2025 (3) TMI 1479 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay of 1537 days in filing the Second Appeal under Section 51 of the Limitation Act 1963 - sufficient cause for delay or not - HELD THAT - In the present case the filing of the Review Petition before the First Appellate Court was with a delay of two years and four months and the Second Appeal before the High Court was delayed by about a year from the date of the dismissal of the Review Petition i.e. 30.09.2019. Pausing for a moment it is necessary to indicate that in the present case the dispute over title of a land is not between private parties but rather between the private party and the State. Moreover when the land in question was taken possession of by the State and allotted for public purpose to the Youth Welfare Department and the Collectorate and has continued in the possession of the State the claim of the State that it is government land cannot be summarily discarded. The delay of 1537 days reckoned from 01.10.2015 i.e. when the First Appellate Court decreed the suit includes two years and four months delay in filing a Review Petition (which was itself dismissed on the ground of delay by the First Appellate Court) and of about a year thereafter for filing the Second Appeal before the High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case which at the cost of repetition relate to land claimed by the State as government land and in its possession persuades to not interfere with the Impugned Order. Relevantly initially the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court which decision was reversed by the First Appellate Court. The Second Appeal deserves to be heard contested and decided on merits. However a note of caution is sounded to the respondent to exhibit promptitude in like matters henceforth and in futuro failing which the Court may not be as liberal. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this appeal are:

(a) Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 1537 days in filing the Second Appeal under Section 51 of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly when the delay included a two-year and four-month delay in filing a Review Petition which was itself dismissed on the ground of delay.

(b) What constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay, especially when the delay is caused by a State respondent, and how the principles of due diligence, negligence, and the impact of COVID-19 pandemic are to be balanced.

(c) Whether the State should be granted any special indulgence or a different yardstick in condoning delay as opposed to private litigants.

(d) The extent to which the Court should adopt a liberal approach to condonation of delay in appeals involving substantial questions of title over government land, and whether the matter deserves to be adjudicated on merits despite procedural delays.

(e) The appropriate exercise of discretion in condoning delay in the context of balancing the interests of justice, including the rights of the parties and public interest in government land disputes.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (a): Justification for condoning delay in filing the Second Appeal

Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 51 of the Limitation Act, 1963, allows condonation of delay if the appellant satisfies the Court that there was 'sufficient cause' for not filing within the prescribed period. The Court referred to precedents such as Sheo Raj Singh v Union of India (2023), State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish Chand Shivhare (2022), and Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector (2024), which emphasize that the State is not entitled to a different yardstick but courts may adopt a liberal approach where a plausible cause for delay is shown.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court acknowledged that the delay included a significant period consumed in filing a Review Petition (two years and four months) which was dismissed on grounds of delay, and an additional delay of about one year before filing the Second Appeal. The Court noted that the State's explanation included the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor for delay post dismissal of the Review Petition. The Court recognized that while the State must act with due diligence, the merits of the case involving government land warranted adjudication rather than dismissal on technical grounds.

Key evidence and findings: The record showed that the appellant had filed an execution case to take possession of the land, implying non-possession, and the land was allotted for public purposes by the State. The delay was partly due to procedural steps taken by the State and partly due to pandemic-related constraints.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principle that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause but also emphasized that merits should not be scuttled merely on limitation grounds, especially in cases involving public land and State interests. The Court found the explanation for delay not entirely negligent or lacking due diligence.

Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant argued that the delay was caused by negligence and lack of vigilance, especially since the cause of action arose before the pandemic. The respondent argued that the delay was unintentional and justified by procedural and pandemic-related reasons. The Court balanced these views, noting the State's obligation for promptitude but also the need to adjudicate the substantive rights involved.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the High Court's condonation of delay, finding sufficient cause in the peculiar facts and circumstances, including the nature of the dispute and the State's possession of the land.

Issue (b): Interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and due diligence in condonation of delay

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court relied on established principles that 'sufficient cause' requires absence of negligence and exercise of due diligence. The Court reviewed judgments including State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish Chand Shivhare and Pathapati Subba Reddy, which caution against condoning delay caused by lackadaisical or negligent conduct, even by the State. The Court also referred to Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of Maharashtra (1974), which emphasized discretion and case-specific analysis in condoning delay.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court reiterated that all parties, including the State, must act with due diligence and promptitude. However, it also recognized that the rule against delay is a rule of practice and discretion, not an inviolable rule of law. The Court emphasized that delay should not bar adjudication on merits where fundamental rights or substantial justice are at stake.

Key evidence and findings: The respondent's delay was partly explained by the time consumed in filing the Review Petition and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court found no deliberate laches or gross negligence on the part of the State.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied a balanced approach, acknowledging the State's duty to act diligently but also the need to adopt a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' in light of the circumstances and the nature of the dispute.

Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant's contention that COVID-19 should not excuse delay was weighed against the respondent's explanation of pandemic-related constraints and procedural delays. The Court found the State's explanation plausible and not a mere excuse.

Conclusion: The Court held that 'sufficient cause' was established, warranting condonation of delay, but cautioned the State to exercise greater promptitude in future.

Issue (c): Whether the State is entitled to any special indulgence in condoning delay

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court considered the principle that the law of limitation binds the Government as well as private parties (State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish Chand Shivhare). However, courts may adopt a liberal approach in condoning delay where the State is involved, especially in public interest matters, as observed in Sheo Raj Singh and State of West Bengal v Administrator, Howrah Municipality.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court acknowledged that while the State is not entitled to a different yardstick, the impersonal nature of State functioning and public interest in government land disputes justify a liberal approach. The Court emphasized that liberal approach does not mean condoning delay caused by negligence or lack of due diligence.

Key evidence and findings: The State's delay was partly due to procedural complexities and pandemic-related issues, not deliberate negligence.

Application of law to facts: The Court balanced the need for promptness with the public interest in adjudicating government land disputes on merits.

Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant urged strict adherence to limitation laws without special indulgence to the State, while the respondent highlighted the need for liberal construction given the nature of the dispute.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the principle of no special yardstick but accepted a liberal approach in the present case.

Issue (d): Whether the matter deserves adjudication on merits despite procedural delays

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court referred to the principle from Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Collector (LA) v Katiji that justice on merits is to be preferred over technical dismissal on limitation grounds. The Court also cited A B Govardhan v P Ragothaman, emphasizing substantial justice and the discretion to condone delay to prevent denial of substantive rights.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the dispute involves valuable government land, possession by the State for public purposes, and conflicting claims that require adjudication on merits. The Court noted that the Trial Court had dismissed the suit, but the First Appellate Court reversed that decision, indicating a complex factual matrix.

Key evidence and findings: The appellant's claim rested on allotment orders and rectification of revenue records, while the State claimed the land as government property reserved for public departments. The appellant's execution case for possession demonstrated admitted non-possession.

Application of law to facts: The Court concluded that the matter involves substantial questions of title and possession that merit adjudication rather than dismissal on procedural grounds.

Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant sought dismissal of the appeal on limitation grounds, while the respondent urged hearing on merits to resolve the dispute.

Conclusion: The Court held that the Second Appeal deserves to be heard and decided on merits.

Issue (e): Exercise of discretion and imposition of costs

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court exercised its discretion to condone delay subject to costs, as a measure to offset hardship to the appellant and to ensure promptness in future proceedings.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the respondent to be paid to the appellant within one month, failing which the Second Appeal would be dismissed. The Court also directed the High Court to take up the appeal on priority and dispose of it expeditiously.

Key evidence and findings: The costs were imposed to balance the interests of justice and to compensate the appellant for the delay in pursuing legal remedies.

Application of law to facts: The discretion to impose costs was exercised to ensure fairness and to deter future delays.

Treatment of competing arguments: No specific competing arguments on costs were recorded.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the Impugned Order with costs and directions for expeditious disposal.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"The rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts."

"The law of limitation binds everybody including the Government. The usual explanation of red tapism, pushing of files and the rigmarole of procedures cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The Government Departments are under an obligation to exercise due diligence to ensure that their right to initiate legal proceedings is not extinguished by operation of the law of limitation."

"When consideration of an appeal on merits is pitted against the rejection of a meritorious claim on the technical ground of the bar of limitation, the Courts lean towards consideration on merits by adopting a liberal approach towards 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay."

"The real test for sound exercise of discretion ... is whether by reason of delay there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay."

"In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, which relate to land claimed by the State as government land and in its possession, the delay of 1537 days ... persuade us to not interfere with the Impugned Order."

"The Second Appeal deserves to be heard, contested and decided on merits. However, a note of caution is sounded to the respondent to exhibit promptitude in like matters henceforth and in futuro, failing which the Court may not be as liberal."

Final determinations:

- The delay in filing the Second Appeal was condoned as 'sufficient cause' was established in the facts and circumstances of the case.

- The State is not entitled to a different yardstick but courts may adopt a liberal approach in condoning delay where justified.

- The matter involves substantial questions of title over government land and deserves adjudication on merits.

- The appellant is entitled to costs of Rs. 50,000 from the respondent, payable within one month, failing which the Second Appeal shall be dismissed.

- The High Court is directed to prioritize and expeditiously dispose of the Second Appeal.