2007 (12) TMI 553 - AT - FEMA

Summary

Issues:
1. Delay in filing the appeal after the adjudication order dated 28-3-2006.
2. Interpretation of the procedural aspects under FER Act, 1973 and FEMA, 1999.
3. Application of section 49(4) of FEMA, 1999 to the appeal.
4. Applicability of section 52(2) of FER Act, 1973 regarding the time limit for filing an appeal.

Detailed Analysis:
1. The appeal was filed against an adjudication order dated 28-3-2006, with a delay of about 145 days. The appellant argued that the delay should be governed by FEMA, 1999, which allows discretionary power to entertain an appeal after the expiry of 45 days. However, the Tribunal found that the FER Act, 1973 is a self-contained code with specific procedural provisions. The Tribunal noted that FEMA, 1999 saved the provisions of the repealed FER Act, 1973, and as such, the appeal had to be decided under the provisions of FER Act, 1973.

2. The Tribunal emphasized that when a law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action began, unless the new statute shows an intention to vary such rights. The Tribunal referred to a Supreme Court decision that highlighted the principle that the re-enactment of a law is a re-affirmation of the old law unless there is a clear legislative intention to the contrary.

3. The Tribunal analyzed section 49(4) of FEMA, 1999, which states that all offenses committed under the repealed Act shall continue to be governed by the provisions of the repealed Act. In this case, since the adjudication order was passed under FER Act, 1973, the appeal had to be governed by the provisions of the repealed Act read with FEMA, 1999. The Tribunal concluded that the appeal had to be decided under the law proper, which is the FER Act, 1973.

4. Regarding the time limit for filing an appeal under FER Act, 1973, the Tribunal referred to section 52(2) which prescribes a 90-day outer limit for filing an appeal. The Tribunal noted that the appeal in question was filed after 90 days from the date of the impugned order, and as the Tribunal is bound by statutory provisions, the delay could not be condoned. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed based on the legislative mandate and clear language of the law.

In conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal due to the delay in filing it beyond the statutory time limit, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural provisions under the relevant Acts and the principle of continuity in legal rights and liabilities during statutory changes.