2024 (5) TMI 1595 - SC - Indian Laws

Refusal to quash a summoning order - Existence of sufficient material against the Appellant prompting the Trial Court to pass a summoning order u/s 319 Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT - The degree of satisfaction required to exercise power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is well settled. The evidence before the trial court should be such that if it goes unrebutted then it should result in the conviction of the person who is sought to be summoned. As is evident the degree of satisfaction that is required to exercise power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is much stricter considering that it is a discretionary and an extra-ordinary power. Only when the evidence is strong and reliable can the power be exercised. It requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The appellants were named in the first information statement however in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C PW-1 clarified that the names of appellants were written in the FIR falsely and without full information. She has also stated that the appellants were not involved in the murder of her son. Even in the charge sheet the names of the appellants were not mentioned as accused. It is only in her deposition before the Trial Court the names of the accused resurfaces again. There are no other witnesses who have deposed against the appellants. There is no documentary evidence that the prosecution had collected against the appellants. There is absolutely no role that is attributed to the appellants. The deposition of PW-1 is also in line and consistent with her statement under Section 161. When these factors are looked in a holistic manner it would be clear that the higher degree of satisfaction that is required for exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is not met in the present case. The Trial Court committed a serious error in allowing the application under Section 319 and issuing summons to the appellants. The High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 and quashed the order - The High Court having failed to quash the order of summons dated 24.08.2017 it is inclined to allow these appeals and set-aside the order passed by the Trial Court dated 24.08.2017. Appeal allowed.

Summary

ISSUES:

Whether there was sufficient material on record to exercise the power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. to summon persons not originally charge-sheeted to face trial for an offence under Section 302 IPC.What is the degree of satisfaction required by a court to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C.?Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the summoning order passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

RULINGS / HOLDINGS:

The Court held that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is "a discretionary and an extraordinary power" which "is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant." It requires "strong and cogent evidence" that if unrebutted, "may lead to conviction" of the person sought to be summoned.It was found that the evidence against the persons summoned was insufficient, as the only witness who named them was not an eyewitness and had contradicted herself in statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and in trial deposition, stating the names were included "falsely without collecting full information" and "on the basis of suspicion."The Court concluded that the Trial Court erred in exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the High Court should have quashed the summoning order under its Section 482 jurisdiction. Both orders were set aside accordingly.

RATIONALE:

The Court applied the legal framework established by the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, which clarified that the word "appear" in Section 319 Cr.P.C. means "seems" and imposes a higher threshold than mere prima facie case but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.The Court emphasized that the evidence must be "strong and reliable" and more than a "mere probability of complicity" to justify summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C.The Court noted that the first informant's initial FIR named the appellants based on suspicion and old enmity, but her subsequent Section 161 statement and the charge sheet excluded them, and no other evidence implicated them.The Court underscored that the extraordinary power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised on casual or cavalier grounds and must be supported by cogent evidence from the prosecution's case.The High Court's reliance on the existence of a prima facie case at the Section 482 stage was deemed insufficient given the higher degree of satisfaction required under Section 319 Cr.P.C.