TMI Blog1989 (2) TMI 112X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a and P. Parameswaran, Advocates, with him), for the petitioner. J. Ramamurthy, Senior Advocate (B. Parthasarathi, V.J. Francis, C.S. Vaidyanathan, S.R. Seita, Harish N. Salve, Ravider Narain, D.N. Misra, S. Padmanabha Mahale, Leelawati, K.K. Gupta, V Balachandranand Uma Dutta, Advocates, with him), for the respondents. JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.- In these matters, the question that arises for consideration is whether a learned single judge sitting in chambers is competent to dismiss applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals under Order XX-A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, regarding appeals under section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, as well as under Order XX-B regarding appeals under section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962, and section 35L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It appears that an application for condonation of delay came before a learned single judge and in the circumstances mentioned in the Review Petition No. 557 of 1987, the application was dismissed by the learned single judge. That order was passed by the learned single judge under Order VI, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er a prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making an application within such a period." Some grounds, according to the appellant, had been made for condonation of delay. Apparently, in the facts of the case, the learned single judge did not find any merit in those grounds and refused to condone the delay. Consequently, it was contended that the effect of the refusal of condonation of delay was dismissal of the appeal following as a result thereof. The question is, can the learned single judge do it ? The learned single judge has done it by virtue of rule 2(14) of Order VI of the said Rules. Order VI deals with "Business in chambers". Order VI, rule 1 provides that the powers of the court in relation to the matters enumerated thereunder would be exercised by the Registrar. Order VI, Rule 2, provides that the powers of the court in relation to certain matters may be exercised by single judge sitting in chambers. Thereafter, 28 such matters are enumerated. Rule 2(14) of Order VI provides as follows: "Applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , and any enlargement might be ordered, although the application therefor was not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed. A petition of appeal was required under Order XV of the Rules to be presented within 60 days from the grant of certificate of fitness. The time to present the petition of appeal was fixed by the rules of this court. It was observed, therefore, that Order XLVII, rule 3, should apply with regard to enlargement or abridgement of any time appointed by the rules for doing any act. This court was of the view that Order VI, rule 2(14), spoke of the applications for enlargement or abridgement of time. Here, the words "enlargement or abridgement of time" took in applications for enlargement of time appointed by the rules, that is to say, according to this court, fixed by the rules. The significant feature of the Rules was that applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions were excepted from the business of a chamber judge. The natural presumption was that, but for the exception, the rule would have to include also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. Any application for condonation of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... matter. We have considered the matter. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor-General. We accept the reasoning of the decision of this court in CIT v. R. H. Pandit, AIR 1974 SC 2269. We find that that was the practice of the court. That has been sanctified by the judicial decision. We also see reason in the decision and the practice. We do not find any reason for holding that the practice of this court, followed since 1966, requires to be altered. Arranging the business of the court is within the domain of the court. These rules have been framed by this court with the approval of the President of India. Under Order 1, rule 2(1)(g), of the Rules, "court" means the Supreme Court of India. Sub-rule (14) of rule 2 of Order VI empowers a single judge to decide certain matters which speak of applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by the court and except, inter alia, applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. On a proper reading, it appears to us that the exception made only in favour of the time fixed by the court means court functioning judicially in terms of Order VII, rule ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by the Limitation Act, and the court further refused an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act to admit the appeal after the prescribed time and the appeal was dismissed. Having regard to the abovementioned facts, Sanderson C. J. observed that it cannot be held that the order was not one "passed on appeal". Sanderson C. J. had some doubts on that proposition but agreed with Woodroffe J. that the appeal involved a substantial question of law. In that appeal, a certificate was granted. In our opinion, this decision is not relevant for the issue before us. Whether an order dismissing an application for condonation of delay in the case of a statutory appeal is an order on appeal is not quite in issue here and is not decisive of the matter. It does not solve the question whether a learned single judge can dismiss an application for condonation of delay in a statutory appeal. After all, the court functions by its arrangement under the Rules. Order VI mentions the chamber business and the business to be transacted by the Registrar and single judge sitting in chambers. The powers of the court, that is to say, the whole court and the powers of the Division Bench normally, excep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... utory appeals to be heard by the learned single judge while the applications for condonation of delay in respect of the special leave petitions to be heard by the bench of two learned judges will be violative of article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, this contention should be heard by a larger Bench. We are unable to accept this submission. This court had occasion to consider the situation in which the question settled by this court can be reviewed. Reference may be made to the observations of Gajendragadkar C. J. in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1965] 56 ITR 365 (SC) ; [1965] 2 SCR 908, at page 921, the learned Chief Justice observed (p. 376) : "In dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions of this court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills' case [1959] 37 ITR 11 ; [1960] 1 SCR 249 and Petlad Co. Ltd.'s case [1963] 48 ITR 92 (SC) ; [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 871, should be reconsidered and revised by us, we ought to be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases. Mr. Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that in a proper case, this court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, and so, the abstract question as to whet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercises by this court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if, on a subsequent occasion, the court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error ; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations : What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based ? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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