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2023 (9) TMI 1695 - HC - Indian LawsMaintainability of petition - appealability of remand order - passing of a final order pursuant to the remand - bar either to the institution or the hearing of appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(u) against the remand order or not - HELD THAT - An order of remand made under Order XLI Rule 23 is also having an analogous position being appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(u) with a condition that if no appeal is filed therefrom it cannot be challenged in view of the bar under Section 105(2). Thus the order of remand would have an independent existence and if any person is aggrieved thereby he would have no other alternative but to appeal from it otherwise he would be precluded from disputing its correctness later on. The law gives to the person aggrieved by the order of remand a right to appeal and that right cannot be taken away only for the reason that a final order has been passed consequent to the remand either before or after a person files an appeal against the remand order. So long as his appeal is otherwise in order he would have a right to be heard and such an appeal cannot be dismissed on the mere ground that another appeal has not been filed from the final order passed by the trial court consequent to the remand. The effect of reversal of the order of remand under Order XLI Rule 23 would be that anything done in pursuance of such an order would ipso facto cease to have any effect and the trial court would have no jurisdiction to pass any further order in the case. The contention raised by the respondent that the final order passed by the trial court which is the result of the remand made by the first appellate court would survive the reversal of the remand order would therefore lead to an apparent logical inconsistency and the argument would be unsupportable. The right to appeal against the order of remand would not be lost merely because the party concerned has contested the proceedings in the trial court after the remand. It goes without saying that if the order of remand is ultimately reversed on the appeal against it the subsequent order passed by the trial court which depends for its validity on the earlier order of remand would ipso facto cease to have effect. The subsequent proceedings conducted in pursuance of an order of remand would be subordinate and dependent and would be liable to be superseded by the reversal of the order of remand which is subject matter of appeal before a higher forum - The final order in its nature being dependent and subordinate as it has been passed as a consequence of the proceedings directed and controlled by the remand order when the said order is set aside the final order stands superseded automatically. The order passed by the trial court consequent to the order of remand therefore cannot remain in force if the remand order on which it is dependent is reversed in appeal. Thus an appeal against an order of remand properly presented and otherwise in order would not be rendered defunct or inconsequential by the passing of a final order giving effect to the terms of the remand order. The appealability of the remand order passed under Order XLI Rule 23 would in no manner be affected by the passing of a final order consequent to the remand - The objections raised to the maintainability of the appeal are therefore held to be legally unsustainable. List for admission on 27.09.2023 as fresh.
The core legal question considered in this judgment is whether the passing of a final order by the trial court pursuant to an appellate court's order of remand extinguishes or bars the right of appeal against the remand order itself under Order XLIII, Rule 1(u) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). The Court also examined the interplay between the statutory right of appeal against an order of remand and the consequences of Section 105(2) CPC, which bars raising objections in an appeal against the final decree that could have been raised in an appeal against the remand order.
Another related issue was the effect of a subsequent final order passed by the trial court after remand on the maintainability and efficacy of an appeal against the remand order. The respondents contended that since the trial court had passed the final order on the remanded issue, the appeal against the remand order had become redundant and without purpose. The appellant contested this, asserting the statutory right to appeal against the remand order remains unaffected by the subsequent trial court order. The Court's analysis began by examining the relevant statutory provisions under the CPC, particularly Order XLIII, Rule 1(u), which expressly grants a right of appeal against an order of remand where an appeal lies against the appellate court's decree. Section 105(2) was also pivotal, as it precludes a party from challenging in an appeal against the final decree any objection that could have been raised in an appeal against the remand order. The Court emphasized that the right of appeal against the remand order is a substantial statutory right, and no express provision in the Code limits or extinguishes this right merely because the trial court has passed a consequential order pursuant to the remand. Relying on precedent and statutory interpretation principles, the Court held that the appeal against the remand order retains independent existence and cannot be rendered infructuous or barred simply because the trial court disposed of the remanded issue before or during the pendency of the appeal. The Court cited the decision in Kanakaya v. Lakshmayya and various High Court rulings on analogous issues regarding appeals from preliminary decrees versus final decrees, drawing an analogy to illustrate that preliminary orders or remand orders have independent appealability, and the passing of a final order does not extinguish the right to appeal the preliminary order. The Court reasoned that if the right of appeal against the remand order were to be denied on the ground that the trial court had already passed a final order on the remanded issue, it would create a serious prejudice and logical inconsistency. The party would be forced to appeal against a trial court order that may be unimpeachable, while being barred from challenging the remand order itself due to Section 105(2). This would lead to an untenable situation where the statutory right of appeal against the remand order is effectively nullified. Further, the Court explained that the trial court's jurisdiction to pass orders after remand is derivative and dependent on the remand order. If the remand order is set aside on appeal, the trial court's subsequent orders passed pursuant to the remand would ipso facto cease to have effect, as the trial court would lose jurisdiction. Thus, the final order passed by the trial court cannot be said to supersede or validate the remand order; rather, its validity is contingent upon the remand order's validity. The Court also rejected the respondents' contention that the absence of an appeal against the trial court's final order would preserve that order even if the remand order is reversed. It held that since the trial court order is consequential and subordinate to the remand order, reversal of the remand order would render the trial court's order non est. This reasoning underscores the independent and substantial nature of the appeal against the remand order. In addressing the interplay of rights, the Court held that the right to appeal against the remand order and the right to contest proceedings before the trial court pursuant to the remand are independent and not mutually exclusive. Exercising one right does not bar the exercise of the other. Even if a party participates in the trial court proceedings after remand, it does not forfeit the right to appeal the remand order. If the remand order is ultimately reversed, all subsequent proceedings dependent on it would be superseded. Summarizing the Court's conclusions:
In essence, the Court firmly established that the appeal against an order of remand has an independent and continuing existence, unaffected by subsequent trial court orders passed pursuant to the remand. The statutory scheme envisages a separate and substantial right to challenge the remand order, and this right cannot be curtailed by procedural developments or the passage of subsequent orders. The Court thus rejected the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal and held that the appeal against the remand order is legally sustainable and must be heard on merits.
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