TMI Blog2015 (2) TMI 1404X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... maintenance. In such circumstances, the Magistrate has the power to order monthly payment of maintenance, under Section 20(3) of the Act. Though the words, appropriate lumpsum payment in Section 20(3) of the Act, may suggest to mean that it is a permanent alimony, yet from the reading of the Act, the power of the Magistrate, to order for lumpsum payment, arising out of necessity, including educational, medical expenses and such other need, enumerated in Section 20 of the Act, is not circumscribed. Reading of the Act in entirety makes it clear that the legislature has enumerated certain contingencies and circumstances, in relation to domestic violence and empowered the Court to pass just and proper orders, to redress the grievance of the aggrieved person. From the reading of the Act, it is manifestly clear that the Domestic Violence Act, is independent of other laws. It provides for redressal of all kinds of deprivation or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom, whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to date, shall be paid, within one month, from the date of receipt of the order. Both the Criminal Revision Cases are disposed of. - Hon'ble Judges S. Manikumar, J. For the Appellant : P. Raja, Advocate For the Respondents : P. Govindarajan, Addl. Public Prosecutor, K. Thilageswaran and P. Mahesh Kumar, Advocates ORDER S. Manikumar, J. 1. Both the revision petitions arise out of the order dated 21.08.2012, made in C.A. No. 180 of 2012, on the file of the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, modifying the order, dated 15.06.2012, passed in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore. As pleadings and submissions are common, both the revision petitions are disposed of, by a common order. For brevity, husband is described as petitioner, wife and son, as respondents. Wife and son/respondents, have filed DVA. No. 34 of 2010, under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as, Act ), before the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, against the petitioner and others, for the following reliefs: (1) To pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fe's parents. For some reasons or the other, Husband has categorically refused to spend any money for the education of the 2nd respondent-Son. One day, when the Wife, requested him to accompany her, for affixing his signature in a document, in the school, he replied to her to take somebody, as Husband and refused to come to the school. Son was not allowed to enter the house and he was sent out. Thus, the petitioner neglected both his Wife and Son. While things stood thus, spouses went to Trichy. The petitioner and in-laws hated respondents. Picking up the frequent quarrels and using unparliamentary words, they caused mental agony. Husband forcibly removed the marriage sacred thread, Mangalsutra from the Wife and sent both the respondents out of the house. Left with no other alternative, they started living with her mother, at Coimbatore. 6. While the Husband continuously neglected the respondents, elders negotiated for amicable settlement. A demand of Rs. 1,00,000/- was made for reunion. With great difficulty, the said amount was arranged and given to the petitioner. With that amount, he put up first floor, in the building at Edayarpalayam. While Wife and Son continued to live ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fide intention on the part of the Husband, Wife and Son decided to continue to reside at Coimbatore. Thereafter, Husband caused a legal notice. Explaining the sequence of events, a reply notice, dated 12.10.2010, was given. Lateron, Wife came to know that on 14.09.2010, Husband had settled the schedule mentioned properties in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010. 9. Thereafter, Husband threatened the respondents to vacate from the residence at Coimbatore. According to the Wife, Husband's mother, owns property worth crores both in the native place and Coimbatore. They own a rice mill, cattle field and a marriage hall. They are also engaged in providing vessels for various functions. Husband is a landlord and earns not less than Rs. 2 Lakhs per Month. 10. By threatening the respondents, Husband obtained her signature on a receipt, as if payment of Rs. 3,00,000/- was made. Transfer of some of the schedule mentioned properties was made to exert pressure on the Wife, for divorce, at her instance, and one such alleged transfer was made after the complaint given to Thudiyalur Police Station. There are many properties in the name of the Husband. Thus, citing various instances, Wife has alleged domest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gineering College, he said to have secured 70% marks in his Higher Secondary Examination. He himself represented before the Court that he is living with his mother, he is willing to join in V.L.B. Engineering College for which he need Rs. 5 Lakhs Rupees for get into admission in the said college. The second petitioner asserts that his father neglected him and he is not maintained by his father. He further said that his father is running Rice Mill and he is having Agricultural lands and he is capable to advance the said amount. The second petitioner is a budding engineer and forth coming pillar of the country. Already he would have suffered lot due to domestic problems, both physically and mentally inspite of that he likes to continue his studies. His rightful desire must be given due attention and to be executed. As a father the respondent have both moral and legal responsibility to afford the education to his Son. Hence, the respondent is directed to advance an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the 2nd petitioner towards his educational expense and to get admission in the Engineering College. Compliance report and for filing counter in other respect call on 25.06.2013. 14. From the mate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... counsel for the petitioner submitted that the challenge in this revision is to the order, directing the petitioner to pay a lumpsum payment of 50% of the capitation fees and payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the Son. 17. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner-Husband, alleging domestic violence, D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 has been filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore, in the year 2010. Miscellaneous Application has been filed after two years. It is his contention that from 2004 onwards, the respondents were living separately and therefore, the averments made in DVA. No. 34 of 2010, filed in the year 2010, alleging domestic violence, are not true. In any event, the averments have to be proved. While that be the case, the learned Judicial Magistrate, ought not to have entertained C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012, filed under Section 23 of the Act, filed after two years. 18. He further submitted that the very purpose of considering the grant of interim ex-parte order, is to mitigate the circumstances, warranting any protection or other orders, to be considered, under Sections 18 to 23 of the Act, and when the respondents have not chosen to seek for any interim ex-pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er also submitted that the direction to pay Rs. 50,000/- to Son, with liberty to utilise the same, for other personal expenses, is wholly untenable. According to him, directions ordered lack statutory support. 22. Referring to Section 23(2) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that even taking it for granted, an application filed after two years, under Section 23 of the Act, praying for an interim ex parte orders, could be entertained, according to him, an ex parte order, can be passed only on the basis of an affidavit, in such form, as may be prescribed and in the absence of satisfying the mandatory requirement of filing of an affidavit, the lower Court has erroneously considered C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012 and passed an ex parte interim order, which has been modified on appeal. 23. According to the learned counsel, when the statute contemplates a procedure to be done in a particular manner, the same ought to have been followed. In the absence of an affidavit, petition in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2012, ought to have been rejected. It is also his submission that when the petitioner has filed a counter affidavit to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he respondents, from the house at Edayarpalayam, upto 2009. Thereafter, the Husband's brother, is collecting the rent. First respondent-wife's father, died in the year 2010. Prior to his death, out of love and affection, he extended financial assistance and thereafter, the respondents were literally starving. Earlier, with the little contributions from her father, she was managing the educational expenses. 28. As dutiful mother, she wanted to provide the best education to her Son and thus, admitted in Sri Krishna College of Technology at Coimbatore. Thus, at the time, when there was necessity to meet the educational expenses and maintenance, C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 was filed in 2012, setting out the reasons, for the interim reliefs, sought for. 29. Referring to the definitions Monetary Reliefs , under Section 2(k) and Economic Abuse under Section 3(d)(iv) and the power of the learned Judicial Magistrate, under Section 23, learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the learned Judicial Magistrate is empowered to pass suitable ex parte interim order, as he deems, just and proper, depending upon the necessity, and that there is no embar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arned counsel for the respondents seek for appropriate revision. 35. Both the learned counsel have relied on case laws, in support of their contentions. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 36. The Protection of Women from Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,, 2005 (Act 43 of 2005), is enacted to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. As per Section 2(f), domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. 37. Monetary relief is defined under Section 2(k), which means, the compensation which the Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off. (3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto. (4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court. (5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under subsection (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing. 40. Section 17 deals with the right to reside in a shared household, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman. (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person. (3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of domestic violence. (4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and shall be dealt with accordingly. (5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. (6) Wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ies or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent. 21. Custody orders:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent: Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. 22. Compensation orders: In addition to other reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent. 42. As per Section 23 of the Act, the Magistrat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d for myself and for my daughter/Son. 2. That I am the natural guardian of....... 3. That being conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case I am competent to swear this affidavit. 4. That the Deponent had been living with the Respondent/s at................. since......... to.............. 5. That the details provided in the present application for the grant of relief under section (s).........have been entered into by me/at my instructions. 6. That the contents of the application have been read over, explained to me in English/Hindi/any other local language (Please specify............................) 7. That the contents to the said application may be read as part of this, affidavit and are not repeated herein for the sake of brevity. 8. That the applicant apprehends repetition of the acts of domestic violence by the Respondent(s) against which relief is sought in the accompanying application. 9. That the Respondent has threatened the Applicant that ............................................ ...................................................... 10. That the reliefs claimed in the accompanying application are urgent in as much as the applicant would face great finan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Assistants' Brotherhood, High Court, Allahabad (supra), facts could not be deduced from the judgment. Secondly, it is the general principle of law, to be followed in judicial proceedings. But there is no hard and fast rule that in given circumstances, no interim order, which has the effect of granting the main relief, cannot be granted at all. For instance, in a suit for injunction, not to demolish a building or not to interfere with the possession and enjoyment, removal of an alleged encroachment, without due process of law and in such other cases, where protective interim orders are prayed for, Courts cannot simply postpone the hearing of the interim applications, till the disposal of the suits and allow demolition of the building or interference with possessory rights, and depending upon the nature of relief, sought for, interim orders can be granted. The above instances are only illustrative. In any event, interim orders granted in the proceedings are subject to the outcome of the trial. Even the interim order of injunction granted can be vacated at the time of final disposal of the proceedings. For the abovesaid reasons, both the judgments relied on by the learned counsel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3 SC 322, the Chhattisgarh High Court held that there was no illegality or infirmity in the order of the trial Court, in awarding maintenance to the persons aggrieved of domestic violence and it observed as follows: Section 26 of the Act says that relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in addition to and along with any other relief which the aggrieved person may seek in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court or a criminal court. Relief of maintenance to Wife and children is available to the effected party under his entitlement and liability of the person against whom relief is claimed under Section 125 of the Code, when such person is unable to maintain herself and the person against whom relief is claimed is under obligation to maintain and having sufficient means to maintain, but fails to maintain the applicants. But in case of domestic violence, the Court is empowered to grant such relief if the person is aggrieved as a result of the domestic violence and may grant monetary relief in terms of maintenance which would be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved party is accust ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich enables the Court to grant maintenance or lumpsum payment, dehors, Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Family Courts Act, 1984 and any other Act, relating to award of maintenance. 50. In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat AIR 1986 SC 984 : (1985) 4 SCC 337 : LNIND 1985 SC 328 : (1986) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 12, the question considered by the Apex Court, was whether a magistrate before whom an application is made under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can pass an interim order directing the person against whom the application is made under that section to pay reasonable maintenance to the applicant concerned pending disposal of the application. In the abovesaid judgment, Wife, filed an application under Section 125 of the Code, for maintenance. Pending disposal of the main application, she filed an interim application, for a direction to the Husband to pay some reasonable amount, by way of maintenance. The learned Judicial Magistrate, declined to make an interim order, on the grounds that there was no express provision in the Code, enabling the Magistrate to pass such an order. Being aggrieved by the same, Wife filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... istrate, may, however, insist upon an affidavit being filed by or on behalf of the applicant concerned stating the grounds in support of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case for making such an order. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on affidavits, there is no reason why a magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. The affidavit may be treated as supplying prima facie proof of the case of the applicant. If the allegations in the application or the affidavit are not true, it is always open to the person against whom such an order is made to show that the order is unsustainable. Having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a magistrate under section 125 of the Code, we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the magistrate to pass an order directing a person agains ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed. 53. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no specific ground in the present Memorandum of Grounds of revision filed by the husband. On the aspect, as to whether, any separate application is required for appropriate orders, under Section 23 of the Act, for granting interim orders, in P. Chandrasekara Pillai v. Valsala Chandran 2007 Crl.L.J. 2328 : LNIND 2007 KER 153, at Paragraph 11, the Kerala High Court, held as follows: 11. I am unable to understand the provisions of Section 23 as compulsorily insisting on any separate application for interim order under Section 23. An application referred to in Section 23(2) is obviously an application under Section 12 claiming relief under Sections 18 to 22. It is impossible to understand the expression an application in Section 23(2) as importing a requirement that a separate application must be filed to claim the relief of an interim order under Section 23. Doubts, if any, on this aspect pale into insignificance when we consider that Section 23 only insists on an affidavit in such form as may be prescribed to justify the claim for an interim order and ad interim order under Section 23. Rules presc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere is no requirement of filing a separate application for grant of interim relief under section 23 of the said Act. However, while considering the question of granting the ex-parte ad-interim or interim relief the learned Magistrate will have to consider the nature of the reliefs sought in the main application under section 12(1) of the said Act in as much as an interim relief under section 23 of the said Act can be granted in aid of the final relief sought in the main application. On the basis of an affidavit in Form III prescribed by the Rules, in a given case, learned magistrate can grant ex-parte ad-interim relief. However, before granting an interim relief, an opportunity of being heard has to be afforded to the respondent. The respondent can always file a reply to the affidavit. 55. Affidavit in Latin Affidare means to pledge one's faith and a written statement sworn before a person having authority to administer an oath. 56. As per Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, Affidavit is a voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declaration before an officer author zed to administer oaths of great deal of evidence is submitted by affidavit. 57. Affi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ometimes that which is right and fair according to positive law. It can-notes reasonableness and something conforming to rectitude and justice, something equitable and fair. (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 50, p. 1100). Words and Phrases, West Publishing Co, Vol. 23, p. 438, the true meaning of the word 'just' states in these terms: 'the word 'just' is derived from the Lain 'Justus' which is from the Latin jus, which means a right and more technically, a legal right-a law. Thus 'jus dicere' was to pronounce the judgment to give the legal decision. The word 'just' is defined by the Century Dictionary as 'right in law or ethics', and in Standard Dictionary as 'conforming to the requirements of right or of positive law', and in Anderson's Law Dictionary as 'probable, reasonable'. Kinneys's Law Dictionary defines the word 'just' as 'fair, adequate, probable, reasonable', and justa causa as 'a just cause; lawful ground.' (Bergman v. Kress 81 NYS 1072 (1073), 83 App. Div. 1). Proper. Natural; suitably; correct; just; right; becoming. The word is also used in the sense of 'own'. The La ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e time of filing of application, under Section 12 of the Act, the aggrieved person may reside in the shared household. There would not be any apprehension of sending her out of the shared household. Lateron, if the conduct of the respondents, give rise to a reasonable likelihood or genuine apprehension in the mind of the aggrieved person of restricting or prohibiting her from residing at the shared household, and at that stage, she may prefer to seek for an interim ex-parte order, under Section 23 of the Act. 65. Likewise, at the time of filing of the application, under Section 12 of the Act, the aggrieved person or the child may be hale and healthy and may not require any medical expenses. After the filing of application under Section 12, if anyone of them falls sick or if there is any accident, wife or the child, may require medical expenses and it cannot be said that she has to wait till the fins 1 disposal of the application, filed under Section 12 of the Act. 66. In yet another instance, Wife may have some earnings, at the time of filing of the petition, under Section 12 of the Act, which may or may not be sufficient to meet the expenditure, towards basic amenities, including ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... if the Court has to decline such prayers, holding that it can be granted only at the time of final disposal of the application filed under Section 12 of the Act, then the aggrieved person and her child/children, would be left without any financial support and there would be a deprivation of her right to live with dignity and that would amount to violation of human rights. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to reproduce the words of the Apex Court in Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (supra), as follows: In order to enjoy the fruits of the proceedings under section 125, the applicant should be alive till the date of the final order and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed by the court. Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle is embodied in the maxim 'ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist.) Monetary relief granted under Section 20 of the Act, shall be adequate, f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice. (iii) In Samrao v. District Magistrate, Thana AIR 1952 SC 324, the Apex Court held that, It is the duty of the Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act, when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act, must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided. (iv) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274 : LNIND 1953 SC 38 : (1953) 1 MLJ 739, the Supreme Court held that, ft is settled rule of construction that to as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system. (ix) In State of W.B. v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 : LNIND 1962 SC 438, the Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. (x) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Mangal Sen Shyamlal AIR 1975 SC 1106 : (1975) 4 SCC 35, the Apex Court held that, A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it according to the intent of them that made it . From that function the court is not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, ut res magis valiat quam pereat , lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air. (xi) In C.I.T., Madras v. T. Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd., (1976) 1 SCC 77 : LNIND 1975 SC 586, the Supreme Court held that, if the language o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression shall or may is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character. (xvi) In Easland Combines, Coimbatore v. Collector of Central Excise AIR 2003 SC 843 : (2003) 3 SCC 410 : LNIND 2003 SC 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be deduced from the language used , for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. (xx) In Narendra H. Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72 : LNIND 200 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1208, the Supreme Court held that, 12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. 13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the language is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making. 14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language..... 15. W ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh AIR 2006 SC 2677 : (2006) 5 SCC 745 : LNIND 2006 SC 464, the Apex Court held that, It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions (xxvi) In Adamji Lookmanji and Co. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 Bom. 56, the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of status are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ell settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. (xxxi) In Suresh Khullar v. Vijay Khullar AIR 2008 Del. 1 : LNIND 2007 DEL 906, the Court held that, Where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute has been enacted rather than the one which would put hindrances in its way. If the choice is between two interpretat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2009) 3 SCC 553. 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. (xxxv) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna AIR 2010 SC 2777 : (2010) 5 SCC 622 : LNIND 2010 SC 476 : (2010) 5 MLJ 153, the Supreme Court held as follows: 12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be op ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be. (xxxvii) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 573 : (2011) 9 SCC 354 : LNIND 2011 SC 788, the Supreme Court held that, 55. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957 AC 436], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the duty of court to examine every word of a statute in its context. The learned Law Lord further said that in understanding the meaning of the provision, the Court must take into consideration not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy. (All ER p. 53 I) 57. These principles have been followed by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193. At SCC p. 240, Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. (v) In P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1995 SC 1395 : LNIND 1995 SC 418, the Apex Court observed that: It has been urged that in Rule 2(b) the expression means and includes has been used which indicates that the definition is inclusive in nature and also covers categories which are not expressly mentioned therein. We are unable to agree. A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word 'means' or the word 'includes'. Sometimes the words 'means and includes' are used. The use of the word 'means' indicates that definition is a hard and fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition. (See: Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682, at p. 717). The word 'includes' when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they si ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... used; (one) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to take in the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it; (two) to include meaning about which there might be some dispute; (three) to bring under one nomenclature all transactions possessing certain similar features but going under different names. 17. It goes without saying that interpretation of a word or expression must depend on the text and the context. The resort of the word 'includes' by the Legislature often shows the intention of the Legislature that it wanted to give extensive and enlarged meaning to such expression. Sometimes, however, the context may suggest that word 'includes' may have been designed to mean means . The setting, context and object of an enactment may provide sufficient guidance for interpretation of word 'includes' for the purposes of such enactment. 73. Economic abuse means deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom. It is: customary that father is morally bound to maintain his Wife and child, by providing basic amenit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... me Court, held as follows: 55. It is trite that for the purpose of interpretation a statute is to be read in its entirety and all efforts must be made to give effect to the statutory scheme. (See High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Others JT 2003 (3) SC 50, Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others v. Union of India and Others (2003) 7 SCC 589, Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd., JT2003 (9) SC109 : 2003 (9) SCALE 713, Ashok Leyland v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another 2004 (1) SCALE 224, State of West Bengal and Others v. Sujit Kumar Rana 2004 (1) SCALE 641, Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Baroda 2004 (3) SCALE 546 and Secretary, Department of Excise and Commercial Taxes and Others v. Sun Bright Marketing (P) Ltd., Chhattisgarh and Another (2004) 3 SCC 185). 56. The object underlying the statute is required to be given effect to by applying the principles of purposive construction. 57. Francis Bennion in his treatise 'Statutory Interpretation' at page 810 described purposive construction in the following manner:- A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives eff ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gendra Rathore AIR 2006 SC 2167 : (2006) 12 SCC 138 : LNIND 2006 SC 298 : (2006) 3 MLJ 57, at Paragraphs 10 and 11, the Supreme Court held as follows: 10. In Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R. 1898 AC 735 : 67 LJPC 126, Lord Davy observed: Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter. 11. The Court has adopted the same rule in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa AIR 1961 SC 1107; Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India (1974) 1 SCC 596, Mysore SRTC v. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg (1977) 2 SCC 457, V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99, Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand (1978) 2 SCC 144, CIT v. National Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370, Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B. AIR 1962 SC 1044 and J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170. This rule of construction which is also spoken of as ex visceribus actus helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. (v) In National ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation, Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. 31. In Dikshitulu's case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court observed as under: The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed 'according to the intent of they that made it' (Code). Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language of the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... act upon the true intention of the Legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the Court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the Legislature. This task very often raises difficulties because of various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that the assembly of Legislatures consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to foresee all situations exhaustively and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for. Nonetheless, the function of the Courts is only to expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a modern State is actuated with some policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar proble ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-re-buttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably. 75. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to remind the parties, as what our Great Thiruvalluvar has about the duties of a father and education. The good which a father can do to his son, is to prepare him, For a prominent role in the assembly of the learned. One's learning alone is one's indestructible and outstanding wealth, Nothing else possesses this special value. 76. Family is one of the most cherished facet of any human being. Father has an obligation to provide love and affection, righteousness basic amenities and the most important amo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Legislature has also included deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom. It is the custom and practice that everywhere in the World that parents are morally obligated to provide basic amenities, including health and education. 82. If the contention of the petitioner that the child is not entitled to maintenance or educational expenses, on attaining majority, is accepted, then the expression, in addition to , employed in Section in Section 20(1)(d) would be otiose. As per Section 2(k), the compensation which the Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved person, as a result of the domestic violence. 83. Expressions used in the statute have a material bearing on the facts of this case. It is well known that while interpreting the words or expression used in a statute, Courts have to consider the objects of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. The Protection of Women from Protection of Women from Domestic Violence A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he proposed enactment against any relative of the Husband or the male partner, it does not enable any female relative of the Husband or the male partner to file a complaint against the Wife or female partner. (ii) It defines the expression domestic violence to include actual abuse or threat or abuse that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic. Harassment by way of unlawful dowry demands to the woman or her relatives would also be covered under this definition. (iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. It also provides for the right of a woman to reside in her matrimonial home or shared household, whether or not she has any title or rights in such home or household. This right is secured by a residence order, which is passed by the Magistrate. (iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in favour of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from aiding or committing an act of domestic violence or any other specified act, entering a workplace or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person, attempting to communicate with her, isolating any assets used by both the parties and causing violence to the aggrieved person, her relative ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct Collector, (2006) 1 CTC 328 : LNIND 2005 MAD 1606 : (2006) 2 MLJ 401, this Court held that, 8. It is well-settled principle of interpretation that a statute is to be interpreted on its plain reading; in the absence of any doubt or difficulty arising out of such reading of a statute defeating or frustrating the object and purpose of an enactment, it must be read and understood by its plain reading. However, in case of any difficulty or doubt arising in interpreting a provision of an enactment, courts will interpret such a provision keeping in mind the objects sought to be achieved and the purpose intended to be served by such a provision so as to advance the cause for which the enactment was brought into force. If two interpretations are possible, the one which promotes or favours the object of the Act and purpose it serves, is to be preferred. At any rate, in the guise of purposive interpretation, the courts cannot rewrite a statute. A purposive interpretation may permit a reading of the provision consistent with the purpose and object of the Act, but the Courts cannot legislate and enact the provision either creating or taking away substantial rights by stretching or straining ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gislation is primarily directed to the problems before legislature based on the information derived from past and present experience. When the purpose and object or the reason and spirit pervading through the statute is clear, Court has to adopt purposive approach in interpreting such a statute. 92. An order under Section 20(d) is not limited to maintenance for the aggrieved person, as well as the children and it includes, an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. Manifest intention of the Legislature, conferring power on the Magistrate, to direct the respondent to pay monetary relief, to meet the expenses incurred and the loss suffered by the aggrieved person, is abundantly clear. If the Legislature has intended to restrict an order under Section 20(d), only for maintenance, then there is no need for the usage of the expression, but is not limited to . Section 20(d) of the Act makes it clear that in addition to the maintenance, under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate is empowered to pas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re is reasonable income, there is no proof. 96. At the time of filing of the application in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, the Son was studying in 11th Standard. After completing 12th Standard, he joined B. Tech in Sri Krishna College of Technology, Coimbatore, 4th respondent herein. Therefore, when necessity has arisen for the respondents to bear the educational expenses and maintenance, Miscellaneous Application in C.M.P. No. 2] 12 of 2012, has been filed in the year 2012 For the reasons, stated supra, merely because an application was filed in the year 2012, under Section 23 of the Act, the contention that such application ought not to have been entertained, deserves to be rejected. 97. As stated supra, monetary compensation can be directed, at any stage of the proceedings. As per the Memorandum filed by Sri Krishna College of Engineering, Coimbatore, Son has completed the first two years in B. Tech IT course. College fees to the tune of Rs. 2,11,200/- is payable for the 3rd and 4th years. For non-payment of fees, Son has been sent out of the college. 98. Keeping in view the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and to provide a remedy, under the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... beral construction. It is always the duty of the court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-not and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. (iii) In Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 3378 : (1999) 6 SCC 459 : LNIND 1999 SC 704, on the aspect, as to how, Court should interpret the provision, specially beneficial provision, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 15, held as follows: It is the duty of the Court to interpret a provision, especially a beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the Rule. The Apex Court has considered the view of Lord Denning (as he then was) in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher 1949 2 All ER 155, which is extracted hereunder: When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament. and then h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... India, AIR 2003 SC 3240; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2004) 3 SCC 1; Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 355; Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda, AIR 2004 SC 2107; Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ramlal and Others, AIR 2005 SC 851; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1971; and Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimahaiah and Others, AIR 2008 SC 1797). 99. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is to rectify the causus omission in the ordinary civil law. The expression, Causus Omissus , as explained in various decisions, means (1) Omitted case, (2) What a statute or an instrument of writing undertakes to foresee and to provide for certain contingencies, and through mistake, or some other cause, a case remains to be provided for, it is said to be a Causus Omissus. 100. In a given case, Wife would not have made any claim for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or any other law, for the time being in force. However, under Section 23 of the Act, she can make a claim for maintenance. In such circumstances, the Magistrate has the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ivil or criminal, shall be incurred by any person for giving in good faith of information for the purpose of subsection (1). 5. Duties of police officers, service providers and Magistrate: A police officer, Protection Officer, service provider or Magistrate who has received a complaint of domestic violence or is otherwise present at the place of an incident of domestic violence or when the incident of domestic violence is reported to him, shall inform the aggrieved person . (a) of her right to make an application for obtaining a relief by way of a protection order, an order for monetary relief, a custody order, a residence order, a compensation order or more than one stick order under this Act; (b) of the availability of services of service providers; (c) of the availability of services of the Protection Officers; (d) of her right to free legal services under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; (e) of her right to file a complaint under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, wherever relevant: Provided that nothing in this Act shall be construed in any manner as to relieve a police officer from his duty to proceed in accordance with law upon receipt of information as to the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omplied with and executed, in accordance; with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (i) to perform such other duties as may be prescribed. (2) The Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision of the Magistrate, and shall perform the duties imposed on him by the Magistrate and the Government by, or under, this Act. 10. Service providers: (1) Subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, any voluntary association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in force with the objective of protecting the rights and interests of women by any lawful means including providing of legal aid, medical, financial or other assistance shall register itself with the State Government as a service provider for the purposes of this Act. (2) A service provider registered under sub-section (1) shall have the power to- (a) record the domestic incident report in the prescribed form if the aggrieved person so desires and forward a copy thereof to the Magistrate and the Protection Officer having jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence took ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a direction to set aside the order made in C.A. No. 180 of 2012 dated 21.08.2012 passed by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore and consequentially, prayed to confirm the order passed by learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore in C.M.P. No. 2112 of 2012 dated 15.06.2012. 108. As stated supra, the learned Magistrate has directed the petitioner to make payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the son towards educational expenses for getting admission in Engineering Course. Though, a prayer for maintenance for Rs. 10,000/- each, has been made in CMP No. 2112 of 2012 in D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, the learned Magistrate has not passed any order of maintenance. 109. Wife and son have not filed any appeal against the denial of maintenance. But the petitioner has filed Crl. A. No. 180 of 2012 against the directions to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- towards the educational expenses to son. The appellate Court has modified the same, to the extent directing wife to furnish proof of admission in VLB College or any other college, and also to furnish complete fee structure to be paid, for the year 2012, alongwith the proof of capitation fees, if any, before the trial Court and further d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es for the first two years of B. Tech Engineering Course. It is the wife, who had incurred the same, for getting admission in B. Tech Course in Shri Krishna College of Technology, Kovaipudur, Coimbatore and as per the memorandum dated 15.12.2014 filed, by Shri Krishna College of Technology, Kovaipudur, Coimbatore, a sum of Rs. 2,11,200/- has to be paid for the 3rd and 4th year of study. 113. As per Section 2(k) of Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, Monetary relief, means the compensation which the Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage of hearing of an application seeking relief under the Act for meeting the expenses incurred and also the losses suffered by the aggrieved person, as a result of Domestic Violence. Economic abuse is a domestic violence, as per Explanation No. 4 to Section 3(1) of the Act. 114. Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Act extracted supra makes it abundantly clear that Act is enacted, keeping in view of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India, to provide for a remedy and the intention is to protect the women from being victims of domestic violence and also to p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his Court is not inclined to upset the same. 119. Statutory provision empowers the Magistrate to pass suitable orders under Section 12 of the Act. All orders, that could be passed under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act, can be passed at the interim stage of any proceedings, which includes lumpsum payment also, under Section 23 of the Act, provided the Court is satisfied, what is just and proper. 120. As the petitioner has expressed a grievance over the pendency of D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010 and consideration of interim application, pending disposal of the same, with an order for lumpsum payment, the learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of D.V.A. No. 34 of 2010, within two months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 121. In the light of the discussion and decisions, Husband is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,11,200/- towards the college fees for 3rd and 4th years, in two installments. The first installment should be paid within 10 days, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The 2nd payment should be made within one month thereafter. Payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the Son, on admission, is sustained, having regard to the amount spent towards purchase of books, trave ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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