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2022 (6) TMI 216 - AT - CustomsSeeking provisional release of seized goods - functus officio in the order impugned in the appeal - accountability in personam - section 110A of Customs Act, 1962 - import of ‘betel nut product known as “supari” - Classification of goods - Prohibited goods or not - HELD THAT:- The applicability of a decision of constitutional courts to the facts of a particular dispute is a matter be considered by the quasi-judicial authority. However, discarding of binding precedent is contrary to judicial discipline which the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of in Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd [1991 (9) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT]. In the circumstances in which the cited decisions were found to be unreliable by the customs authorities, we must advise that these guidelines and guardrails, distinguishing tax administrators from brigands and highwaymen, must surely adorn the walls of every chamber in which the hallowed authority to adjudicate is exercised to immunize themselves of any inclination to delude themselves into taking the law into their hands even in face of superior wisdom. The ground of ‘unfit for human consumption’ is, as admitted by the Principal Commissioner of Customs, no longer existent as far as proceedings initiated against the appellant is concerned. As we have premised supra, the issue before us is simple enough: the extent to which the provisions of section 110A of Customs Act, 1962 are intended by law for denying an importer access to his goods pending a dispute on classification that may have import policy ramifications. Classification does not, of itself, measure the gravity of intent of importer as it is the arena within which the rules of engagement between customs authorities, in any country or across time, and importers; every misclassification may not have been with deliberate intent and that is for the adjudicating authority to evaluate before allowing or denying provisional release. It is from the acknowledgement of such obligation to evaluate that section 110A of Customs Act, 1962 was amended to accord co-terminus jurisdiction under section 124 of Customs Act, 1962 and section 110A of Customs Act, 1962. In the present instance, the Principal Commissioner of Customs has sought to distance himself from that obligation by pleading lack of propriety engendered from the possibility of binding over the ‘real adjudication authority’ who, however, did not have appear to have any scruples in ‘snatching’ a process from the Principal Commissioner of Customs; such noble tolerance of assertiveness does not, however, ennoble the omission to consider the issue remanded to him in accordance with intendment of section 110A of Customs Act, 1962. There are no reason to believe that another remand would prompt a less apathetic response to binding precedent. This is a classification dispute and, being a classification dispute, denial of provisional release would be disproportionate detriment. The appellant is a regular importer and differential duty, if any, arising upon conclusion of proceedings should be recoverable without difficulty. Breach of policy prohibition, should that be determined, is also rectifiable for such is the authority to relax vested in the Director General of Foreign Trade and, hence, not warranting denial of provisional release. In the circumstances the execution of bond to the extent of three times the differential duty is considered suffice for safeguard of revenue. The application for implementation of the order is disposed off in view of grant of provisional release on grounds of attempt to evade the order of the Tribunal without recourse to appellate challenge of it.
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