2003 (10) TMI 463 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
Whether the appellant No. 1 used the brand name of another person (appellant No. 4) in the manufacture of goods (aluminium ladders) and is not entitled to the benefit of the exemption Notification 1/93-CE.

Analysis:
The appeals were directed against an order confirming duty and penalties on the appellants for using a brand name registered by appellant No. 4. The central issue was whether appellant No. 1 used the brand name of appellant No. 4 in manufacturing aluminium ladders, thus affecting their entitlement to exemption under Notification 1/93-CE. Appellant No. 1 denied using another person's brand name and claimed sole ownership. The adjudicating authority upheld the duty demand and penalties, which was affirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

The learned Counsel argued that there was no concrete evidence to prove appellant No. 1 used appellant No. 4's brand name. They highlighted that appellant No. 1 had been using the brand name since 1990, applied for its registration, and mentioned a relinquishment deed by appellant No. 4 in 1998. Conversely, the JDR supported the impugned order's correctness.

Upon review, the Tribunal found insufficient evidence to substantiate that appellant No. 1 used appellant No. 4's brand name. It was noted that appellant No. 4's brand name registration ended in 1985, and they did not renew it, while appellant No. 1 had been using the brand name since 1990 without objection. The Tribunal emphasized that appellant No. 4 did not oppose appellant No. 1's brand name registration and failed to claim ownership during the proceedings. Additionally, an assignment/relinquishment deed executed by appellant No. 4 in favor of appellant No. 1 further supported appellant No. 1's right to use the brand name.

Considering the evidence and circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that appellant No. 1 did not use another person's brand name, thereby allowing the appeals and setting aside the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order. The decision was based on the lack of proof that appellant No. 1 utilized appellant No. 4's brand name, entitling them to the small-scale exemption under Notification 1/93 for the disputed period.