2011 (7) TMI 1379 - SC - Indian Laws

Murder - Communal violence - Conviction for offence punishable under Sections 302/149 148 324/149 and 449 of the IPC - High Court converted the judgment of conviction into acquittal - presumption of innocence and right to fair trial - HELD THAT - It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has to prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial are twin safeguards available to the accused under our criminal justice system but once the prosecution has proved its case and the evidence led by the prosecution in conjunction with the chain of events as are stated to have occurred if points irresistibly to the conclusion that accused is guilty then the Court can interfere even with the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of acquittal might be based upon misappreciation of evidence or apparent violation of settled canons of criminal jurisprudence. When the conclusions of the High Court in the background of the evidence on record are tested on the touchstone of the principles set out above the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court s judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. A Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and Anr. v. C.P. Rao 2011 (5) TMI 860 - SUPREME COURT discussed the scope of interference by this Court in an order of acquittal and while reiterating the view of a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Sanwat Singh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan 1960 (12) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT . Reference can also be usefully made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan 2007 (5) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT where this Court reiterated with approval the principles stated by the Court in earlier cases particularly Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 2007 (2) TMI 704 - SUPREME COURT Emphasizing that expressions like substantial and compelling reasons good and sufficient grounds very strong circumstances distorted conclusions glaring mistakes etc are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal the court stated that such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with the acquittal. Thus where it is possible to take only one view i.e. the prosecution evidence points to the guilt of the accused and the judgment is on the face of it perverse then the Court may interfere with an order of acquittal. In light of the above stated principles Three eye witnesses PWs. 4 5 and 7 were found to be truthful and reliable witnesses by the trial court whereas those very witnesses were held to be untrustworthy witnesses by the High Court. Satyanarain (PW 7) has also made statements which fully aid the case of the prosecution and his statement recorded on the adjourned date before the trial court i.e. 18th March 1999 which is at variance cannot be treated as gospel truth. Even if we exclude the statement of PW7 from consideration then identity of the accused is still fully established by the statements of PW3 PW4 PW5 and PW6. There is no reason for the Court to hold that PWs 4 and 5 (neighbours of the deceased) are not trustworthy. Their statements describe the occurrence in its proper course and are compelling evidence of the same. We do not find it appropriate to discard their statements as not inspiring confidence. The statement of these witnesses must be appreciated in the proper perspective. The injury on the head duly finds corroboration from the statement of the Doctor i.e. Ex.P4. It is not a case where the medical evidence does not support or corroborate the ocular evidence. Some discrepancies or some variations in minor details of the incident would not demolish the case of the prosecution unless it affects the core of the prosecution case. Unless the discrepancy in the statement of witness or the entire statement of the witness is such that it erodes the credibility of the witness himself it may not be appropriate for the Court to completely discard such evidence. The core of the prosecution case is that when the mob came PWs 4 and 5 ran to their houses locked their doors went to the roof of the houses which were adjacent to the house of the deceased and watched some members of the mob of whom they could identify a few assault the deceased. This statement clearly shows the trustworthiness of these witnesses as they have stated that there were some other persons whom they could not identify. However both these witnesses and complainant Satyanarain clearly identified the persons who had entered and assaulted the deceased persons. Though Satyanarain (PW 7) fully supported the case of the prosecution that he was also assaulted by these persons he did speak in a different voice the next day before the Court. In our considered opinion the cumulative effect of the ocular evidence and documentary evidence is that the prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Ld Counsel for the accused contend that there was no common object to commit murder - In the present case common object to commit murder has been fully proved. Second the case of the prosecution is not that the entire mob had entered the house of the deceased. Out of the mob of 50-60 persons only 7 to 10 persons had broken the door of the house and some of them had climbed the wall to enter the house of the deceased. These persons had raised the slogan maro maro and thereafter had inflicted the injuries upon the body of the deceased. It has been established that more than five persons constituted an unlawful assembly and in furtherance to their common object and intent assaulted and caused injuries to vital parts of the bodies of the deceased ultimately resulting in their death. We therefore have no hesitation in holding that there is no merit in this contention of the accused and the trial Court applied the law correctly. Therefore we find the present case a fit case for interference in the judgment of acquittal recorded by the High Court. Consequently the appeals of the State are allowed the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. We concur with the finding of guilt and the quantum of punishment awarded by the trial court.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Appreciation of evidence by the trial court and High Court.
2. False implications and contradictions in witness statements.
3. Identification of accused by witnesses.
4. Legal standards for interference with acquittal judgments.
5. Common object under Section 149 IPC.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Appreciation of Evidence by the Trial Court and High Court:
The trial court found the charges against Abdul Mannan, Afzal, and Abdul Zabbar under Sections 302/149, 148, 324/149, and 449 IPC fully established beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing them accordingly. However, the High Court acquitted the accused, noting inconsistencies in witness testimonies and concluding that the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court re-evaluated the evidence, emphasizing that the trial court had found the eye-witnesses trustworthy, while the High Court had not properly appreciated the prosecution's evidence, leading to an erroneous acquittal.

2. False Implications and Contradictions in Witness Statements:
The accused appealed on grounds of false implications and contradictions in witness statements. The High Court found the testimonies of Mahesh (PW-4), Kanhaiya Lal (PW-5), and Satya Narayan (PW-7) inconsistent and unreliable. However, the Supreme Court noted that minor discrepancies in witness statements do not necessarily undermine the core of the prosecution's case. The Court highlighted that the trial court had found the defense witnesses not credible, and the prosecution's evidence, including medical reports, supported the charges.

3. Identification of Accused by Witnesses:
The High Court questioned the identification of the accused by witnesses. Mahesh (PW-4) and Kanhaiya Lal (PW-5) identified the accused as part of the mob that attacked the deceased. Satya Narayan (PW-7) initially supported the prosecution but later showed inconsistencies. The Supreme Court found that despite some contradictions, the identification of the accused by PW-4 and PW-5 was reliable and corroborated by other evidence, including medical reports detailing the injuries inflicted.

4. Legal Standards for Interference with Acquittal Judgments:
The Supreme Court discussed the principles for interfering with acquittal judgments, emphasizing that an appellate court can review the evidence and overturn an acquittal if there are compelling reasons, such as misappreciation of evidence or violation of legal principles. The Court cited precedents, noting that the presumption of innocence is strengthened by acquittal, but if the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt, the appellate court can interfere to prevent miscarriage of justice.

5. Common Object under Section 149 IPC:
The Supreme Court addressed the common object under Section 149 IPC, noting that the accused had a common intent to commit murder, as evidenced by their actions during the incident. The Court found that more than five persons constituted an unlawful assembly, and their collective actions led to the deaths of the deceased. The Court rejected the defense's argument that there was no common object to commit murder, affirming that the trial court correctly applied the law.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the State's appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment of acquittal, and restored the trial court's judgment, finding the accused guilty and upholding the sentences. The Court directed the accused to surrender within four weeks, failing which the Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Tonk, Rajasthan, would ensure their custody to serve the remaining sentence.