TMI Blog1969 (6) TMI 23X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eized various goods and documents. Thereafter the Customs officers made inquiries and investigations regarding the violation by the petitioner of The Import and Export Control Act, 1947. The Sea Customs Act, 1962. It is alleged that with regard to the Import of parts of watches, clocks and time pieces, show cause notices under the Customs Act, 1962, could not be served upon the petitioner within the prescribed period of six months from the date of the seizure as required by Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. 3.On December 5, 1965, an order was made by the Customs Authorities under the proviso to Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 whereby the petitioner was directed not to remove, part with or otherwise deal with the goods except with the previous permission of respondents No. 3. With regard to this order the petitioner's case is that there was no material on the basis of which the respondents could have any reason to believe that the goods or any of them were liable to be confiscated under the Act. In the petition there is a challenge to the vires of Section 110 of the Customs Act 1962 on the ground that it confers upon the Customs Officer an absolute arbitrary, u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the basis of or in connection with the order of extension of the period of detention by two months as communicated by the letter of May 30, 1966, or from issuing any notice or initiating any proceedings whatsoever against the petitioner. 7.On May 31, 1966, the six months period prescribed by Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, for issue of a show cause notice under Section 124 of the Act expired. By a letter dated May 30, 1966, the petitioner was informed that the Additional Collector of Customs, on sufficient cause being shown, had extended the period by two months with effect from June 1, 1966. This extended period of two months expired on July 31, 1966, but before the expiry of this period however the petitioner obtained the Rule nisi and the order of injunction mentioned above. On September 27, 1966, by consent of parties an order was made by this Court whereby the interim order already passed was modified so as to enable the Customs Authorities to serve show cause notices on the petitioner. The order was made without prejudice to the rights and contention of the parties and it was also ordered that the petitioner's contentions regarding the validity of the show cau ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e party whose goods had been seized, and after giving him an opportunity of being heard, and of making representations against such an order of extension; and if an order was made without hearing the party, and without giving him an opportunity of making representations against the proposed order of extension, such an order would be clearly violative of the rules of natural justice, as the statute required the Customs Authorities to have a judicial or quasi-judicial approach to any request for extension of time. 10.The next contention on behalf of the petitioner was that even assuming that the order of extension was validly made, the period of extension expired on July 31, 1966, and as no show cause notice was served within the extended period, the petitioner was entitled to the return of the goods, as also of the books and documents seized by the Customs authorities. Several show cause notices dated 1st October, 1966, 3rd October, 1966, 15th October, 1966 and 8th November, 1966 were issued and served on the petitioner. These notices, it was argued, were clearly served beyond the extended time which expired on July 31, 1966. Leave to serve show cause notices was obtained by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Customs and Superintendent Preventive Service Ors. - AIR (1968) Cal. 28. In that case also the appellant carried on the business of a watch dealer and a search was conducted at his place of business. Several watches of foreign make were seized on March 19, 1963, and a show cause notice was issued on March 6, 1964. Between the dates of the seizure and the issue of the show cause notice, two extensions were granted under the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Act. The first extension was granted on September 19, 1963, for four months and a second extension for two months was granted extending the time till March 17, 1964. The first extension of four months granted on September 19, 1963, expired on January 19, 1964. The second extension of two months, however, was granted after the expiry of the first extension on January 19, 1964, as the order of second extension of two months was made on February 20, 1964. The show cause notice under Section 124 of the Act in that case was given on March 6, 1964. Admittedly therefore in this case the second extension was granted after the expiry of the first extension of January 19, 1964. The contention of the appellant was that both the extensions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e order extended the time within the period of six months as prescribed by the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Act was bad. The question decided in that case was that where the period prescribed by the statute had expired or lapsed in consequence whereof a party had acquired a vested right to the return of the goods seized, such a vested right could not be taken away so as to deprive the party to the return of the goods by an order made ex parte extending the time. In other words it was held that where a party had acquired a vested right to the return of the goods by reason of the expiry of the time within which notice was to be served, such a vested right could not be taken away by an order of extension made ex parte without hearing the party. For these reasons this decision, to my mind, is of no assistance to the petitioner in this case. 13.The next decision relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner was a decision of this Court reported in 73 C.W.N. 340 (Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh Anr. v. I.J. Rao Ors.). In that case on May 5, 1966 various type-writers, adding and calculating machines were seized by the Customs authorities after a search. Before the expiry of the per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act requires an objective analysis of the grounds made out for extension of time or merely postulates a subjective satisfaction of the Collector of Customs who is empowered to make the order of extension. 15.The provisions in statute requiring public servants to make confiscatory orders, whenever they have reason to believe that grounds exist for formation of such a reason to believe, have received judicial attention in several decisions to which I shall presently refer. It is necessary to go into these decisions to find out if the phrase on sufficient cause being shown in the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Customs Officer or postulates an objective analysis, which demands a show cause notice to the party likely to be affected by the order and also an opportunity of being heard being given to him. The first case to which I shall refer in this connection is a decision of the Supreme Court, The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty - 1999 (110) E.L.T. 157 (S.C.) = AIR 1962 SC 316. In that case Section 178(1) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which prescribed that where goods to which that section applied were se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... section is the subjectivity of the Customs Officer in having a reasonable belief that the goods are smuggled. 17.The question of 'reasonable belief' was again considered by the Supreme Court in Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, Collector of Central Excise Anr. -1983 (13) E.L.T. 1360 (S.C.) = AIR 1962 SC 1559. In that case the Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur, passed an order directing confiscation of gold found in the possession of a party and imposing upon him a personal penalty of ₹ 25,000 under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, read with Section 19 of the said Act and Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. It was contended that there were nothing on record to show that the seizure of gold had been effected by the officer acting on a reasonable belief that the gold was smuggled. It was also contended that the question whether there was reasonable belief or not was justifiable and since there was no material on the record to show that the belief could have been reasonable the statutory presumption could not be raised. In rejecting this contention the Supreme Court held : After all, when you are dealing with a question as to whether th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whose possession the goods were seized. 20.In dealing with the question of reasonable belief in the section quoted above it was held in Pukhraj's case (supra) that the Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the Customs Officer in dealing with a question as to whether the belief in the mind of the officer was reasonable or not. In my view the same principles are attracted in construing the phrase 'on sufficient cause being shown' in the provision to Section 110(2) of the Act. With regard to the nature and sufficiency of the cause, it is the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs that provides the ground and justification for an order extending the time to complete the inquiry. Objection raised on behalf of the party from whose custody goods have been seized, however strong and cogent they may be, cannot in my view provide any grounds for challenging the legality or validity of an order of the Collector of Customs extending the time under the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Act. If the order of extension is made before expiry of the initial period of six months, or before expiry of the extended period, it cannot in my view be challenged on the ground th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s to enable the department to commence and conclude investigation regarding the importation of the goods and subsequent dealings therewith. If the party from whose custody the goods have been seized, and who may be charged with smuggling of the goods, and against whom an order confiscating the goods, and imposing a personal penalty may be made, is informed that investigations with regard to the import of and subsequent dealings with the goods are going to be made, from such and such persons at such and such places, the purpose of the investigation itself, and indeed the whole proceedings commencing from search and seizure would be altogether defeated. The investigation contemplated by the statute, must be made without the knowledge of the party (from whom the goods have been seized) as to the sources at which investigation is to be made. For such an investigation to succeed, it must be made behind the back of the party who has been charged with the offence of smuggling. Parliament in my view did not intend that when an order of extension was made before expiry of the statutory period of extension thereof notice must be given to the party from whom goods have been seized and such a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... viso to Section 110(2) of the Act an implied provision requiring the Customs Officer to act judicially will be altogether contrary to the scheme of the Act in Chapter XIII which deals with search, seizure and arrest. 24.It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner, that even if it was held that the order of the Collector of Customs was an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial order, notice should have been given to the petitioner, who should also have been given an opportunity of being heard. In other words, it was contended that even in case of an administrative order, the authority making order is required to follow the rules of natural justice, and should therefore give to the party affected, a notice that an order affecting him may be made and also give such a party an opportunity of being heard. In support of this contention reliance was placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei - AIR (1967) SC 1269. In that case there was a dispute with regard to the declared age of a Government servant who claimed that her age as recorded in the Civil List and the Service Records of Gazetted Officers should be acce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d was made. This decision, to my mind, does not support the petitioner's contention in this case. Certain materials collected behind the back of the Government servant were going to be used against her and she was not informed of such materials, nor was she given an opportunity of explaining the discrepancy arising out of her declared age and the age arrived at on materials collected by the Government, and relying on the materials collected by the Government an order of superannuation was made. In the instant case now before me no order has been made against the petitioner to his prejudice nor has any materials collected against him been used. All that has been done was that an order of extension was made in terms of the proviso to Section 110 (2) of the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above is not an authority for the proposition that rules of natural justice must be followed in the case of every administrative order and a notice should be served to the party against whom an order is proposed to be made. An order for search and seizure for instance made under the Act is also an administrative order, and it is an order which is seriously detrimental to the part ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9;circumstances' was the condition fundamental to the making of an opinion, the existence of the circumstances if questioned, had to be proved at least prima facie and that it was not enough to assert that circumstances existed and give no clue to what they were because the circumstances must be such as to lead to conclusions of certain definiteness on the question of subjective satisfaction of the Central Government as to the existence of the circumstances. A material portion of the observations runs as follows: No doubt the formation of opinion is subjective but the existence of the circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine qua non for action must be demonstrable. If the action is questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to an inference of the kind contemplated by the Section exists, the action might be exposed to interference unless the existence of the circumstances is made out . 26.It will be amply clear that the questions considered by the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals case (supra) were entirely different from the question with which I am concerned in this application. There are no conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to ext ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed jurisdiction and power on any authority to deal with the rights of citizens, it may be required by the statute to act judicially in dealing with matters entrusted to it and that an obligation to act judicially might in some cases be inferred from the scheme of the statute and its provisions. In such cases it was held, it is easy to hold that the authority must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that it was not necessary that the obligation to follow the principles of natural justice must be expressly imposed on the authority. On the obligation to act judicially the Supreme Court observed at page 1770 of the report as follows :- If it appears that the authority or body has been given power to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, the very nature of the power would inevitably impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Whether or not such an authority or body is a tribunal, would depend upon the nature of the power conferred on the authority or body, the nature of the rights of citizens, the decision of which falls within the jurisdiction of the said authority or body, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed as spent on duty for pension only but he was not to be allowed any pay beyond what he had actually received or what was allowed to him by way of subsistence allowance. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition for quashing the order of re-instatement without pay and for an order directing the Government to treat the period of absence from duty as period spent on duty. This petition, however, was dismissed by the High Court and the matter thereafter went up to the Supreme Court in appeal. It was held that the order passed under the relevant fundamental rule would affect the Government servant adversely if it was made under clauses III and V and that consideration of the case depended on facts and circumstances in their entirety, and an order resulting from a finding of the facts and circumstances would result in pecuniary loss to the Government servant and such an order must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. It was further held that the very nature of the function implied the duty to act judicially and if an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed was not given the order was liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tor of Customs. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was the decision of the Supreme Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal Anr. - 1969 (1) Supreme Court Cases 325. In that case also the validity of an order made by Central Government under sub-clauses (i), (ii) of clause (b) of Section 237 of the Companies Act, 1956, appointing Inspectors to investigate into the affairs of a company was considered by the Supreme Court. The challenge to the order was on the ground that Central Government had no material before it from which it could have come to the conclusion that the appellant's business was being conducted in violation of the provisions of the statute. Agreeing with the majority view in Barium Chemicals' case (supra) it was held as follows : - For the reasons stated earlier we agree with the conclusion reached by Hidayatulla and Shelat JJ, in Barium Chemicals' case that the existence of circumstances suggesting that the company's business was being conducted as laid down in sub-clause (i) of the persons mentioned in sub-clause (2) were guilty of fraud or misfeasance or other misconduct towards the company or toward ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ster and the Chief Minister had imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. It was further held that the power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner was a statutory power and he alone could have exercised that power and he could not abdicate his responsibility in favour of any one, and that the Cane Commissioner acted in a quasi judicial capacity as there was a lis between two contending parties and this lis commenced as soon as one of the parties moved the Government for altering or modifying the reservation made in the earlier order. It was further held that the order was bad on the ground that though the Cane Commissioner acted in a quasi judicial capacity no opportunity for making representation was given to the appellant. I do not see how this decision helps the petitioner in the instant case now before me. There is no question involved in this case of the order having been made by any authority other than that whom the statute has empowered to make the order. There is no question of abdication of power or authority by the Collector of Customs in favour of anybody else, and there is no challenge to the order of extension on that ground. Secondly there was no lis between two r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e where the officer was acting judicially or quasi-judicially and he was required to adopt a judicial process and then went on to hold at p. 231 of the report : This, as it seems to me is a very different case, and I doubt whether it can be said that the Immigration authorities are acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity as those terms are generally understood. At the same time, however, I myself think that even if an Immigration Officer is not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the sub-section and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but of acting fairly and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow and within the legislative frame-work under which the administrator is wor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly, there is no charge in this case that the Collector of Customs was biased or had acted capriciously or dishonestly. There is nothing in the petition to show that the order of extension was unfairly made. 35.In support of the same contention reliance was placed on another English decision in R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain (1967) 2 A.E.R. 770. In that case a police constable became blind as a result of shooting by a suspect, when he was about to question. He applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation under the scheme. He was offered and accepted an interim compensation of 300. Later he committed suicide which was attributable to the injury. His widow became entitled to the interim award and also applied for further compensation. On this application a single member of the Board made a final award of 300. The widow thereupon applied for a hearing before three members of the Board who decided that having regard to other payments made she was not entitled to any compensation and made a nil award The widow thereupon applied for a certiorari to quash the decision. The contention that the jurisdiction of the Court did not extend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tatement made to his prejudice. This decision, again, is of no assistance to the petitioner in this case, because upon a complaint being made against the employer of indentured labourers an inquiry was to be made by the Governor and all that was held was that before coming to a decision the Governor who was to hold the inquiry must give the party against whom a complaint was made an opportunity of making representation against the complaint. An inquiry was to be made on a complaint of a particular nature and quite plainly the person against whom the complaint was made must be given opportunity of making proper representation. To my mind, this decision has no application to the instant case now before me. 37.I now turn to the next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. This was based on the definition of 'imported goods' in sub-section (25) of section 2 of the Act. This definition is as follows : - (25) 'Imported goods' means any goods brought into India from a place outside India but does not include goods which have been cleared for home consumption . 38.It was argued that the goods in this case had been cleared upon payment of Customs duty ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of clearing the goods according to the respondents, were forged licences. If a licence is forged, it is no licence at all, and any import of goods, of which the importation is prohibited by law, cannot be a valid import under the Act. Goods so imported cannot therefore be treated to be lawfully imported goods within the definition of that terms in Section 2(25) of the Act. Since the respondents' case is that the licence on the basis of which the goods were imported were forged licences, if the allegation of forgery is true, the goods must be held to have brought into India contrary to a prohibition imposed by law as contemplated by Section 111(d) of the Act, and in that case such goods are liable to confiscation and the power to seize under Section 110(1) of the Act can be invoked by the Customs authorities and the goods, though cleared after payment of duty can be seized under Section 110(1) of the Act. The contention on behalf of the petitioner that the goods having been imported into India for home consumption would cease to be imported goods and the decision of the Customs authorities to release the goods upon payment of the duty imposed cannot be revised by any authori ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d of six months and therefore the facts in this case are quite distinguishable from the facts in Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh's case. By the time the order of extension was served on the party in Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh's case (supra) the six months had expired and it was contended that the petitioner had acquired a vested right to the return of the goods. It was in these facts that Ghose J. came to the conclusion following the Bench decision in Charandas Malhotra's case (supra) that the Customs Officer should have had a judicial approach and should have given a show cause notice and an opportunity of being heard. 41. Let me now turn to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents on the question namely whether the Customs Officer should have a judicial approach in making the order of extension or whether the order is an administrative order and no show cause notice and opportunity of being heard need be given to the party. The first decision relied upon was a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court reported AIR (1968) Mysore 89 in (Ganesh Mul Channilal Gandhi anr. v. Collector of Central Excise and Asstt. Collector, Bangalore). In that case the same quest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be a very unusual and inconvenient thing for the Collector at this stage to call upon the person from whom the goods were seized to show cause why the delay should not be condoned or to reveal to him the difficulties which were encountered during the investigation and which was responsible for its non-completion within the prescribed period. Disclosure of these grounds to the person from whom the goods were seized would be against public interest and would be utterly detrimental to the completion of the investigation. We therefore take the view that the petitioner had no right to be heard at the stage when the Collector ordered the extension . 42.Reliance was next placed on a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in A.I.R. 1967 Bom. 138 (Vasantlal and Ranchhoddas Patel Ors. v. Union of India Ors). In that case the Enforcement Department conducted a search on the strength of a search warrant and recovered certain diamonds. On the day following the search, a safe was opened and some further packets of diamonds were recovered. All the diamonds remained in the custody of the Enforcement Directorate till September 14, 1964 on which day the Customs Department took char ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rization it was not stated that there was a reason to believe that goods were secreted. It was held that though the words 'reasons to believe' were not embodied in the authorization the phraseology used in it had the same effect. The next point decided was that the Section 105 of the Act did not require the Customs Officer to give reasons for his belief and that while it was advisable and proper to give reasons the non-mention of reasons in itself did not vitiate the order. The next question decided was that it was not necessary to set out the particulars of the nature of the goods and of the documents in the authorization. To my mind, this decision is not of any assistance, in this case. The question of validity of the authorization on the ground that the reason to believe had not been set out in it or on the ground that goods and documents had not been specified was not canvassed on behalf of the petitioner in this case. 44.The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondents was that the licence used by the petitioner for the purpose of clearing the goods was not a genuine licence, but was a forged one, and therefore there was no license at all; and that bei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ces were served on October 3, 1966, and October 15, 1966. These show cause notices under Section 124 of the Act were issued after the Rule Nisi was issued, and the order for interim injunction was made restraining the respondents from taking any steps on the basis of or in connection with the seizure of the goods and the order of detention dated December 5, 1965. I have already dealt with this contention earlier in this judgment. I need not therefore say anything more on this question except that the order of injunction obtained by the petitioner restrained the respondents from taking any steps in connection with the seizure and the order of detention. Quite clearly the show cause notices under Section 124 of the Act could not be issued by the Customs authorities in violation of the order of injunction. The injunction restrained the respondents from issuing the show cause notices under Section 124 of the Act, and the respondents became entitled to serve the show cause notice only after the order modifying the order of injunction was made on September 27, 1966. The petitioner had moved the Court for the order of injunction, and had obtained the same, and it is not open to him to con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ffidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Maurich Galestine on August 31, 1968, it is said that there were definite materials for the reasons to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation, particularly the documents relating to import of watch parts against forged I.T.C. licence on account of Messrs Bhagwan Dass and Company, which was recovered from the show-room at premises No. 6, Dalhousie Square East and the disclosure made in the course of inquiry revealed that the goods were prima facie liable to confiscation. In paragraph 32 of this affidavit it is said that there are systematic infringement of prohibition committed by the petitioner regarding import of parts of watches and time-pieces parts, on the strength of documents recovered from the petitioner's premises which relate to forged import trade licences valued at ₹ 1,73,946. In paragraph 38 of this affidavit it is said that inquiries made had disclosed that the petitioner with others at Calcutta, Delhi and other places had been party to a conspiracy for unlawful import of watch parts and time-pieces parts valued at ₹ 25 lacs. In paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Chittaranjan Dutta on S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he only ground of attack on the order of extension was that it was made in violation of the rules of natural justice, inasmuch as no notice was served upon the petitioner to show cause why an order of extension should not be made, and the petitioner was given no opportunity of being heard. Chapter XIII of the Act deals with searches, seizure and arrest, and Section 110 of the Act is in this chapter. The order of extension contemplated by the proviso to Section 110C(2) of the Act is to be made where a notice under Section 124 of the Act could not be served within the initial period of six months. As I have noticed earlier the case that can be shown for an order of extension is that inquiries from particular persons or at particular places could not be completed within the specified period for one reason or another. If notice is to be served upon the persons whose goods have been seized, that inquiries have yet to be made from particular persons or at particular places, the purpose of the investigation itself would be defeated. Such investigation to succeed must in its very nature be of a confidential character. It must be made in secrecy and behind the back of the party whose goods ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. 53.In the instant case the second principle is attracted and applying that principle can it be said that the statute in this case requires the authority to act judicially? On an analysis of the scheme of the Act and the requirement by the statute itself of notice to a party in particular cases, the answer to the question cannot but be in the negative. There is nothing in the statute itself of notice to a party in particular case, the answer to the question cannot but be in the negative. There is nothing in the statute which requires the Collector of Customs to act judicially and to direct him to act judicially or quasi-judicially and compel him to serve notice upon the party whose goods have been seized before making an order of extension under the proviso to Section 110 (2) of the Act would be contrary to the statute itself and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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