1952 (12) TMI 47 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Severance of Joint Status in Hindu Coparcenary.
2. Applicability of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 (as amended in 1938) to widows whose husbands died before the Act came into force.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Severance of Joint Status in Hindu Coparcenary

The key issue was whether there was a severance of joint status between the plaintiff and his deceased brother, Dibyasingha. The plaintiff claimed that Dibyasingha died in a state of jointness, making the plaintiff the sole surviving coparcener. Both lower courts found no severance of interest, relying on evidence such as the single assessment of Chowkidari tax in the plaintiff's name, payment of rent and water-rate tax by the plaintiff, and joint execution of documents by both brothers describing them as members of a joint Hindu coparcenary.

The defense relied on two sale-deeds (Exs. B and A) executed separately by the brothers, arguing that these documents defined their shares, thus indicating severance. However, the courts rejected this argument, noting that the documents did not explicitly state an agreement to define shares or an intention to separate. The court cited the Privy Council decision in 'Harkishan Singh v. Partap Singh', which held that defining shares constitutes severance of joint status, but found that the documents in question did not meet this criterion. Therefore, the court concluded that the mere execution of documents by one coparcener does not constitute an unequivocal expression of an agreement to separate.

2. Applicability of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 (as amended in 1938)

The second issue was whether the widow (defendant 2) could claim an interest in the property under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, even though her husband died in 1934, before the Act came into force. The defense argued that the widow was entitled to her deceased husband's interest under Section 3(2) of the Act.

The court examined the provisions of Section 3, noting that the Act is prima facie prospective. The court referenced the Federal Court decision in 'Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi', which held that the Act does not apply retrospectively to widows whose husbands died before the Act came into force. The court emphasized that the Act's proper construction and operation must be determined with reference to conditions and contingencies likely to arise after its commencement.

The defense cited the Special Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in 'Radhi Bewa v. Bhagwan Shau', which held that Section 3(2) applies to widows whose husbands died before the Act, provided the joint family continued until the Act came into force. However, the court distinguished this case, noting that it did not apply to situations where the property had vested in a sole surviving coparcener before the Act commenced.

The court concluded that in cases where the husband died before the Act and the property vested in the sole surviving coparcener, the widow is not entitled to benefits under Section 3(2). The court found that the present case was not covered by the Special Bench decision, as the property had vested in the plaintiff as the sole surviving coparcener before the Act came into force.

Conclusion:
Both issues raised by the appellant failed. The court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, concluding that there was no severance of joint status between the plaintiff and Dibyasingha, and that the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, did not apply retrospectively to the widow. The appeal was dismissed with costs.