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2016 (10) TMI 1352 - SC - Indian LawsConstitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Domestic violence - protection of the female sex generally - what exactly is the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act? - HELD THAT:- A cursory reading of the statement of objects and reasons makes it clear that the phenomenon of domestic violence against women is widely prevalent and needs redressal. Whereas criminal law does offer some redressal, civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. The idea therefore is to provide various innovative remedies in favour of women who suffer from domestic violence, against the perpetrators of such violence - What is of great significance is that the 2005 Act is to provide for effective protection of the rights of women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The preamble also makes it clear that the reach of the Act is that violence, whether physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic, are all to be redressed by the statute. That the perpetrators and abettors of such violence can, in given situations, be women themselves, is obvious. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the result that the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in the Subramanian Swamy judgment [2014 (5) TMI 783 - SUPREME COURT], the words "adult male person" are contrary to the object of affording protection to women who have suffered from domestic violence "of any kind" - the words "adult male" before the word "person" in Section 2(q) are struck off, as these words discriminate between persons similarly situate, and far from being in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act. Having struck down these two words from the definition of "Respondent" in Section 2(q), the next question that arises is whether the rest of the Act can be implemented without the aforesaid two words. This brings us to the doctrine of severability - a doctrine well-known in constitutional law and propounded for the first time in the celebrated R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India [1957 (4) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT]. This judgment has been applied in many cases. It is not necessary to refer to the plethora of case law on the application of this judgment, except to refer to one or two judgments directly on point. An application of the severability principle would make it clear that having struck down the expression "adult male" in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, the rest of the Section is left intact and can be enforced to achieve the object of the legislation without the offending words. Under Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, while defining 'Respondent', a proviso is provided only to carve out an exception to a situation of "Respondent" not being an adult male. Once 'adult male', is struck off, the proviso has no independent existence, having been rendered otiose. Having struck down a portion of Section 2(q) on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is not deemed necessary to go into the case law cited by both sides on literal versus purposive construction, construction of penal statutes, and the correct construction of a proviso to a Section. None of this becomes necessary in view of our finding above. It is declared that the words "adult male" in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands deleted - appeal disposed off.
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