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2020 (6) TMI 25 - AT - Income TaxPenalty u/s 271(1)(c) - unexplained cash credit - HELD THAT:- In response to a specific question from the bench, learned Departmental Representative could not show us any specific initiation of penalty proceedings by the CIT(A). It is only elementary that unless the penalty proceedings are specifically initiated in respect of an addition, the penalty cannot be imposed. As no such addition was made by the Assessing Officer, there could not have any occasion to initiate the penalty in respect of this addition Addition was made by the CIT(A), who has himself termed it as “enhancement”, and there was no specific initiation of penalty by the CIT(A). In the absence of specific satisfaction recorded by the CIT(A) that the penalty is required to be initiated in respect of the related addition in our considered view, the impugned penalty is devoid of a legally sustainable foundation. We, therefore, deem it fit and proper to delete the impugned penalty. The assessee gets the relief accordingly. Pronouncement of order after the expiry of 90 days from the date of conclusion of hearing - Covid 19 epidemic - world wide lockdown - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words “ordinarily”, in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case.
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