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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Ordinance No. II of 1942 under the Governor-General's emergency powers. 2. The legitimacy of the Special Magistrate's authority and the appropriate remedy for the appellants. 3. Interpretation of the Governor-General's power to declare an emergency and delegate authority. 4. Compatibility of Section 26 of the Ordinance with Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935. 5. Discriminatory powers granted to Provincial Governments under the Ordinance. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of Ordinance No. II of 1942 under the Governor-General's emergency powers: The Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor-General under para. 72 of Schedule 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in the context of an emergency due to wartime conditions. The Federal Court had declared the Ordinance ultra vires, but the Privy Council decided to address the validity of Ordinance II to aid future decisions on similar issues. The key provision allows the Governor-General to make ordinances in emergencies for the peace and good government of British India, with the force of law for six months. The Privy Council emphasized that the Governor-General's judgment on the existence of an emergency is not subject to court challenge, as established in Bhagat Singh v. The King-Emperor. The circumstances at the time, including Japan's declaration of war and bombings in Rangoon, constituted an emergency. 2. The legitimacy of the Special Magistrate's authority and the appropriate remedy for the appellants: The High Court's jurisdiction to revise the Special Magistrate's decision was questioned, as the Ordinance itself excluded appeals to the High Court. The Privy Council noted that if the Ordinance was invalid, the Special Magistrate's actions were unauthorized, akin to a private person conducting a trial, making habeas corpus the appropriate remedy. However, the Privy Council chose to focus on the validity of the Ordinance rather than disposing of the case on procedural grounds. 3. Interpretation of the Governor-General's power to declare an emergency and delegate authority: The Ordinance's provision allowing Provincial Governments to declare its enforcement raised concerns of delegated legislation. The Privy Council found no issue with the Governor-General's foresight in preparing for special courts without immediate implementation across India. This approach was compared to the Emergency Powers Act in the UK. The Privy Council rejected the notion of invalid delegation, affirming that the Governor-General's legislative powers in emergencies are as broad as those of the Indian Legislature. The local application of the Ordinance by Provincial Governments does not constitute delegated legislation but a common legislative practice. 4. Compatibility of Section 26 of the Ordinance with Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935: Section 26 of the Ordinance excluded the High Court's revisional and appellate powers over cases tried by Special Courts. The argument that this conflicted with Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, was dismissed. Section 311(6) of the Act includes Ordinances made by the Governor-General within references to Acts of the Legislature, allowing the Governor-General to alter the High Court's jurisdiction in emergencies. 5. Discriminatory powers granted to Provincial Governments under the Ordinance: The Ordinance allowed Provincial Governments to direct which cases or classes of cases should be tried by Special Courts, raising concerns of discriminatory application and undermining established criminal procedures. The Privy Council acknowledged the discomfort this caused among Indian judges but emphasized that the validity of the Ordinance hinges on the language of the Government of India Act. The Privy Council found no constitutional limitation preventing the Governor-General from authorizing Provincial Governments to direct case trials. Historical precedents and existing legislation in India supported this practice. Conclusion: The Privy Council advised that the appeal be allowed, setting aside the Federal Court's judgment and declaring Ordinance II of 1942 not to be ultra vires. The Ordinance was deemed valid under the Governor-General's emergency powers, with no constitutional or legal barriers to its provisions on emergency declarations, delegated authority, and jurisdictional adjustments.
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