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2015 (11) TMI 1426 - SC - Companies LawBuy back arrangement - collaboration for profitable implementation - Appellant contended that as his buy-back from HSIDC, was a transfer of shares from a State level financial institution to a co-promoter of the Target Company, it was exempt under Regulation 10 - Tribunal dismissed the contention stating that the exemption under Regulation 10 was only with respect to making a public announcement and does not permit the Appellant from not disclosing the transaction for the purpose of calculating the minimum offer price - whether the transaction of buy-back of shares which transpired between the Appellant and HSIDC was required to be disclosed in the public announcement dated 24.4.1999 Held that:- It is evident from a reading of the Regulations 10, 11 and 12 the buy-back transaction between the Appellant and HSIDC was incapable of triggering Regulation 10, as the said transaction was protected by Regulation 3. However, the acquisition of the entire share capital of Garg by the Appellant attracted Regulation 10 as the acquisition was in excess of 15%. Further, as this transaction was between two promoters, it did not have the protection of Regulation 3. As required under Regulation 10, the Appellant did make a public announcement, but did not disclose its buy-back transaction with HSIDC. The Appellant has vainly and incorrectly attempted to justify his act of non-disclosure by stating that the transaction with HSIDC was protected by Regulation 3, which placed it beyond the ambit of Regulation 10, 11 and 12. In our view, Regulation 3 only protects a transaction between a co-promoter and a State financial institution to the extent that, as a consequence of such transaction a public announcement will not be required to be made as provided under Regulations 10, 11 and 12. However, it does not imply that the said transaction is to be protected from the rigours of other Regulations provided for under the Act. Thus, the transaction between the Appellant and HSIDC will have to be subject to Regulations 16 and 20, and the rate at which the Appellant bought back the shares from HSIDC had to be disclosed in the public announcement. Find no force whatsoever in the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the post-dated cheques forwarded to HSIDC enclosed with letter dated 15.4.1999 were given by way of a guarantee, especially in light of the fact that the same was denied by HSIDC in its letter to SEBI dated 11.1.2001, wherein HSIDC stated that the post-dated cheques had been issued in consideration of the buy-back of shares. Cheques presented dishonoured on presentation - It has already been held beyond doubt that the post-dated cheques issued by the Appellant in favour of HSIDC were in consideration of the buy-back of the shares held by HSIDC in the Target Company. The Appellant had submitted that the cheques were post-dated because he was suffering from a liquidity crunch. In our view, the post-dated cheques amounted to a promise to pay and that promise would be fulfilled on the date mentioned on the cheque. Thus, this promise to pay amounted to a sale of shares/equity. The subsequent dishonouring of the post-dated cheque would have no bearing on the case. At the time of making the public announcement the Appellant had bought back the shares of HSIDC by making payment via the said post-dated cheques. Further, as the buy-back was in pursuance of an agreement, there was consensus ad idem. The Appellant has subsequently shirked his responsibility and has tried to slither away from honouring the agreement, which he cannot be allowed to gain from, as is established by the legal maxim commodum ex injuri su non habere debet. As per Regulation 2 Clause (1) Sub-clause (a)- ‘acquisition’ means directly or indirectly acquiring or agreeing to acquire shares or voting rights in, or control over, a Target Company. This definition clarifies that an acquisition takes place the moment the acquirer decides or agrees to acquire, irrespective of the time when the transfer stands completed in all respects. The definition explicates that the actual transfer need not be contemporaneous with the intended transfer and can be in futuro. Also the letter on which the Counsel for the Appellant had placed reliance to prove that there was no acquisition, is dated 9.12.1999, which was well after the public announcement dated 24.4.1999 where the Appellant was required to make disclosures in compliance with the Regulations. This clearly indicates, that at the date of making the public announcement the Appellant was under the impression that the acquisition has taken place.
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