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2011 (7) TMI 1379 - SC - Indian LawsMurder - Communal violence - Conviction for offence punishable under Sections 302/149, 148, 324/149 and 449 of the IPC - High Court converted the judgment of conviction into acquittal - presumption of innocence and right to fair trial - HELD THAT:- It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has to prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial are twin safeguards available to the accused under our criminal justice system but once the prosecution has proved its case and the evidence led by the prosecution, in conjunction with the chain of events as are stated to have occurred, if, points irresistibly to the conclusion that accused is guilty then the Court can interfere even with the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of acquittal might be based upon misappreciation of evidence or apparent violation of settled canons of criminal jurisprudence. When the conclusions of the High Court in the background of the evidence on record are tested on the touchstone of the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. A Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and Anr. v. C.P. Rao [2011 (5) TMI 860 - SUPREME COURT], discussed the scope of interference by this Court in an order of acquittal and while reiterating the view of a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Sanwat Singh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan [1960 (12) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT]. Reference can also be usefully made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan [2007 (5) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT], where this Court reiterated with approval the principles stated by the Court in earlier cases, particularly, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka,[2007 (2) TMI 704 - SUPREME COURT] Emphasizing that expressions like 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, the court stated that such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with the acquittal. Thus, where it is possible to take only one view i.e. the prosecution evidence points to the guilt of the accused and the judgment is on the face of it perverse, then the Court may interfere with an order of acquittal. In light of the above stated principles, Three eye witnesses PWs. 4, 5 and 7 were found to be truthful and reliable witnesses by the trial court whereas those very witnesses were held to be untrustworthy witnesses by the High Court. Satyanarain (PW 7) has also made statements which fully aid the case of the prosecution and his statement recorded on the adjourned date before the trial court i.e. 18th March, 1999 which is at variance cannot be treated as gospel truth. Even if we exclude the statement of PW7 from consideration, then identity of the accused is still fully established by the statements of PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6. There is no reason for the Court to hold that PWs 4 and 5 (neighbours of the deceased) are not trustworthy. Their statements describe the occurrence in its proper course and are compelling evidence of the same. We do not find it appropriate to discard their statements as not inspiring confidence. The statement of these witnesses must be appreciated in the proper perspective. The injury on the head duly finds corroboration from the statement of the Doctor i.e. Ex.P4. It is not a case where the medical evidence does not support or corroborate the ocular evidence. Some discrepancies or some variations in minor details of the incident would not demolish the case of the prosecution unless it affects the core of the prosecution case. Unless the discrepancy in the statement of witness or the entire statement of the witness is such that it erodes the credibility of the witness himself, it may not be appropriate for the Court to completely discard such evidence. The core of the prosecution case is that when the mob came, PWs 4 and 5 ran to their houses, locked their doors, went to the roof of the houses which were adjacent to the house of the deceased and watched some members of the mob, of whom they could identify a few, assault the deceased. This statement clearly shows the trustworthiness of these witnesses as they have stated that there were some other persons whom they could not identify. However both these witnesses and complainant Satyanarain clearly identified the persons who had entered and assaulted the deceased persons. Though Satyanarain (PW 7) fully supported the case of the prosecution that he was also assaulted by these persons, he did speak in a different voice the next day before the Court. In our considered opinion the cumulative effect of the ocular evidence and documentary evidence is that the prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Ld Counsel for the accused contend that there was no common object to commit murder - In the present case, common object to commit murder has been fully proved. Second, the case of the prosecution is not that the entire mob had entered the house of the deceased. Out of the mob of 50-60 persons only 7 to 10 persons had broken the door of the house and some of them had climbed the wall to enter the house of the deceased. These persons had raised the slogan 'maro! maro!' and thereafter had inflicted the injuries upon the body of the deceased. It has been established that more than five persons constituted an unlawful assembly and in furtherance to their common object and intent, assaulted and caused injuries to vital parts of the bodies of the deceased, ultimately resulting in their death. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that there is no merit in this contention of the accused and the trial Court applied the law correctly. Therefore, we find the present case a fit case for interference in the judgment of acquittal recorded by the High Court. Consequently, the appeals of the State are allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. We concur with the finding of guilt and the quantum of punishment awarded by the trial court.
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