1964 (7) TMI 59 - HC - Indian Laws

Challenged the two Notification under the Land Acquisition Act - delegation of authority - expression public purpose - Applicability of section 17 - Constitutional validity of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act - Word arable . HELD THAT - Having regard to the correct meaning of the word arable we do not think the petitioner s lands in the present case were arable lands. That they were not waste lands is not disputed. On the interpretation which we have given to the word arable and upon the statement of the Commissioner himself that these are agricultural lands therefore it must be held that the petitioner s lands could not be taken under Section 17(1). It seems to us that the law in its wisdom deliberately excluded cultivated land from being thus taken under the urgency provisions. The intention of the law is clear as indicated in the judgment in Special Civil Appln No. 93 of 1962 (Bom) that where a person has expended time money and labour in tilling the soil and in cultivating crops the land should not be taken except under the normal procedure of the Land Acquisition Act. That interpretation which is consonant with the normal meaning of the words used is an interpretation which in our opinion is also just. We take the view that the lands of the petitioner were not arable lands and could not be taken under Section 17(1) all the notifications issued in this case ought not to be held bad but only those notifications which were issued from the point where the authorities went wrong. The effect of holding that section 17(1) did not apply to the petitioner s lands would be that Section 5-A would not be excluded and therefore the petitioner would be entitled to urge and be heard upon any objections to the acquisition which he may choose to take. It was urged that therefore the notification under Section 6 and the subsequent notification under Section 9 should alone be held bad but not the notification under Section 4. On behalf of the petitioner however Mr. Bhatt contended that section 4 is so inextricably inter-mingled with the other provisions of the Act that we cannot set aside only the notifications under Sections 6 and 9. He pointed out that under Sections 6 and 9. He pointed out that under Section 5-A he was entitled to show by taking objections that the land was really not needed for a public purpose at all or that other land was available or that only a part of the land ought to be taken in which case even the notification under Section 4 would have to be held bad and unnecessary. In the result we allow the petition and quash the notifications issued by the first respondent under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. We also quash the notifications so far as Section 17 has been applied in this case and hold that the possession of the petitioner s land taken under those notifications under Section 17 was illegal and must be restored to the petitioner. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner. The order restoring possession is at the request of Mr. Setalvad for the State stayed upto 1st October 1964. Petition allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Delegation of State Government's power to acquire land.
2. Constitutional validity of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
3. Public purpose of the land acquisition.
4. Conclusiveness of the declaration under Section 6.
5. Acquisition for a company and compliance with Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act.
6. Classification of the petitioner's lands as waste or arable.
7. Subjective vs. objective opinion under Section 17.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Delegation of State Government's Power to Acquire Land:
The petitioner challenged the delegation of the State Government's power to the Commissioner under the Land Acquisition Act, arguing that it was an excessive delegation of legislative power. The court examined the provisions of the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act, 1957, which allowed the State Government to confer powers on the Commissioner through notifications. The court held that the delegation was valid, as it did not amount to an essential legislative function but was merely an administrative convenience. The court referred to principles laid down in previous cases, including the Delhi Laws Act case and Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, concluding that the delegation did not involve any essential change in policy.

2. Constitutional Validity of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act:
The petitioner argued that Sections 4 and 6, read with the amendment in Section 3(f)(2), infringed Articles 14, 19, and 31 of the Constitution. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Somawanti v. State of Punjab, which upheld the validity of the Land Acquisition Act against similar challenges. The court also noted that Article 19 was not applicable due to the proclamation of emergency. The court held that the provisions did not infringe Article 31, as the acquisition was for a public purpose, and the definition of "public purpose" in Section 3(f)(2) was valid.

3. Public Purpose of the Land Acquisition:
The petitioner contended that the acquisition was not for a public purpose but for a company, the Maharashtra State Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC). The court examined the notifications and affidavits, concluding that the purpose of acquiring the land was for developing an industrial area, which constituted a public purpose. The court held that the acquisition was for a public purpose, as it aimed to ensure orderly and planned development of industries, relieving congestion, and providing proper amenities.

4. Conclusiveness of the Declaration Under Section 6:
The court held that the declaration under Section 6 was not conclusive if it was a colorable exercise of power. The court found that the Commissioner's declaration was based on incorrect premises and without proper application of mind, as he was misinformed about the source of funds for the acquisition. The court held that the declaration was invalid, as the conditions of the proviso to Section 6 were not fulfilled.

5. Acquisition for a Company and Compliance with Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act:
The court found that the acquisition was for the MIDC, a company, and the compensation was to be paid from its funds. The court held that the acquisition should have followed the procedure under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, which was not done. Therefore, the acquisition was invalid.

6. Classification of the Petitioner's Lands as Waste or Arable:
The petitioner argued that his lands were not waste or arable but fit for industrial and building purposes. The court examined the evidence, including the petitioner's plans to shift his factory and the approval from the Government of India. The court held that the lands were not waste or arable, as they were within municipal limits and suitable for industrial use. The court found that the classification of the lands as waste or arable was incorrect and showed non-application of mind by the Commissioner.

7. Subjective vs. Objective Opinion Under Section 17:
The court held that the conditions under Section 17(1) must be objectively proved and were not left to the subjective satisfaction of the authority. The court found that the Commissioner's opinion that the lands were waste or arable was not based on proper application of mind and was incorrect. The court held that the urgency clause was wrongly applied, and the petitioner was deprived of his right to object under Section 5-A.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the application of Section 17. The court ordered the restoration of possession of the petitioner's land, finding the acquisition illegal and invalid. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the petitioner, with a stay on the order restoring possession until 1st October 1964.