1969 (4) TMI 123 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in relation to applications under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. Whether applications under s. 33C(2) should have been filed under s. 33C(1) and the validity of filing under s. 33C(2).

Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard appeals against the Central Government Labour Court's order, which held that applications under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were barred under art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if the claim exceeded three years. The Labour Court relied on a decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, which stated that applications under s. 33C(2) were governed by art. 137. However, the Supreme Court, in a previous case, Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, disagreed with this interpretation, stating that art. 137 only applies to applications to courts and not to other provisions outside the Civil Procedure Code. The Court emphasized that the Indian Limitation Act deals solely with applications to courts, and the Labour Court does not fall under this category.

Moving on to the second issue raised, the respondent argued that the applications should have been filed under s. 33C(1) instead of s. 33C(2). The Court clarified that s. 33C(1) pertains to cases where money is due to a workman under a settlement or award, while s. 33C(2) deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive money or benefits computable in monetary terms. In this case, the employees' applications were to compute holiday benefits in monetary terms, falling under s. 33C(2). Although s. 33C(2) does not specify the method of determining the amount due, the rule-making authority provided for such cases. Rule 62(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, allows for applications in Form K-3 for the determination of amounts due or benefits to be computed.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Labour Court's order that the applications were time-barred under art. 137. The Labour Court was directed to proceed with the final order in accordance with the law, and the appellants were awarded costs and one hearing fee.