TMI Blog1978 (8) TMI 74X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... took on rent from Sir Sobha Singh the following portions of the said building : (a) Confectionary shop on the ground floor. (b) A hall with verandah on the first floor, and (c) A kitchen on the first floor. The confectionary shop on the ground floor and the hall and veranda on the first floor bear Municipal No. A-16. The kitchen on the first floor bears Municipal No. A-33. The rest of the building was with other tenants. In 1956, a small space under the main staircase leading to the hall in the tenancy of Wenger was also taken on rent by the petitioner from Sir Sobha Singh at a rent of Rs. 100 p.m. The rent for the confectionary shop on the ground floor was Rs. 402.18 p.m., for the hall and veranda on the first floor Rs. 625 p.m. and for the kitchen on the first floor Rs. 75 p.m. Sir Sobha Singh sold the said building and his leasehold rights by different sale deeds to Dayal Singh Library Trust Society and Shri Moolchand Kharaiti Ram Trust. The petitioners purchased the entire building by two sale deeds, one executed by Dayal Singh Library Trust Society on March 9, 1962, and the other by Shri Mool Chand Kharaiti Ram Trust executed on September 27, 1973. It may be notice ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng that while he proposed to accept the existing annual letting value for the portions in the occupation of the tenants, he proposed to estimate the fair market value of the portions in the occupation of petitioner No.1 at Rs. 27,96,000 as on March 31, 1972. Though the notice was sent in the name of Shri B. M. Tandon, petitioner No. 1 filed objections to the proposed revision of the fair market value of the premises in its occupation. Thereafter, the premises were inspected and the petitioners were heard by the District Valuation Officer but he maintained the proposed valuation which he had indicated in his notice dated June 11, 1974. The fair market value of the entire building was thus assessed by respondent No. 1 at Rs. 32,80,000 as on March 31, 1972. It is this report which is challenged before us. The grounds of challenge are that respondent No. 1 had no cogent evidence or basis in fixing the fair market value of the portion in the occupation of the petitioners at Rs. 27,96,000. Further, respondent No. 1 has relied on some information which he had but which was never disclosed to the petitioners and the source of that information is still not disclosed. Alternatively, it ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... calculated the value on the basis of what were the rates prevailing for sale of commercial flats in Connaught Place Extension Area. For the tenanted portion he capitalised the rental value. As far as the value of land is concerned, he took note of the fact that it was a lease in perpetuity and the building thereon would last for another 25 years. Thereafter, the land value was added at Rs. 3,200 per square yard. This land value he worked out on the basis of sale of an adjacent property bearing No. 9-A in Connaught Place, New Delhi. That property was sold in August, 1973, for Rs.8 lakhs. It is constructed on 212 sq. yds. of land and is a double-storeyed structure with a plain area of 4,188 sq. ft. The construction was of the same specifications as the property in question. The depreciated cost of the structure, according to respondent No. 1, was Rs. 15 per sq. ft. After deducting the depreciated cost of structure from the total sale price, he arrived at a figure of Rs. 7,37,180 for 212 sq. yds. of land. This works to Rs. 3,477 per sq. yard. Respondent No. 1, however, adopted a lesser figure of Rs. 3,200 per sq. yard in the case of land of the petitioners' property. The petitioner ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... asset exceeds the value of the asset as returned by more than such percentage of the value of the asset as returned or by more than such amount as may be prescribed in this behalf or (ii) that having regard to the nature of the asset and other relevant circumstances, it is necessary so to do. (2) For the purpose of estimating the value of any asset in pursuance of a reference under sub-section (1) the Valuation Officer may serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to produce or cause to be produced on a date specified in the notice such accounts, records or other documents as the Valuation Officer may require. (3) Where the Valuation Officer is of opinion that the value of the asset has been correctly declared in the return made by the assessee under section 14 or section 15, he shall pass an order in writing to that effect and send a copy of his order to the Wealth-tax Officer and to the assessee. (4) Where the Valuation Officer is of opinion that the value of the asset is higher than the value declared in the return made by the assessee under section 14 or section 15, or where the asset is not disclosed or the value of the asset is not declared in such return or w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ir complaint is in respect of a report which respondent No. 1 has submitted to respondent No. 2 and which report must be accepted by respondent No. 2 by virtue of the provisions of sub-s. (6) of s. 16A. The report is, no doubt, a step in the final process of assessment but the assessment order that respondent No. 2 has to pass cannot be anything except the valuation determined by the impugned report. If the report is based on no evidence, is arbitrary, is fanciful or is based on undisclosed material, the writ of certiorari will be available to the petitioners. No doubt it is only after respondent No. 1 has passed an order of assessment that the petitioners would be obliged to pay wealth-tax, all the same in view of the provisions of sub-s. (6) of s. 16A, it cannot be said that the impugned report does not affect the rights of the petitioners. The scheme of s. 16A is such that respondent No. 1 must be held to be against not merely administratively but in somewhat quasi-judicial manner. If that is correct, then he has to arrive at his conclusion in accordance with norms postulated by the principles of natural justice. The petitioners are entitled to show that respondent No. 1 has bas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nfine principle to cases in which the determination affected rights in the sense of enforceable rights. Indeed, in the Electricity Commissioners case [1924] 1 KB 171 (CA), the rights determined were at any rate not immediately enforceable rights since the scheme laid down by the Commissioners had to be approved by the Minister of Transport and by resolutions of Parliament. The Commissioners nevertheless were held amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, as can be seen from Rex v. Postmaster-General, Ex parte, Carmichael [1928] 1 KB 291 (DC) and Rex v. Boycott, Ex parte Keasley [1939] 2 KB 651 (DC) the remedy is avilable even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected. The position as I see it is the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined. They have varied from time to time being extended to meet changing conditions. At one time the writ only went to an inferior court. Later its ambit was extended to statutory Tribunals determining a lis inter partes. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed by him for fixing the valuation of the tenanted portions is not under challenge. Respondent No. 1 has fixed the rate of Rs. 3,200 per square yard for the land calling it " the reversionary value of the land ". This is challenged. We have already noticed earlier how he had arrived at this valuation. According to the petitioners the valuation should have been done on the basis of the annual letting value fixed for the tenanted portions and self-occupied portion by the New Delhi Municipal Committee in consonance with the principles laid down by a Full Bench of this court in Dewan Daulat Ram Kapur v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, ILR [1973] 1 Delhi 363. The contention is that the fair market value is dependent on the standard rent which can be charged for the various portions of the building and a hypothetical purchaser would keep that in view in quoting his price. Though some portions of the building are self-occupied the major part of this portion was originally on rent with the petitioners and, therefore, the rent that the hypothetical purchaser would be able to get for that portion would be the same as was the standard rent. Capitalisation of the standard rent would thus, ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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