The principal legal question addressed by the Court is the nature of the transaction through which mobile phone connections are provided: whether it constitutes a sale, a service, or a composite of both. This determination is crucial because it governs which legislative authority-State or Union-has the competence to levy tax on such transactions under the Constitution. Specifically, if the transaction is a sale, States can impose sales tax under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. If it is a service, only the Union Government can levy service tax under Entry 97 (or Entry 92C after 2003) of List I. If the transaction has characteristics of both sale and service, the issue arises whether both authorities can levy tax concurrently or if exclusivity applies.
The service providers contend that the transaction is purely a service and that States lack legislative competence to impose sales tax. They argue that the transaction involves no transfer of goods or legal rights to use goods, as prohibited under their licenses granted by the Telegraph Act, 1885. The Union Government supports this position. Conversely, the States assert that the transaction amounts to a deemed sale under Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution, thus enabling them to levy sales tax.
Earlier High Court decisions were divided: Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab & Haryana High Courts held against sales tax applicability, while the Kerala High Court upheld sales tax on activation charges as part of the sale price of SIM cards. The Supreme Court had previously overruled the former High Courts in State of U.P. v. Union of India (2003), but the present batch of appeals and petitions called for a larger Bench to reconsider the issues.
A preliminary objection by the States invoking res judicata based on the earlier U.P. decision was rejected. The Court held that res judicata does not bar reconsideration of the issue in subsequent assessment years, especially when the petitioners challenge the precedential value rather than the finality of the earlier decision. The Court distinguished between res judicata and the binding precedential effect of Supreme Court decisions, emphasizing that subsequent Benches of superior strength may overrule earlier decisions.
On the merits, the Court examined the nature of the transaction, the legal framework, and relevant precedents. The key constitutional provision is Article 366(29A), introduced by the 46th Amendment, which defines "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" to include certain deemed sales, such as transfer of the right to use goods. The Court traced the historical development of this provision, noting that prior to the amendment, composite contracts involving goods and services were not subject to sales tax unless the sale element was distinct and dominant, as per the dominant nature test established in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co.
The Court held that the 46th Amendment created specific fictions of deemed sales in defined categories-works contracts, hire purchase, catering contracts, etc.-but did not broadly alter the meaning of "goods" or permit arbitrary splitting of composite transactions. The dominant nature test continues to apply to transactions not covered by Article 366(29A). The Court emphasized that the word "goods" retains its established legal meaning, including tangible movable property and certain incorporeal rights, provided they satisfy attributes such as utility, capability of being bought and sold, and capacity for transfer, delivery, and possession.
Applying these principles to telecommunication, the Court analyzed whether electromagnetic waves or radio frequencies constitute "goods." It concluded that electromagnetic waves are merely the medium of communication, not goods themselves, as they are intangible, non-deliverable, non-storable, and not marketable. The signals transmitted are generated by subscribers and do not involve transfer of goods. The Court rejected the States' contention that the entire telephone system, including wiring and exchanges, constitutes goods, distinguishing prior electricity cases where electrical energy was held to be goods. The Court found the analogy inapposite because telecommunication involves transmission of messages, not transfer of physical goods or energy as goods.
The Court further held that for a transfer of the right to use goods under Article 366(29A)(d), goods must be available and deliverable at the time of transfer. The mere provision of access or telephone connection does not amount to transfer of possession or control over goods. The license conditions under the Telegraph Act prohibit transfer or assignment of rights, reinforcing that the transaction is a service. The Court rejected reliance on the earlier decision in State of U.P. v. Union of India to the extent it held that telephone connections and accessories constituted goods, finding that decision erroneous on this point.
Regarding SIM cards, the Court recognized that whether they are goods subject to sales tax depends on the factual question of whether they are sold to subscribers or merely provided as part of the service. The Kerala High Court's decision to include activation charges in the sale price of SIM cards was found to be premature and erroneous in applying the aspect theory to value inclusion. The Court remanded this issue for determination by the assessing authorities, emphasizing that if SIM cards are merely incidental to service, they are not taxable as goods.
The Court addressed the aspect theory, which allows different aspects of a transaction to be taxed by different authorities if within their legislative competence. It held that while the theory permits overlapping taxation of distinct aspects, it does not authorize States to include service value in the sale price or vice versa. The Court stressed the need for maintaining exclusivity and mutual respect between State and Union taxing powers under Articles 246 and 286.
On the question of inter-state sales, given the finding that electromagnetic waves are not goods, the Court found the issue academic and left it unanswered.
The Court concluded that telecommunication services are essentially services, not sales of goods, except for tangible goods such as handsets and possibly SIM cards if sold separately. States may tax such goods but cannot levy sales tax on the service component or on deemed sales not covered by Article 366(29A). The Union Government alone has competence to levy service tax on telecommunication services. The Court allowed the appeals of service providers, set aside contrary decisions, and remanded issues concerning SIM cards to the assessing authorities.
The concurring opinion reaffirmed these conclusions, emphasizing the attributes necessary for a transfer of the right to use goods-availability of goods for delivery, consensus on identity of goods, legal right to use, exclusivity of such right, and prohibition of multiple transfers. It found these absent in telecommunication service contracts. The concurring Judge underscored the integrity of the license under the Telegraph Act, which prohibits transfer or assignment, and held that the transaction is a composite service contract not amenable to disintegration into sale and service for taxation purposes.
In sum, the Court established that:
- Electromagnetic waves and radio frequencies are not "goods" for sales tax purposes.
- The provision of telecommunication services does not involve transfer of the right to use goods as contemplated by Article 366(29A)(d).
- The transaction is predominantly a service contract, with any sale element limited to tangible goods like handsets or possibly SIM cards.
- States cannot levy sales tax on the service component of telecommunication; only the Union can levy service tax.
- The aspect theory does not permit States to include service value in sale valuation or vice versa.
- Earlier decisions holding telephone connections and accessories as goods are overruled to the extent inconsistent.
- Issues relating to SIM cards require factual determination and are remanded.
- The principle of res judicata does not preclude reconsideration of the issue in subsequent assessment years or by a Larger Bench.
- The dominant nature test continues to apply to composite contracts except where Article 366(29A) creates specific deemed sales.
This judgment clarifies the constitutional demarcation between State and Union taxing powers in the context of telecommunication, emphasizing the service nature of telecommunications and limiting State sales tax to tangible goods sold separately.