2004 (5) TMI 627 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered by the Court were:

• Whether the accused, who had been treated as an approver in other related cases, was entitled to be treated as an approver in the present prosecution as well.
• Whether the Court had discretion to reject the prosecution's and accused's joint request to treat the accused as an approver under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), or whether the Court was bound to accept such a request.
• The scope and nature of the Court's jurisdiction in granting pardon and treating an accused as an approver, particularly in light of precedents and statutory provisions.
• Whether the accused's plea of "not guilty" after charges were framed affected his entitlement or ability to be treated as an approver.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Entitlement of the accused to be treated as an approver in the present case given prior approver status in other related cases

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court examined the provisions of Sections 306 and 307 of the CrPC which empower the Magistrate or the Court to tender pardon to a person directly or indirectly concerned in an offence on certain conditions, effectively allowing such a person to turn approver. The Court also considered the Supreme Court's decision in State (Delhi Administration) v. Jaggit Singh, which rejected the argument that an accused treated as an approver in one case cannot be so treated in another, even if he is an accused in other cases.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that prior treatment as an approver in other cases does not create an obligation to treat the accused as an approver in the present case. Each prosecution is distinct, and the Court has discretion to decide whether to accept the accused as an approver in the specific case before it.

Key evidence and findings: The accused was a prime accused in the present case, involving substantial misappropriation. The Court below found it inappropriate to treat him as an approver given the gravity and particulars of this case.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principle that the approver status is not automatically transferable across cases, especially where the accused's role in the present case was significant and the Court found it necessary to retain him as an accused.

Treatment of competing arguments: The accused argued that being an approver in other fodder scam cases and the prosecution's agreement entitled him to approver status here. The Court rejected this, emphasizing judicial discretion and case-specific considerations.

Conclusion: The Court concluded that the accused was not entitled as a matter of right to be treated as an approver in the present case merely because he had been so treated elsewhere.

Issue 2: Whether the Court is bound to accept the prosecution's recommendation to treat an accused as an approver or has discretion to refuse

Relevant legal framework and precedents: Sections 306 and 307 CrPC vest the power to tender pardon in the Magistrate or Court. The Court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Pascal Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra, which clarified the role of the Court and prosecution in the approver process. The Court also examined the distinction between judicial power to grant pardon (Section 306) and executive power to withdraw prosecution (Section 321), as noted in Bawa Faqir Singh v. Emperor.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court rejected the contention that the Court is a mere rubber stamp bound to accept a contract between prosecution and accused regarding approver status. It held that while the prosecution's recommendation is important, the Court retains ultimate discretion to grant or refuse pardon and to treat an accused as an approver.

Key evidence and findings: The Court noted that the Special Judge gave sound and justifiable reasons for refusing to treat the accused as an approver, including the accused's role as a prime accused and the nature of the offence.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principle that the power to grant pardon is judicial and discretionary, not merely contractual, and that the Court must be satisfied that granting approver status is appropriate under the circumstances.

Treatment of competing arguments: The accused's counsel argued that the sovereign power to grant pardon lies with the prosecution and that the Court must accept the prosecution's recommendation. This was rejected based on statutory provisions and judicial precedents emphasizing the Court's independent role.

Conclusion: The Court concluded that the Court has jurisdiction and discretion to refuse to treat an accused as an approver even if the prosecution supports it, and the lower Court's refusal was within jurisdiction and reasonable.

Issue 3: Effect of accused's plea of "not guilty" on his claim to be treated as an approver

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court referred to the procedural context where after framing charges and the accused pleading "not guilty," the scope for claiming approver status is diminished.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court reasoned that once the accused has pleaded "not guilty," it is inconsistent to pursue approver status, which involves cooperation with the prosecution and typically a plea of guilt or conditional pardon.

Key evidence and findings: The accused had pleaded "not guilty" after charges were framed, indicating a denial of involvement rather than cooperation.

Application of law to facts: The Court held that the accused's plea of "not guilty" reduced the appropriateness and scope for treating him as an approver at that stage.

Treatment of competing arguments: The accused sought approver status despite the plea. The Court found this untenable and a factor supporting the refusal to grant approver status.

Conclusion: The plea of "not guilty" entered by the accused militated against his claim to approver status and reduced the scope for judicial interference in the refusal to grant it.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"The power to actually grant pardon is vested in the Court. When the power to grant pardon is vested in the Court, it necessarily follows that a right to refuse it is also in the Court."

"It is not for the Special Judge to enter the ring as a veritable director of prosecution. The power which the Special Judge exercises is not on his behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency, and must, therefore, be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the request."

"The Court has discretion in the matter of acceding to a request to treat one of the accused as an approver and it was not merely a matter of contract between the prosecution and one of the accused."

"Once the accused has pleaded 'not guilty' to the charge framed against him, the scope for interference by this Court in revision has become considerably less even if it has not vanished altogether."

Core principles established include:

• The Court retains judicial discretion to grant or refuse approver status and is not bound by the prosecution's recommendation.
• The grant of pardon under Sections 306 and 307 CrPC is a judicial function, not a mere contractual arrangement between prosecution and accused.
• Prior treatment of an accused as an approver in other cases does not create an automatic right to approver status in a separate prosecution.
• An accused's plea of "not guilty" reduces the appropriateness of treating him as an approver at the trial stage.

Final determinations on each issue were that the Court below acted within jurisdiction and reason in refusing to treat the accused as an approver, and the revision petition challenging that refusal was dismissed. The accused was properly retained in the array of accused and charges were rightly framed against him.