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2007 (5) TMI 624 - SC - Indian LawsInterpretation of the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (the Act) - Planning and development and use of land - notification in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 38 of the Act - (i) Whether having regard to notification dated 13.02.1974 vis-‘-vis the expansion of the Indore Development Plan, the District Committee in exercise of its delegated power can automatically extend the area of operation of the appellant despite the notification constituting it by the State whereby and whereunder its area of operation was limited to the one covered by the notification dated 13.02.1974 ? - (ii) Whether the appellant authority can declare its intention in terms of Section 50 of the Act before the development attained finality - HELD THAT:- The essence of planning in the Act is the existence of a development plan. It is a development plan, which u/s 17 will indicate the areas and zones, the users, the open spaces, the institutions and offices, the special purposes, etc. Town planning would be based on the contents of the development plan. It is only when the development plan is in existence, can a town planning scheme be framed. In fact, unless it is known as to what the contents of a possible town planning scheme would be, or alternatively, whether in terms of the development plan such a scheme at all is required, the intention to frame the scheme cannot be notified. The limit of Indore planning area was specified by a notification dated 13.02.1974 in terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Appellant Authority was constituted by the State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of its power u/s 38(1) of the Act for the area comprised within the Indore planning as specified in the notification dated 13.02.1974. The State in exercise of its jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 75 of the Act delegated its power conferred upon it under Sections 13 and 47A of the Act upon the District Planning Committee. No power u/s 38 was delegated. The District Planning Committee exercises its jurisdiction pursuant to the said delegation in terms of a notification dated 13.11.2000 extending the Indore Development Planning Area to 152 villages. The villages Bicholi and Kanadia were not included in the notification dated 12.08.1977. They were included only in the notification issued by the District Planning Committee. The District Planning Committee, however, issued another notification amending the planning area to 90 villages only and deleting 62 villages from its earlier notification. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that even a delegatee exercises its power relying on or on the basis of its power conferred upon it by the delegator, its act would be deemed to be that of the principal as has been held by this Court in State of Orissa and Others v. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement,Cuttack and Others[1998 (8) TMI 601 - SUPREME COURT]. Yet again, the State in exercise of its power u/s 38(1) of the Act notified planning area confirming to the one identified by the District Planning Committee in terms of its notification dated 28.10.2005. Application of the principle of executive construction would lead to a conclusion that the State and the appellant themselves proceeded on the basis that in terms of the notification issued by the District Planning Committee, the area of operation of the appellant was not extended. The State exercises its different power for different purposes. Issuing notification of a planning area, whether named or not, for the purpose of Section 13(1) is different from the one for which a development authority is created within the meaning of Section 38(1) of the Act. The State in a given situation may appoint more than one authority for the same planned area. The State delegated its power upon the District Planning Authority u/s 38 of the Act. The appellant authority was created for a definite purpose. Its jurisdiction was limited to the area notified. When so creating, although 1974 notification was referred to, the same was only for the purpose of limiting the area of operation of the appellant authority. The principle of legislation by incorporation was applied and not the principle of legislation by reference. The difference between the two principles is well-known. Whereas in the case of the former, a further notification amending the ambit or scope of the statute would be necessary, if the statute incorporated by reference is amended, in the latter it would not be necessary. It is furthermore a well-settled principle of law that a delegatee must exercise its jurisdiction within the four-corners of its delegation. If it could not exercise its delegated power for the purpose of creation of the appellant authority or extended its jurisdiction, in our opinion, it cannot be done by amendment of a notification issued u/s 13(1) of the Act. Admittedly, the villages in question had been included by the State in its notification issued on 28.10.2005. Prior thereto, the said villages having not been included within the area of operation of the appellant authority, any action taken either by way of its intention to frame a town planning scheme or otherwise shall be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. It would render its act in relation to the said villages a nullity. It is, therefore, difficult for us to accept the submission of Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Gambhir that the notification dated 13.11.2000 subsumes in the notification dated 12.08.1977. Thus, we do not have any other option but to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court. We may, however, observe that several other contentions, as noticed hereinbefore, have been raised before us but we do not find any necessity to go thereinto. Hence, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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