2025 (4) TMI 1660 - HC - GST

Condonation of delay in filing appeal - Time Limitation - rejection of appeal on the ground that the same was filed beyond the maximum period of four months from the date of communication of the order appealed against - HELD THAT - The Hon ble Division Bench in S.K. Chakraborty and Sons 2023 (12) TMI 290 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT held that since the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 have not been expressly or impliedly excluded by Section 107 of the Act of 2017 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 Section 5 of the Act of 1963 stands attracted - Thus it is well settled that in the absence of specific exclusion of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 it would be improper to read an implied exclusion thereof. After going through the impugned order this Court finds that the appellate authority rejected the appeal on the ground that the same was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation from the date of communication of the order appealed against - The appellate authority did not consider the prayer for condonation of delay on its merit. By applying the ratio laid down by the Hon ble Division Bench in S.K. Chakraborty and Sons this Court is of the considered view that the appellate authority was not justified in rejecting the appeal petition solely on the ground that the same was filed beyond the maximum period of four months - this Court is inclined to interfere with the order impugned. Appeal allowed.

Summary

The core legal questions considered by the Court include: (1) whether the appellate authority under Section 107 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (WBGST Act) and the corresponding SGST Act has the power to condone delay in filing an appeal beyond the prescribed limitation period; (2) the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to appeals under the WBGST Act; and (3) the binding nature of a Division Bench decision of the High Court in light of a stay order passed by the Supreme Court on a special leave petition challenging that decision.

Regarding the first issue, the relevant legal framework comprises Section 107 of the WBGST Act, which prescribes a limitation period of four months for filing appeals against orders of adjudication, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which empowers courts or authorities to condone delay in filing appeals or applications beyond the prescribed period if sufficient cause is shown. The Division Bench decision in S.K. Chakraborty and Sons held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under Section 107 of the WBGST Act because the latter does not expressly or impliedly exclude the Limitation Act's provisions, particularly by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court emphasized that the absence of a non-obstante clause or any express exclusion in Section 107 means that the general law of limitation and the power to condone delay under Section 5 remain applicable.

The State contended that the Division Bench decision in S.K. Chakraborty and Sons is not binding due to a stay order passed by the Supreme Court on a special leave petition filed against that decision. However, the Court relied on the precedent set by a Coordinate Bench in Pijush Kanti Chowdhury, which clarified that a stay order by the Supreme Court on a pending appeal does not amount to a declaration of law and does not undermine the binding effect of the High Court's judgment as a precedent. The stay is binding only on the parties to the appeal and does not negate the legal proposition laid down by the High Court unless the Supreme Court expressly overrules it. Therefore, the Court rejected the State's submission and held that the Division Bench decision remains binding.

Applying these principles to the facts, the appellate authority had rejected the petitioner's appeal solely on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed four-month period, without considering the petitioner's prayer for condonation of delay on merits. This was found to be legally erroneous because the appellate authority is empowered to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act unless expressly excluded, which is not the case here. The Court held that the appellate authority ought to have considered the application for condonation of delay and decided it on merits after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties.

The Court thus set aside and quashed the impugned order rejecting the appeal on limitation grounds without merit consideration. The application for condonation of delay was restored to the appellate authority's file, and the appellate authority was directed to decide the application in accordance with law and after hearing the parties.

In conclusion, the Court established the following significant holdings:

"Since provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 have not been expressly or impliedly excluded by Section 107 of the Act of 2017 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963, Section 5 of the Act of 1963 stands attracted."

"Section 107 does not have a non- obstante clause rendering Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 non-applicable. In absence of specific exclusion of the Section 5 of the Act of 1963 it would be improper to read an implied exclusion thereof."

"The effect of the order of stay in a pending appeal before the Apex Court does not amount to 'any declaration of law' but is only binding upon the parties to the said proceedings and at the same time, such interim order does not destroy the binding effect of the judgement of the High Court as a precedent."

These principles underscore that limitation periods prescribed under special statutes do not automatically exclude the general law of limitation unless expressly stated, and appellate authorities must consider condonation applications on merits. Moreover, interim stay orders by the Supreme Court do not diminish the binding nature of High Court precedents unless expressly overruled.

The final determination was that the appellate authority's rejection of the appeal solely on limitation grounds without considering the condonation application was unjustified. The appellate authority was directed to reconsider the condonation application and decide it on merits in accordance with law, thereby ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to the applicable legal framework.