TMI Blog1987 (12) TMI 55X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h Court for an appropriate decision as to which other entry the goods in question attract. The concerned Respondents are directed to refund to the appellants, sums equivalent to 6% wherever the taxes are already recovered at 16%. - 4026-4027 of 1987 - - - Dated:- 18-12-1987 - S. Natarajan and M.N. Venkatachaliah, JJ. S.N. Khare, R.K. Sharma and T.C. Sharma, Advocates, for the respondents. A.K.Sanghi, Advocate, for the appellant in C.A. No. 4026 of 1987. G.L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate (J.R. Das, Advocates, with him), for the appellant in C.A. No. 4027 of 1987. [Judgment per : Venkatachaliah, J.]. - In these petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, petitioners seek special leave to appeal from the Judgment and order dated, 10-9-1986 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 2919 of 1985 and Misc. Petition No. 413 of 1985 respectively. The appeals raise a short and interesting question whether stacks of "eucalyptus-wood" sold by the forest department after separating the "Ballies"and "poles" constitute and answer the description of 'Timber' under entry 32A of Part II of Schedule II to the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... technical expressions or words of art, but are words of everyday use, must be understood and given a meaning, not in their technical or scientific sense, but in a sense as understood in common parlance i.e. "that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it". Such words must be understood in their 'popular sense'. The particular terms used by the legislature in the denomination of articles are to be understood according to the common, commercial understanding of those terms used and not in their scientific and technical sense "for the legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists or geologists or botanists". The expression 'Timber', it seems to us, has an accepted and well-recognised legal connotation and is nomen-juris. It has also a popular meaning as a word of everyday use. In this case, the two meanings of 'Timber' the legal and the popular, coalesce and are broadly subsumed in each other. In Honeywood v. Honeywood, (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 306, at p. 309 Sir George Jessel referred to what distinguishes and is "Timber": "The question of what timber is depends, first on general law, that is, the la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ular sense, 'timber' is understood to be 'Imarathi-Lakdi'. In a popular sense, 'Timber' has certain association of ideas: as to its size, stability, utility, durability, the unit or measure of quantity and of valuation etc. The question is whether by the standards of these popular connotations, the 'wood-stacks' or 'wood-heaps' sold to and purchased by, the appellants can be held to answer the popular notions of "Timber". When "standing-timber" is sold as uncut tree, different considerations may arise. The nature of the "wood" sold is described in the letter, dated 30-5-1985, addressed by the Divisional Forest Officer. The subject-matter of the sale has been referred to as 'Nilgiri fuel-wood'. The wood was offered for sale in stacks of the size of 1 x 1.25 x 2 mtrs. With each piece of a length of 1.25 metres and a girth, at the thinner end, of not less then 10 cms. They were sold not by volume or by the number of pieces. The wood was offered with a particular kind of user in mind, viz., as a source of industrial raw material for 'pulp' in the manufacture of synthetic fibre. As pointed out by the High Court, in the returns filed by the respondents, it was mentioned that eucalyptus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ft wood timber...." " The petitioners offered to purchase the goods which could be used for manufacture of wood-ware, furniture, etc. as well as manufacture of pulp. The petitioners deal in timber ." Here again, pushed to its logical conclusions, the reasoning incurs the criticism of proceeding to determine the nature of the 'goods' by the test of the use to which they are capable of being put. The 'user-test' is logical; but is again, inconclusive. The particular use to which an article can be applied in the hands of a special consumer is not determinative of the nature of the goods. Even as the description of the goods by the authorities of the forest department who called them varyingly as 'eucalyptus fuel-wood' 'eucalyptus wood-heap' etc. is not determinative, the fact that the purchasers were dealers in timber is also not conclusive. The High Court also observed : " The length of the pieces is not relevant criteria to determine whether the wood is timber or not. The goods offered for sale were eucalyptus wood-stacks...." Length is, no doubt a relevant consideration; but it is a relative concept and associated with the idea of utility. A piece of rope, it is said, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oth sides submitted that, if we hold that entry 32A is not the appropriate one, the matter be remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration of the matter in the light of such other or further material the parties may place before the High Court. We accept this submission. 8. In the result, these appeals are allowed in part and the finding of the High Court that the goods in question fall within and attract entry 32A of Part II of Schedule II of the 'Act' is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for an appropriate decision as to which other entry the goods in question attract. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. 9. We might advert to yet another submission of Sri Sanghi. He submitted that consistent with the finding that the 'goods' do not attract tax at 16% under the said entry 32A respondents cannot retain the tax already collected at 16%. Learned counsel submitted that even if the goods are said to fall under the Residuary entry, the rate of tax would only be 10% and that respondents, accordingly, should be directed to refund to the appellants sums equivalent to 6% of the tax, wherever tax at 16% has been collected, without waiting for a decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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