1939 (12) TMI 4 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues:
Review of judgment in an Income-tax matter; Applicability of Civil Procedure Code to judgments under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act.

Analysis:
The judgment concerns an application for review of a judgment passed in an Income-tax matter. The primary issue raised is whether a review lies in this case. The first point of contention is whether the judgment of the court amounts to a decree or order or is merely a judicial expression of opinion, as argued by the applicant. The second point is the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code to such matters, which is crucial in determining the availability of the power of review under Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The applicant's counsel relies on a previous observation by the Judicial Committee, emphasizing the need for a formal decree following a High Court judgment in certain cases. It is argued that this requirement implies that the judgment should be considered a decree within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, thereby making the review provisions applicable. The interpretation hinges on whether the judgment under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act should be equated to a decree, thus necessitating the application of the Civil Procedure Code and the availability of the review process.

However, a detailed examination of the provisions of Section 66 of the Income-tax Act reveals that the High Court's role in considering references is consultative in nature. The court delivers its judgment on the question of law without issuing a decree but forwards a copy of the judgment to the concerned authority for further action. This consultative function of the High Court under Section 66 indicates that the proceedings are distinct from those governed by the Civil Procedure Code, thereby casting doubt on the applicability of the review provisions.

The judgment references previous cases, such as Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay, which clarified the appealability of such judgments under the Civil Procedure Code and the Letters Patent. The court's analysis highlights the unique nature of proceedings under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act, emphasizing the special jurisdiction exercised by the court in such matters. The conclusion drawn is that these proceedings are not subject to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, leading to the dismissal of the application for review.

In conclusion, the court upholds the preliminary objection regarding the availability of a review in this case and dismisses the application with costs. The decision rests on the understanding that the proceedings under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act operate outside the scope of the Civil Procedure Code, thereby precluding the option of review. The judgment reaffirms the distinct nature of the High Court's role in such matters and clarifies the limitations on the applicability of review provisions in this context.