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2020 (3) TMI 906 - SC - Indian LawsTermination of tenancy - Section 3 of West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976 - HELD THAT:- Normally, the rights of the lessor and the lessee and the incidence of tenancy are governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The provision relating to termination of tenancy in case of breach of the conditions of the lease and recovery of possession from the lessee under the Transfer of Property Act is very time-consuming. Even, the execution of decree for possession is a complicated and time-consuming process. In order to avoid all these hurdles and to expedite the recovery of possession, the Legislature has enacted the Act. The preamble of the Act makes it clear that it has been enacted to provide for regulation of certain incidences of tenancy in relation to government premises in West Bengal and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto - In the present case, the premises in question are not owned by the government. It is owned by the appellant-Corporation, which is a government company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Whether the Corporation can be regarded as a “Government undertaking” so as to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Act in respect of the premises held by it? - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted position that the Corporation is registered under the Companies Act, 1956. The Corporation is under the administrative control of the State Government and almost all the shares of the Corporation, are held by the State Government, apart from a few shares which are held by IAS officers in their official capacity. It owes its status as a body corporate to the Companies Act enacted by the Parliament - the Appellant company is a “Government undertaking” as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act. Whether the premises owned by the Corporation and let out to respondent No.1 are government premises within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act? - HELD THAT:- When a seat in a room of a Government premises is let out to a tenant, certainly it will be a Government premises. Again, if a seat in a room is let out together with the gardens; grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to a seat in a room, such tenancy will be of a “Government premises”. When neither a building nor a part of the building nor a hut nor a part of the hut nor a seat in a room is let out to a tenant but only bare land is let out to a tenant, can such tenancy be regarded as relating to a “Government premises” to attract the provisions of the Act? - HELD THAT:- The expression “includes” is used in two places of the definition of “premises” in Section 2(c) and the expression “includes” which was used for the second time in the said definition without any doubt was included to expand the ambit of “Government premises” so as to attract the provisions of the said Act. The expression “appurtenant to it” carries special significance. We cannot read the definition of “premises” bereft of the expression “appurtenant to it”. The expression “appurtenant” in the context means ‘relating to’, ‘usually enjoyed’, ‘occupied with’ or ‘adjoining’. Therefore, if a garden, ground, or an outhouse is let out along with building or hut or a seat in a room, such a garden, ground or an outhouse becomes part of the “premises”. However, bare land has not been independently included in the definition of “premises” - there are no hesitation to hold that if bare land is let out by the government and/or the government undertaking to its tenant, the incidence of such tenancy cannot be governed by the provisions of the Act and as such a tenant cannot be evicted by taking aid of the provisions of the Act. When the eviction proceedings were initiated, admittedly, the land in question did not contain any structures. If the bare land is let out by the government undertaking and it continues to be a bare land as on the date of initiation of eviction proceedings, the incidence of such tenancy cannot be governed by the provisions of the Act and such a tenant cannot be evicted by taking aid of the provisions of the Act. The material date is the date of initiation of the eviction proceedings. Had respondent No.1 put up the construction on the plots of land leased to it, and if the eviction is sought under Section 3 of the Act for violation of some other clauses of the lease deed or upon satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) of Section 3, the proceedings would have been maintainable. The eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against respondent No.1 under the Act was without jurisdiction - Appeal dismissed.
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