TMI Blog1979 (3) TMI 58X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gument, that the construction adopted by the High Court could lead to double taxation and even unconstitutional results. But in the instant case, nothing of this kind has happened. The firm has not been assessed. No question of double taxation or exceeding the constitutional ceiling of ₹ 250 fixed by art. 276(2) of the Constitution arises on the facts of the present case. The present case is one, where the Municipal Committee acted " under the Act ". It follows, therefore, that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit was barred, even if the dispute raised therein related to the principle of assessment to be followed. Appeal dismissed. - C.A. 1998 OF 1969 - - - Dated:- 6-3-1979 - Judge(s) : P. S. KAILASAM., O. CHINNAPPA REDDY., R. S. SARKARIA JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by SARKARIA J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated October 3, 1968, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The facts leading to this appeal are that the appellants are partners of a firm, Bharat Industries, Chheharta. By a notification, dated May 15, 1946, the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ship business. In support of his conclusion that the tax was on trade and not on persons, the learned judge by way of analogy, referred to cls. (a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of sub-s. (1). He also referred to two Madras decisions in Municipal Commissioners of Nagapatnam v. Sadaya Pillay [1883] ILR 7 Mad 74 and Davies v. President of the Madras Municipal Commission [1890] ILR 14 Mad 140 and found himself in entire agreement with the reasoning of the learned judges in those cases. Aggrieved, the Municipal Committee preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. The Appellate Bench of the High Court held that to import the definition of the term " person " occurring in s. 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act into s. 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act, will be repugnant to the subject. In the opinion of the Bench, under the scheme of the statute in question, the tax cannot be levied on a firm or factory as such, but only on the individual owners of the factory or of the firm. On this reasoning, the Bench reached the conclusion " that under s. 61(1)(b) of the Act, it is the individual who is to be assessed and is liable to pay the tax mentioned therein and so the assessment as well as the demand o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urposes of this Act, and in the manner directed by this Act, impose in the whole or any part of municipality any of the following taxes, namely :-- ....... (b) a tax on persons practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality. Explanation.-A person in the service or person holding an office under the State Government or the Central Government or a local or other public authority shall be deemed to be practising a profession within the meaning of this sub-section. " From a plain reading of the extracted provision, it is clear that a tax leviable under cl. (b) is, in terms, a tax on " persons ". The expression " persons " undoubtedly includes natural persons. The class of such taxable persons has been indicated by the legislature with reference to their occupational activity. Thus, in order to be authorised, a tax under cl. (b) of s. 61(1) must satisfy two conditions : First, it must be a tax on " persons ". Second, such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality. There can be no dispute that the appellants are " persons " and, as such, satisfy the first condition. Even t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ividuals, who belong to a class practising any profession or art, or carrying on a trade or calling in the municipality. To hold that persons who are collectively carrying on a trade in the municipality cannot be taxed individually, would be to read into the statute words which are not there. There are no words in cl. (b) or elsewhere in the statute which, expressly or by necessary implication, exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from being taxed as individuals. To attract liability to a tax under this clause, it is sufficient that the person concerned is carrying on a trade in the municipality, irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnership with others. Thus, both the conditions necessary for levying a tax under cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case. The appellants are " persons " and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharta Municipality. In the view we take, we do not think it necessary to go further into the question, whether the definition of " person " given in s. 2(40) of the Punjab General Clauses Act, can be imported into the statute under consider ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which is analogous to that provided in s. 66(2) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act. It is well recognised that where a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that ss. 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar, by inevitable implication, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act. In the view we take, we are fortified by the decision of this court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana [1963] 50 ITR 187; AIR 1963 SC 1547, wherein ss. 84 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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