TMI Blog1979 (2) TMI 41X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the ITO for levy of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961, and as the minimum penalty imposable exceeded Rs. 1,000, the cases were referred to the IAC. The IAC held that the appellant is guilty of concealment of income by giving inaccurate particulars of income in its original returns and, in that view, imposed minimum penalty under s. 271(1)(c) for all the assessment years. Aggrieved by the said order imposing penalty, the assessee went in appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the assessee contended that the offence of concealment is with reference to the original returns and as the original assessments were completed before April, 1, 1962, the date of commencement of the 1961 Act, the penalty proceedings must have been initiated and penalty levied under the provisions of the 1922 Act, in view of s. 297(2)(f). The stand taken by the revenue before the Tribunal, however, was that as the reassessment proceedings were completed after April 1, 1962, the penalty proceedings have been rightly initiated and penalty levied under the I.T. Act, 1961, in view of s. 297(2)(g). Dealing with the above rival contentions, the Tribunal held that as the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on is whether the initiation of penalty proceedings and imposition of penalty are to be governed in the present case by the provisions of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, as contended by the assessee, or whether they are to be governed by the I.T. Act, 1961, as contended by the revenue. The learned counsel for the assessee refers to the following decisions as supporting his contention that the penalty proceedings in this case have to be initiated and penalty imposed under the provisions of the 1922 Act, and not under the 1961 Act. CGT v. C. Muthukumaraswamy Mudaliar [1975] 98 ITR 540 is a decision of a Division Bench of this court to which one of us was a party. That case arose under the G.T. Act. The assessee in that case filed a gift-tax return for the assessment year 1962-63 on October 22, 1962, though the due date was June 30, 1962. The GTO felt that the assessee had no reasonable cause for not filing the return within the specified time and, therefore, levied a penalty of Rs. 2,605 on the completion of the G.T. assessment on March 31, 1964, on the basis of s. 17(1)(a) of the G.T. Act, as amended by the G.T. Amend. Act, 1962, which came into force from April 1, 1963. On appeal by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment on the ground that an amendment is normally prospective. Therefore, the decision in that case does not support the case of the assessee in this case for there was no provision like s. 297(2)(g) of the I.T. Act, in the G.T. Act, and this has been clearly pointed out in the judgment and in fact it is only on that basis that the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Jain Brothers v. Union of India [1970] 77 ITR 107 has been distinguished. CWT v. Sundarapandian [1978] 114 ITR 367 (Mad) arose under the W.T. Act, wherein the decision in CGT v. C. Muthukumaraswamy Mudaliar [1975] 98 ITR 540 (Mad) has been followed. There also there was a change in the law brought about by an amendment to the W.T. Act. A question arose whether the amended provision under s. 18(1)(a) will apply to a contravention that had taken place before the amendment. The Division Bench observed that the penalty has to be imposed as per the law in force on the date of the contravention or commission of the default, and not on the basis of the amended law which came into force after the commission of the default. While amending s. 18(1)(a) by cl. 24(c) of the Finance Act, 1969, the Legislature has not introduce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se was whether the law as on the date of the commission of the contravention of the particular provision of the statute is to be applied, or the law which came into force at a later date when the reassessments were made, is to apply. The court naturally applied the general principle of law that a penalty to be levied in respect of an offence should be as per the law which was in force on the date when the commission of the offence and not the law which was in force on the date when the offender was actually, punished for the offence. In that case also the decision of the Supreme Court in Jain Brothers v. Union of India [1970] 77 ITR 107 has been distinguished on the ground that the decision in that case was with reference to s.(2)(g) of the I.T. Act. CIT v. Data Ram Satpal [1975] 99 ITR 507 (All) is also on facts similar to the case in Addl. CIT v. Medisetty Ramarao [1977] 108 ITR 318 (AP). In that case also returns had been filed before April 1, 1964, and the only question was whether the unamended s. 271(l)(c) before its amendment by the Finance Act of 1964, on April 1, 1964, was applicable or whether the said section as amended was to be applied in respect of concealment of in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed as if the 1961 Act had not been passed. Clause (g) of s. 297(2) stated that notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in respect of any assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1962, or any earlier year, which is completed on or after the 1st day of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed under the 1961 Act. Thus s. 297(2) makes a distinction between assessments completed before the 1st day of April, 1962, and assessments made after the 1st day of April, 1962. In respect of the former category of cases, the penalty proceedings are to be initiated and penalty imposed only under the 1922 Act treating the 1961 Act as not having been passed. In respect of the latter cases where the assessments have been completed after the 1st April, 1962, penalty proceedings have to be initiated and penalty should be imposed only under the provisions of the 1961 Act. These provisions do not contemplate the idea of the time when the contravention had taken place. In view of these statutory provisions in s. 297(2)(f) and (g), one has to proceed on th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... : CIT v. V. G. Panneerdas and Co. [1978] 112 ITR 225 (Mad) is a case where the assessments for the years 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 were completed under s. 23(3) of the Indian I.T Act, 1922, on February 29, 1964, and for concealment of income in the returns filed by the assessee, penalty proceedings were initiated under the 1961 Act and penalty was levied under s. 271(1)(c) of that Act. The levy of penalty under the new Act was justified by the Division Bench in that case on the basis that the question is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jain Brothers v. Union Of India [1970] 77 ITR 197. When the attention of the Division Bench was drawn to the earlier decision of this court in CIT v. C.Muthukumaraswamy Mudaliar [1975] 98 ITR 540 (Mad) arising put of the imposition of penalty under s. 17 of the G.T. Act, it was pointed out that the said decision related to an amendment of a particular provision and the applicability of that provision was to an individual case when it was not in terms made retrospective, and that such a general principle decided in that case cannot be made applicable to the interpretation of s. 297(2)(g) which specifically mentions that the appli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he statute words which are not there, and such importation would be not to construe, but to amend the statute, and that the court has no justification to depart from the normal rule of construction according to which the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the words used in the statute, and not to interpret the statute in such a way as not to cause hardship contrary to the intention or the language of the statutory provision. While construing a taxing enactment, there is no scope for considerations such as hardship, inconvenience, etc. As pointed out by Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC [1921] 1 KB 64 (KB) at page 71 : "...in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." Therefore, merely on the basis of hardship, we cannot interpret s. 297(2)(g) in a manner inconsistent with the language used therein. In the result, we answer the reference in the affirmative and against the assessee. The revenue will have its costs, one set. Counsel' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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