2014 (4) TMI 1279 - SC - Indian Laws

Seeking a direction to the MPRTC to immediately hand over possession of the land - Seeking to grant permission to demolish the existing structure - breach of contract by MPRTC entered into with the Appellant - privity of contract - HELD THAT - The scope of judicial review is very limited in contractual matters even where one of the contracting parties is the State or an instrumentality of the State. The parameters within which power of judicial review can be exercised has been authoritatively laid down by this Court in a number of cases. At no stage the Appellant had any privity of contract with IDA. MPRTC entered into a BOT contract with the Appellant contrary to the terms and conditions of the lease which provided specifically that the land shall be used for constructing a bus stand-cum commercial complex. MPRTC had no legal right to create any further right in favour of the Appellant with regard to the receiving of the premium on the constructed units sold to third party(ies). Even otherwise the Appellant seems to be flogging a dead horse. Admittedly the possession of the proposed site was delivered to MPRTC on 22nd January 1982 - The renewal clause in the lease subsequently provides that the renewal shall be with the consent of IDA. This consent by the IDA is not a mere formality. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the cancellation of the lease by the Indore Development Authority (IDA).
2. Enforcement of the High Court's order dated 5th August 2005.
3. Jurisdiction and authority of the Chief Secretary's decision dated 4th March 2009.
4. Privity of contract between the appellant and IDA.
5. Doctrine of frustration and its applicability to the case.
6. Appropriate remedy for breach of contract and specific performance.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Cancellation of the Lease by IDA:
The lease deed between MPRTC and IDA was initially executed on 2nd November 1981, with possession handed over on 22nd January 1982. The lease was for 30 years, and IDA canceled it on 2nd November 2007 due to MPRTC's violation of lease terms by handing over possession to the RTO. This cancellation was challenged by MPRTC but not by the appellant. The High Court, in Writ Petition No. 6770 of 2007, referred the matter to the Chief Secretary, who revoked the cancellation. The appellant did not challenge this order, thus accepting the jurisdiction of the Chief Secretary.

2. Enforcement of the High Court's Order Dated 5th August 2005:
The High Court's order directed MPRTC to hand over possession to the appellant. MPRTC's SLP against this order was dismissed by the Supreme Court, but the dismissal was in limine, meaning it did not result in a merger of the High Court's judgment with the Supreme Court's order. Subsequent events, including the cancellation and reinstatement of the lease, rendered the enforcement of the 5th August 2005 order impractical. The Chief Secretary's decision and subsequent actions superseded the earlier High Court order.

3. Jurisdiction and Authority of the Chief Secretary's Decision Dated 4th March 2009:
The Chief Secretary's decision, following the High Court's directive in Writ Petition No. 6770 of 2007, addressed the cancellation of the lease and other related issues. The appellant accepted this jurisdiction by submitting a representation. The Chief Secretary's order included directions to return the land to IDA and compensate the appellant, which the appellant partially challenged. The High Court upheld the Chief Secretary's decision, noting no violation of natural justice principles.

4. Privity of Contract Between the Appellant and IDA:
The appellant had no direct contractual relationship with IDA. The contract was between MPRTC and IDA, with the appellant entering into a BOT agreement with MPRTC. The High Court observed that the appellant's claims against IDA were untenable due to the lack of privity of contract. The appellant's remedy lies in seeking damages or specific performance against MPRTC, not IDA.

5. Doctrine of Frustration and Its Applicability to the Case:
The appellant argued that the doctrine of frustration did not apply as the frustration was self-induced by MPRTC. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the lease expired by efflux of time and that MPRTC's financial difficulties and breach of lease terms justified the termination. The doctrine of frustration, as per Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, was applicable due to supervening impossibility and illegality.

6. Appropriate Remedy for Breach of Contract and Specific Performance:
The High Court directed the appellant to seek remedies through a civil suit for breach of contract. Judicial review under Article 226 is limited in contractual matters, especially where the contract's enforcement involves disputed facts. The Court emphasized that specific performance is typically not granted in writ jurisdiction, and the appellant should pursue damages or specific performance through civil litigation.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the civil appeals. The appellant's claims were directed to be pursued through appropriate civil remedies, reinforcing the principle that judicial review in contractual disputes involving state entities is limited and should prioritize public interest and adherence to legal procedures.