2022 (3) TMI 1582 - HC - Indian Laws

Suit for mandatory and permanent injunction as also for damages for defamation - HELD THAT - The Delhi Government through the plaintiff has kept the purchase and maintenance orders on hold stating no reason. Hence it is reasonable to infer that the Committee report and the CBI inquiry may have had some effect on this decision of the Government. It would no doubt be upon the defendant No. 1 to actually prove justification during trial. But on the material placed on the record there is nothing on which basis the tweets can be treated as blatant lies and hence defamatory. In Tata Sons Limited Vs. Greenpeace International Anr 2011 2011 (1) TMI 1587 - DELHI HIGH COURT a Coordinate Bench of this Court concluded that wider viewership or a degree of permanence characteristic of publication on the internet would not change the essential fact that it too is but a medium of expression and called for no different standards for grant of interlocutory injunction . This Court does not find any reason to take a different view. On an assessment on the cardinal principles for grant of interim relief i.e. existence of a prima-facie case balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury no case for grant of interim injunction to restrain the defendant No. 1 from tweeting/publishing his views or to take down or archive the existing tweets is made-out. Application dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Application for ex-parte ad-interim injunction against the defendants.
2. Application for amendment of the written statement by defendant No. 1.
3. Allegations of defamation and the right to freedom of speech.
4. Procedural objections regarding the verification of the written statement.
5. Balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Application for Ex-Parte Ad-Interim Injunction:
The plaintiff sought an ex-parte ad-interim injunction to restrain defendant No. 1 from posting defamatory content on social media and to take down existing defamatory posts. The plaintiff claimed that tweets by defendant No. 1 were defamatory, alleging corruption in the procurement of low-floor buses. The tweets were claimed to have caused irreparable damage to the plaintiff's reputation.

2. Application for Amendment of the Written Statement:
Defendant No. 1 filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the verification of the written statement. The plaintiff argued that the improper verification was intentional to avoid the rigors of Section 340 Cr.P.C. The court held that procedural defects in verification are curable and granted defendant No. 1 an opportunity to file the correct verification.

3. Allegations of Defamation and Right to Freedom of Speech:
The court examined the balance between the right to reputation and freedom of speech. It was noted that both the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are public figures. The court referenced the Supreme Court's judgment in R. Rajagopal v. State of TN, which outlines the principles of defamation vis-a-vis freedom of speech. The court emphasized that public figures must endure greater scrutiny and criticism. The tweets in question were related to the plaintiff's public duties and not his private life. The court found that the tweets were not per se defamatory, as they were based on public records and ongoing inquiries.

4. Procedural Objections Regarding Verification:
The plaintiff objected to the verification clause of the written statement, claiming it did not conform to the Delhi High Court Rules. The court noted that procedural defects in verification are curable and allowed defendant No. 1 to amend the verification. The court cited precedents to support this view, emphasizing that procedural defects should not defeat substantive justice.

5. Balance Between Right to Reputation and Freedom of Expression:
The court discussed the need to balance the plaintiff's right to reputation with the defendant's right to freedom of expression. The court referenced several judgments, including Khushwant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi, which held that pre-publication injunctions are generally not granted to prevent defamation. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case for an interim injunction, as the tweets were based on public records and ongoing inquiries. The court emphasized that public figures must tolerate criticism and scrutiny, and the plaintiff's remedy lies in seeking damages, not an injunction.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the application for an ex-parte ad-interim injunction, allowing defendant No. 1 to continue posting on social media. The court granted defendant No. 1 two weeks to file the proper verification of the written statement. The court emphasized that the decision was a prima facie view and would not affect the final determination of the case after trial. The matter was listed for framing of issues on 12th July 2022.