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2017 (9) TMI 1997 - HC - Indian LawsLevy of octroi on natural gas imported by the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission within the municipal limits of the first respondent - whether natural gas was covered by unamended Entry 22(a)? - HELD THAT:- Even without amending Entry 22(a), the Municipal Corporation had power to levy octroi on natural gas. Now we turn to the challenge to the provisions of the impugned Ordinance and the impugned Act. We have already quoted the relevant part of the impugned amendment. The impugned amendment amends clause (a) of Entry 22 by substituting the words “petroleum products” by the words “petroleum products including natural gas and liquified petroleum gas”. It seeks to make the said amendment retrospective by specifically providing that the words “shall be and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from 1st day of April 1978”. Thus, the amendment seeks to clarify that the natural gas was always included in the petroleum products covered by Entry 22(a). In the Statement of objects and reasons appended to the impugned amendment, it is stated that natural gas was always implicitly included in Entry 22(a) as it is a part of the petroleum products. It further records that doubts were expressed whether natural gas and liquified gas were included in petroleum products. Therefore, an amendment is sought to be made though natural gas was already included and it is made retrospectively with effect from 1st April 1978 when the Municipal Corporation started levying octroi on natural gas or liquified gas products. The clear position of law is that every statute is presumed prima facie prospective unless expressly or by necessary implication it is given retrospective operation. But such presumption is not applicable to the declaratory or explanatory statues. Such statutes are made to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the provision or term or expression in the enactment. It is well settled that if the statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law, its retrospective operation is generally intended and is always open for the legislature to make enactments having retrospective operation - Law is very well settled that in case of a taxing statute, the powers of the legislature are different in the sense that more latitude is available to the legislature in the matter of fiscal statutes. Rule 25 is applicable when the importer after following the procedure of the said Rules either fails to pay octroi or the octroi paid is short or when such octroi after having been paid has been erroneously refunded due to inadvertence, error, collusion etc. In such cases, Rule 25 provides that the person primarily liable to pay such tax or difference of tax shall pay the amount of tax or deficiency on receipt of a demand issued within three months of the date of the import or payment of tax as the case may be. The present case is of complete evasion of payment of octroi. It is not the case of the petitioner that the petitioner followed procedure of filling in forms and claiming that octroi was not leviable on natural gas. There is no provision under the said Act which provides for a period of limitation or outer limit within which octroi could be levied or collected from the date of its import. Rule 25 is merely an enabling provision which enables the Municipal Corporation to take steps for recovery of octroi in the contingencies which are covered by the said Rule. By no stretch of imagination Rule 25 can be interpreted to mean that in a case of a person who evades octroi by clandestinely importing articles subject to octroi and who fails to follow the procedure laid down by the Octroi Rules is liable to pay octroi only within a period of three months from the date of import of goods and, therefore, after expiry of the said period of three months, the Municipal Corporation is powerless to take steps for recovery of octroi from the person who has evaded payment of octroi. This petition filed in the year 1989 was admitted and interim relief was granted. Thereafter this petition was dismissed and the said order of dismissal was set aside by the Apex Court. Moreover, we are dealing with a public sector undertaking which was earlier a Commission established under a central statute. Though we are not inclined to entertain this petition on merits, it is not a case where a direction can be issued to the petitioner to pay interest - Petition dismissed.
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