2004 (8) TMI 686 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether to the effect of Section 70 of the Karnataka Rent Act 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the 1999 Act or the New Act ) on the proceedings pending before this Court? Whether if the proceedings continue to survive unabated for adjudication on merits whether a ground for eviction under Section 21(1)(f) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 hereinafter the 1961 Act or the Old Act ?

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Effect of Section 70 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 on pending proceedings.
2. Whether a ground for eviction under Section 21(1)(f) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is made out.

Analysis of Judgment:

1. Effect of Section 70 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 on pending proceedings:

The core issue was the impact of Section 70 of the 1999 Act on proceedings pending before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The 1999 Act repealed the 1961 Act and introduced new provisions for pending cases. Sections 69 and 70 of the 1999 Act were crucial in determining the fate of such cases.

Section 69 dealt with the transfer of pending cases to appropriate forums, while Section 70 provided for the repeal and savings. Specifically, Section 70(2)(c) stated that cases concerning premises to which the 1999 Act does not apply shall stand abated. The Court noted that the suit premises were non-residential and exceeded 14 sq. meters, thus falling outside the purview of the 1999 Act.

The Court held that the legislative intent behind Section 70 was not to abate the original proceedings but to terminate only those proceedings pending at the stage of trial, appeal, or revision on the date of the new Act's commencement. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution could not be curtailed by state legislation. Thus, the appeal under Article 136 survived unabated for adjudication on merits.

2. Ground for eviction under Section 21(1)(f) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:

The landlord sought eviction on the ground of unlawful subletting under Section 21(1)(f) of the 1961 Act, alleging that converting the sole proprietary business into a partnership amounted to subletting. The Court examined whether the tenant had parted with possession in favor of the partners, which would constitute subletting.

The Court reiterated that subletting involves the tenant parting with legal possession of the premises. The term 'sub-let' is not defined in the Act, but it implies transferring the right to enjoy the property to another party. The burden of proving subletting lies on the landlord, who must show that the alleged sub-tenant was in exclusive possession.

The Court referred to previous judgments, emphasizing that merely entering into a partnership does not constitute subletting unless the tenant parts with possession. In the present case, the tenant's family members, including brothers and a cousin, were partners, and there was no evidence to suggest that the tenant had dissociated from the business or that the partners were in exclusive possession.

The High Court's finding of subletting was overturned, as the partnership did not amount to the tenant parting with possession. The appeal was allowed, and the eviction proceedings were dismissed, with no order as to costs.