section 14-M on deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of ten per cent of that amount. This is what this Court said on these two provision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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